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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Shadow Standards and the Logic of Costs:  
Care, Stewardship, and Data in U.S. Community Health 
by  
Margarite J. Whitten 
 
 
Advisor: Dána-Ain Davis 
 
This dissertation examines the delegation of responsibility for providing health care to particular 
categories of marginalized populations in the United States in the absence of a uniform and 
universal health care system. It explores how the U.S. federal government governs patient 
populations at a distance by mandating that healthcare providers collect, produce, and report on 
patient data. Drawing from eighteen months of ethnographic research in Massachusetts clinics 
for the homeless and the frail elderly between 2014-2015, I argue that when marginalized 
patients are unable to satisfy the neoliberal ideal of self-governance to maintain their health in 
cost-effective ways, providers are activated to bring them into compliance. Through the lens of 
political economic, science and technology studies, and critical medical anthropologies, I 
identified how reimbursement models and government funding requirements redesigned under 
the 2010 Affordable Care Act obligate health care providers to reframe the care they provide. 
Providers cultivate what I term the “logic of costs,” a budgetary lens for making care decisions 
that frames management of costs as essential to care. Data creation and reporting practices 
require providers to adopt a logic of costs, as such data informs whether their clinics will be 
 vi 
deemed effective and the clinics’ funding reauthorized. I trace the incongruities between actual 
care practices and the metrics that clinics end up recording and submitting to represent their 
work and their patients. I argue that this work is made possible through the creation of “shadow 
standards,” unofficial, undocumented, and yet routinized healthcare practices that make the 
creation and reporting of health data possible, even when providers do not have the resources to 
comply.  
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Chapter 1 | Introduction 
 
“In God We Trust; All Others Must Provide Data”1 
My first field site at Saint Catherine’s2 is a Health Care for the Homeless (HCH) 
Program. A nurse practitioner sits on a couch in the living room of an addiction rehabilitation 
group home, a blocky black laptop balanced on her knees. A sigh escapes her mouth in a 
frustrated rush. From across the coffee table, the second patient of the morning picks restlessly at 
a throw pillow embroidered with Santa Claus. The internet signal has disappeared again. The 
nurse practitioner pulls a yellow legal pad from her backpack, and leans into the white afghan 
behind her in resignation. Now closed, the laptop is demoted to a lap desk. She charts visits by 
hand, building on patient history from memory. An hour later, when the wireless card in the 
outdated laptop finally connects, she begins to type her notes from the morning’s patient visits 
into the Electronic Medical Record. As it loads, she realizes she forgot to screen her patients for 
smoking cessation, a requirement for funding. She has 72 hours to finish the note, lock the digital 
file, and submit it for billing. But she closes the laptop and rushes out the door to her truck 
instead, so as not to be late to her next appointment.  
When she reaches the main clinic, there is a three-inch stack of paper in her inbox that 
was faxed over the weekend, patient records from other clinics. The Electronic Medical Record 
(EMR) systems at the many clinical sites each patient has attended cannot communicate directly 
with this clinic’s EMR. Another provider3 will scan and attach the full referred files to each 
 
1 Unattributable adage, referencing the United States motto, which appears on U.S. currency. It is often 
misattributed to W. Edwards Deming, an American statistician often credited with educating the Japanese 
business sector after World War II, and inspiring Toyota’s kaizen management model. 
2 This is a pseudonym, as are all personal names, to protect the identities of research participants. 
3 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “provider” to encompass the multiple professional 
designations that participate in health care encounters. In my field sites, this includes physicians, nurse 
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digital patient chart, but they will not be searchable, and data from the scans cannot populate the 
EMR with information about the patient. Instead, the nurse practitioner will have to hand type 
the information from the faxed files into each patient’s digital file, to ensure everyone who sees 
each patient will know the date and results of her last pap smear, or hospitalization, or 
vaccination. But she has five more visits scheduled for today, and there are already a couple of 
walk-ins waiting. She puts the faxed files into a reusable grocery bag. By the end of her shift, she 
will have accumulated a dozen half-written, unlocked notes from the day to add to the pile of 
faxed patient records. She will spend a few hours after dinner, off the clock, trying to catch up. 
My second field site at Saint Catherine’s is a Program for All-Inclusive Care of the 
Elderly (PACE), a program for elders frail enough to qualify for a nursing home, but who wish 
to be cared for in their homes or Assisted Living Facilities. The program is funded entirely by 
Medicare and Medicaid (CMS), and becomes the patient’s exclusive health care team and 
insurance provider. The Program Director, Medical Director, Clinical Nurse Manager, 
Occupational Therapist, and Social Worker sit together for M&M, drolly eating the eponymous 
chocolate candies. The Morbidity and Mortality meeting is designed to identify errors in patient 
care that have led to unnecessary hospitalizations or medical crises. They discuss a patient who 
was hospitalized on Saturday. The woman has an Anxiety Disorder and Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease (COPD), a progressive lung condition that make her feel like she can’t 
breathe. COPD raises the risk of heart attack by a third, so the patient may mistake her shortness 
 
practitioners, certified nurse specialists, registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, certified mental 
health counselors, social workers, case managers, physical therapists, and occupational therapists. These 
specific professional roles and qualifications will be presented when individual interlocutors are 
introduced. 
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of breath for cardiac arrest. Together they fill out the form CMS requires for each “Potentially 
Avoidable Hospitalization.” 
The Medical Director says the Emergency Department (ED) note reads like a grocery list 
from all the tests that were ordered, the costs piling up: “What could have prevented this visit?” 
The Social Worker says, “COPD and anxiety don’t go well together. And she’s full code,” 
meaning the patient wants all life-saving interventions attempted as she dies. COPD is the third 
most common cause of death in the country. The Occupational Therapist says, “I can see her 
demanding to go to the ED without needing to.” The Medical Director asks, “How do we prevent 
a next time?” The patient takes her medications by herself. They decide to provide a home visit 
nurse to check on her medications, make sure she’s taking her Clonazepam for Anxiety, Protonix 
to reduce stomach acid, and order Carafate to treat ulcers in case she needs it. They want to re-
educate her to always call them first, and not to rush off the ED each time she’s in pain. But they 
can’t make her. The Occupational Therapist shakes her head, “She’s like a running locomotive.” 
In the eighteen months I spent at Saint Catherine’s, a non-profit Catholic hospital in 
western Massachusetts, it became clear not only how intensively data is collected, organized, and 
summarized in reports, but also how ambiguous and disjointed the process can be. There are 
crucial unspoken assumptions in the intensive reliance on data for the managing of health care, 
from the level of the clinic up to that of national policy. It assumes that there is a shared 
understanding of what the data is, that it is collected and produced consistently, and that it 
accurately represents care encounters and outcomes. It assumes that the measures designed to 
collect data, staff training, and tools are adequate. It assumes that care interactions are 
standardized, and can be routinely quantified. It assumes patients, providers, and those directing 
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the data collection all want the same outcomes, and will behave accordingly. Fractures between 
the expectations and reality of data permeate health care.  
As these clinical contexts illustrate, the creation and use of data is far less straightforward 
than they are usually presented. Providers are unable to replicate the ideal clinical encounter, as 
determined by a matrix of funding sources, federal policies, and professional standards. They are 
unable to check off or fill in the requisite boxes in the electronic records to demonstrate their 
compliance and the patient’s progress. In this goal, technology fails them. Time fails them. 
Patient autonomy fails them. In their roles as clinical bureaucrats, they are at times 
problematically positioned in opposition to their patients, whose own goals may not align with 
evidence-based practice. This patient-provider dynamic is intensified in programs such as these, 
where patients would often have historically been institutionalized. These “vulnerable” patients 
— homeless individuals that often are formerly incarcerated or who occupied the locked units of 
mental and behavioral health hospitals, and older individuals eligible for nursing home care due 
to their age and frailty—are now less likely to be wholly controlled by the state in asylums and 
privately operated nursing homes. But they are not deemed fully autonomous by the state either. 
They require help to navigate the health care system in a way deemed appropriate. What is 
appropriate is tied up in what is efficient, inseparable from costs and health outcomes. 
As data is increasingly relied on to redesign, legislate, and fund health care in the United 
States, having a clear understanding of what counts as evidence becomes all the more urgent. In 
this dissertation, I seek to intervene in narratives of efficiency and improvement by examining 
where data is created, and how the process of its production skews, misrepresents, or 
oversimplifies the experience of patients and the providers who care for them. By focusing on 
the site of data production in clinical settings, it becomes possible to capture how the various 
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ways providers interact with and manage patient data becomes an essential form of care. Health 
care providers serving vulnerable populations spend most of their work days tending to data. 
They type their patients’ words and symptoms into EMRs during appointments, deliberate how 
and where to capture patient information in records and reports with their colleagues, and 
painstakingly copy handwritten and faxed records into their patient’s records once they have 
returned home for the day. Their commitment to their patients is made evident through the 
burden of paperwork, increasingly but not comprehensively digitized, but moreover in the ways 
they understand its importance. The frame of care that they use is wide. It includes the holistic 
picture of each patient’s health in line with nursing and interdisciplinary models, but the broader 
landscapes of financing and evolving health standards are also always in view. These providers 
are well aware that the representations of their patients that they capture and report can become 
codified into standards of best practice, policies, and reimbursement paradigms. Taking care of 
the data ensures that they can care for their patients. Data work ceases to be just an interruption 
to care; it is care. 
In assessing the gravity of data creation in these clinical contexts, I join many other social 
scientists in experiencing epistemological tension: despite our critiques, evidence-based practice 
has great potential4. Critical analysis is needed, and yet the emergence of evidence-based 
practice represents an important departure from clinical decision-making that relied on the 
professional experience and accompanying biases of individual providers, or “eminence-based” 
practice (Ecks 2008, S88). In this vein, Anthropologist Stefan Ecks has argued for an “Evidence-
Based Medical Anthropology,” by which he proposes anthropologists study evidence-based 
 
4 The tension and potential of evidence-based practice are not limited to health care contexts, having been 
frequently evoked in the field of education as well. In addition to the “audit culture” critiques (Strathern 
2000), sociologist Sue Clegg (2005) has expressed doubt that, “the evidence-based movement as it is 
constituted does provide a basis for emancipatory critique” due to professional power dynamics. 
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practice, investigate how it is used, and examine our own disciplinary standards for evidence. 
However, such an approach does not fully alleviate the tension, even for those who straddle both 
professional worlds. Obstetrician and medical anthropologist Claire Wendlund has noted the 
importance and potential benefit of Evidence-Based Medicine, but also cautions that it is “no 
more exempt from social construction, from partial perspective, than any other [form of 
evidence]” (2007, 228). In examining the clinical trials that informed new evidence-based 
obstetrical standards, Wendlund identified how they support the routinization of cesarean 
sections by excluding and therefore devaluing the evidence of maternal experiences, priorities, 
and perspectives. Patient narratives are essential forms of evidence in anthropological research, 
as they reveal facets of medical practice unexamined by randomized control trials and large 
aggregated datasets, such as the “obstetric racism” experienced by Black women in the work of 
anthropologist Dána-Ain Davis (2019). It is tempting to argue that when combined with the 
detail and specificity of qualitative analysis such as that offered by medical anthropologists, 
evidence-based medicine and its attendant standardized approaches could make patient care 
more equitable. Yet caution remains. Attentive to the power differential between medical and 
anthropological forms of knowledge (Ecks 2008), anthropologists like Helen Lambert (2006) 
question whether epidemiologists and anthropologists could reconcile their methodological 
differences enough to develop a stronger, multi-method approach. It remains to be seen whether 
medical professionals will have any incentive to do so.  
 Rather than examining how the data is “cooked” from start to finish, as medical 
anthropologist Crystal Biruk recounts in her work on public health research in Malawi (2018), 
my lens remains on providers. The care work they engage in has increasingly recast them as an 
interface connecting vulnerable patients, and the government agencies that exert influence over 
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their care. Recent studies of data have shed critical light on how the biases of programmers, 
commercial interests in the information economy, and users are embedded in data technologies 
like search engines and databases (Noble 2018). Racism, sexism, homophobia, and other 
bigotries become coded into digital information, tainting the data that users access, and the 
decisions, such as racial profiling in policing, that are made as a result (Roberts 2011). Such 
interventions are essential because without such scrutiny, data comes to be viewed as neutral, 
impartial to the social context in which it is generated. While this lens is vital, I take a different 
tack. In this dissertation, rather than focusing on the people who create the rubrics, I remain 
attentive to those who fill them out. Feminist scholars of science and technology over the last 
few decades have challenged assumptions and contentions that technologies and scientific 
innovations are simply oriented towards their intended uses (Caspar 1998, Clarke and Montini 
1993, Martin 2001, Oudshoorn 1990, Taylor 2008, Traweek 1988). Users themselves inform 
what innovations and technologies mean, and assert their own needs during use, sharing control 
over their definitions with their original designers (Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003). The concerns 
that inform what data creation looks like on the ground in clinical settings is just as important as 
the guidelines that compel such creation. In order to understand what the data we have come to 
rely on so profoundly in health care means, we need ethnographic insight into where and how it 
comes into being, and what remains uninscribed. 
The technological failure described in the first ethnographic example from HCH initiates 
a cascade effect. Inability to access the internet leads to the provider resorting to paper 
documentation practices, and being unable to see previously collected data about the patient’s 
history, requiring the provider to elicit such information again when she is unable to access it 
from memory. Paper documentation practices means not having access to the list of screening 
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questions which result in data used in reporting and reimbursement. The lack of interoperability 
of the various EMR systems, and the requirement to maintain as complete a record as possible 
for each patient from a variety of sources, adds to the record-building work the provider must do. 
Both forms of technological failure, of internet and EMR compatibility, duplicates work for the 
provider who will have to type notes she has handwritten as well as the content of faxed forms. 
Finally, in order to secure funding, the provider must bring work home to finish typing and 
following protocol for submitting within a set timeframe, in order to be reimbursed for the work. 
Reimbursement frames the organization and delivery of care. That providers are required to use 
faulty, incomplete technology for which they may not be adequately trained, both increases their 
work burden, and necessitates work-arounds in order to complete the work. This is so common 
that providers have had to develop their own routine standards that are not part of formal reports, 
but which enable those reports to exist, which I have come through my research to call “shadow 
standards.” The urgency behind their creation can be attributed to what I call the “logic of costs,” 
of ensuring their clinic—and therefore their patients—are not penalized for a failure to provide 
adequate care. As care is assessed through compilations of data, quality of care is only as good as 
the quality of data reported about it. Care thus becomes a process of caring for costs and for data 
in the context of contemporary health clinics. 
In the second ethnographic example, the PACE participant’s failure to comply with the 
program’s hospitalization procedures results in the care team not being able to influence her 
decisions. Bypassing PACE results in unchecked hospital spending on tests the team would have 
vetoed. PACE then has to pay the hospital for these costs regardless, as the participant’s insurer, 
impacting the available remaining funds for all program participants for the rest of the year. The 
participant’s right to make her own decisions clashes with the health team’s duty to guide her to 
 9 
“best” care practices, such as taking prescribed medications or following the approved channels 
to seek care. The PACE team then has to justify the event to the program funders, describing a 
plan to prevent repeat incidence, which translates to efforts to influence patient behavior. In this 
example, funding again informs how care is organized and delivered, but it is the patients here 
that are faulty. Patient decisions do not necessarily comply with provider-designated care plans, 
plans which take individual patient lives and priorities into account, but which are still largely 
guided by professional best practices and funding requirements.  
However, the requirement to care for costs and data frequently comes into conflict with 
the purpose these programs exist separately from traditional medical models in the first place: 
“non-compliance.” Despite efforts in both HCH and PACE to approach patients “where they are” 
and take seriously their priorities and unique progress trajectories, reporting requirements—for 
the twin purposes of contributing to public health data and for funding—reinforce provider 
obligations to bring patients into compliance with proscribed behaviors that improve care and/or 
control costs. 
This dissertation intervenes at the juncture between these three things: health care costs, 
data, and provider responsibility for patient compliance. In doing so, I employ social science 
literatures on policy, documentation, and science and technology studies (STS), to situate data in 
the form of health records and reports. Furthermore, the subjects of this research are mid-level 
bureaucrats, as I show community health providers to be, using an intersectional approach to 
examine the still largely female work of providing care, and the racialized segmentation that 
distributes data creation responsibility and recognition differentially across clinical staff. I follow 
from anthropologist and Australian health bureaucrat Tess Lea’s analysis of government-
deployed health service work in this approach, as she described in a collaborative essay the 
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importance of examining, “the interface between technology and regulatory regimes” (De la 
Cadena 2015, 451). Lea’s ethnography of health care for Aboriginal people in Australia takes 
bureaucrats and other health workers as its subjects, just as this dissertation centers the work of 
community health care providers serving marginalized populations. Lea offers the “magic of 
intervention” as a way of understanding how state intervention comes to be repeatedly seen as 
the only solution for health disparities that the state itself created, in the case of Australian 
Aboriginal people, through colonialism (2007, 151). In some respects, the state is posed as 
essential for addressing the health care disparities that exist for those who are homeless and the 
frail elderly, but it is only for funding private industries who must provide the actual care, and 
demonstrate through reporting practices that it is sufficient. The state does not directly provide 
care. 
 This dissertation examines the delegation of responsibility for providing health care to 
particular categories of “vulnerable” populations in the United States in the absence of a uniform 
and universal health care system. It explores how the U.S. federal government governs patient 
populations at a distance by mandating healthcare providers collect, produce, and report on 
patient data. When “vulnerable” patients are unable to satisfy the neoliberal ideal of self-
governing to maintain their health in cost-effective ways, providers are activated to bring them 
into compliance. Requirements for data production, and their use for oversight of clinical 
practice, manipulates how care is provided. As medical anthropologists such as Paul Brodwin 
have demonstrated, documentation practices required and audited by the state become “the prime 
metric of performance, and the surveillance has a pervasive effect on how they get written” 
(2013, 99). As a result of reimbursement models that require proof of efficient care and 
improved health outcomes, this dissertation investigates how health care providers must expand 
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their roles, becoming insurance provider and accountant in order to satisfy government funding 
requirements, activating a logic of costs that views care through a fiscal lens. I trace the 
incongruities between actual care practices and the metrics clinics end up recording and 
submitting to represent their work and their patients.  
 In modern U.S. health systems, caring for costs has become inseparable from caring for 
health. I use the concept of responsibilization (Rose 2001, Trnka & Trundle 2017) to specifically 
describe the ways that individuals become tasked with obligations instead of government 
agencies, as a neoliberal strategy of governance. As medical anthropologist Paul Brodwin has 
argued in his work on community-based psychiatry outreach in the United States, frontline 
providers “inherit responsibility for the most disabled and marginalized individuals” (2013, 3), 
keeping them out of institutions and safe in the community despite having little or no control 
over structural barriers such as housing, or personal barriers such as a patient’s own will. When 
patients qualify for government assistance programs for their medical care, and especially when 
they have a history of high spending through use of emergency services, responsibility shifts 
from the patient as consumer to the provider as steward. Providers’ responsibility to improve or 
maintain the health of their patients is matched by a responsibility to be cost-effective. Data 
collection practices should be understood as ways of accounting for costs as well as care. This 
dissertation examines clinics with different funding mechanisms to better illuminate how data 
collection differently constructs clinical practice, depending on the dynamics of reimbursement. 
In other words, to be data-driven is not just to commit to evidence-based “best practices,” but to 
transform patient-provider interactions and care. Practices are changed to accommodate 
insufficient resources or patient “non-compliance.” Providers are responsibilized to constantly 
demonstrate this commitment through data collection activities, where they document and 
 12 
acknowledge mistakes, atone for them with contingency plans for next time, and explain why 
they should not lose their funding. In this way, providers are made responsible for maintaining 
the existence of the health care safety net as well5.  
 
Shadow Standards & Logic of Costs 
This dissertation is framed by two theoretical insights that I have terms the logic of costs 
and shadow standards. The logic of costs is a budgetary lens that providers have to develop when 
care financing mechanisms involve them in some way, and it casts interest in costs as care – 
balancing budgets, stewarding resources, reporting to funding agencies – in order to ensure 
funding persists, and their care work can continue. It is often the clinics serving the most 
marginalized that have the least access to data resources to ensure data creation and collection 
that results in reimbursement and continued grant funding, and this is where providers have to 
innovate. Providers create workarounds to ensure that care is delivered and that the data about it 
is collected and reported. Shadow standards are unofficial but become routine, and make the 
reporting expectations seem reasonable, when the data collected is often partial or arbitrary to the 
care actually being delivered. 
The logic of costs was inspired by anthropologist Annemarie Mol’s ethnography The 
Logic of Care (2008). Mol proposes the logic of care as a recognition of how care is actually 
conceptualized and illnesses managed, particularly for people with chronic health issues. In her 
research with people with diabetes, she found that care is an everyday process that includes a 
team of many people including the patient, providers, and loved ones. Her insights in this 
processual, shared form of caring is contrasted with the logic of choice, which she defines as 
 
5 Sarah Horton (2006) describes this as a “double burden” for these providers.  
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treating care as a consumer product and patients as citizens with autonomy to make their own 
decisions about their bodies. She critiques both of these representations for burdening patients 
with care decisions that do not actually empower them because they do not control the options, 
and for making it appear as if they have meaningful choices about their bodies which have 
frailties and illnesses that they can only manage instead of cure. The logic of care is an important 
contribution to medical anthropology, and our understanding of care. However, in her analysis, 
Mol intentionally and explicitly leaves out context that I find essential for understanding care in 
the United States: 
Even if I talk about ‘the market,’ the complex issue of how to best finance 
health care will be bracketed. As will be the role of insurance companies. I 
will not consider the effects of various combinations of state regulation 
and market ordering for how professionals end up working. I will also skip 
questions about the lessons managers of health-care institutions might 
learn from banks, shops and hotels (Mol 2008, 27) 
I intervene in these brackets. In my research with health care providers in community settings, 
financing and regulation were inextricable from explanations of how care was conceptualized 
and delivered. The models of care available to Medicare and Medicaid patients exist in so far as 
they have been approved through channels of federal financing and regulation. Health care 
providers navigate factors such as these constantly, as they bear strongly on care in this country6. 
The logic of costs seeks to address the ways in which care itself is constituted by 
financial considerations: which care resources are accessible to which patients, where the care 
takes place, how much time patients have with providers, and what patient-provider interactions 
consist of. Mol writes, “even in moments that leave a lot to be desired, health-care professionals 
 
6 It is possible that at least part of Mol’s bracketing can be explained by the differences between our field 
sites. Mol’s work took place in the Netherlands, which is consistently rated as a top ten country for health 
care quality (HAQ Index, Commonwealth Fund, Legatum Institute Prosperity Index healthcare rating, 
etc.) Whereas the U.S. is 37 in HealthCare Rankings. 
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do not write people off as bad investments” (2008, 22). On the contrary, such a thing happens all 
the time in the U.S. health care system. Physician practices and private hospitals often do not 
accept patients who are insured through Medicaid because there are lower reimbursement rates, 
and patients are poor enough that they cannot be expected to pay the difference between what the 
government will pay and what the hospital is charging. Patients are routinely “fired” from 
provider practices for missing too many appointments, which costs the provider reimbursement 
through lost billing time. Taken at the population level, institutions strategize how to prevent 
groups of patients such as those who are the subject of this dissertation—the frail elderly, the 
homeless, and those on public insurance—from “overutilizing” their emergency departments. 
Such initiatives are often funded by insurance companies in order to save them money in the 
long run by routing these patients to more “appropriate,” and less expensive, types of assistance. 
The logic of costs shapes the form of and access to care from individual providers, to institutions, 
to government agencies. 
In response to the intensity and volume of data creation and reporting requirements 
elicited by the federal agencies7 that fund private programs for vulnerable populations, programs 
are sometimes without the resources (be it money, training, staff, technology, or time) required to 
adequately capture and report data from their clinical encounters. Given the significance that data 
reporting has for clinical funding, such clinics adapt to the increase in data work by developing 
unofficial guidelines by which to conduct their documentation practices. When used routinely to 
accommodate insufficiencies in data creation or reporting, these guidelines become what I have 
termed “shadow standards.” My use of “shadow standards” is informed by three concepts in 
 
7 The federal agency in charge of the HCH grant is the Human Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA), and that in charge of PACE reimbursement is the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS). 
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social science. Anthropologist Larissa Adler Lomnitz’ work on “shadow” or informal exchange 
networks, demonstrates how formal systems of exchange rely on the informal to make up for 
shortages or lags created by bureaucracy. The informal systems, operating in the shadows, serve 
to make the formal systems appear more functional than they are, reinforcing the status quo. 
Political scientist Marie Gottschalk describes the employment-based system of health insurance 
that dominates in the United States as an example of the robust “shadow” welfare state that 
operates largely in the private sector, backed by federal and state policies. As a result of 
collective bargaining between labor unions and employers for health benefits, government health 
insurance remained limited, and access to health care coverage weakened in tandem with unions 
for the majority of Americans insured through their employers. In parallel with Lomnitz’ 
insights, the development of health insurance through the private sector bolstered the appearance 
that the forms of state-controlled insurance limited to the elderly, disabled, and poor were 
sufficient, restricting efforts to reform and broaden access to public health insurance. Sociologist 
Cameron Lynne Macdonald speaks to the role of “shadow” mothers in the outsourcing of 
mothering work to paid nannies or au pairs in the United States. The ideal is for the nannies to 
either follow detailed instructions to parent as the mother would, or they are selected for their 
ability to mimic parenting style intuitively, but always to effectively disappear at the end of the 
shift when the “real” mother returns home from work. Similarly, shadow standards serve a 
purpose in ensuring data is produced, but are intended to disappear so the data appears to stand 
alone. In the end, health care data reporting requirements (like upper class working mothers, the 
formal economy, and work-based social systems) seem to work perfectly well on their own, 
while the carefully orchestrated activities that maintain this impression remain unseen in the 
shadows like stagehands. 
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In the clinical setting, in making data creation and reporting possible despite resource 
deficiencies and questionable processes, shadow standards serve to reinforce the use of such data 
in decision-making about population-level health priorities and funding. Like the shadow 
economy from which I borrow the name, shadow standards are unofficial and uncounted, 
remaining outside of the statistical representations of clinical work. They mask the messiness of 
data production, and enable providers to only submit “clean” numbers to funding agencies (Biruk 
2018), which come to depend on shadow standards, in much the same way that governments 
become dependent on underground systems of exchange (Lomnitz 1988). Once the informally 
standardized work-arounds appear to resolve reporting problems, there is little incentive to invest 
in systemic repair. Despite serious faults in management and reporting systems, stripped down 
numbers serve to reinforce their apparent success in achieving higher quality care. 
 
Field Sites 
The research is situated in Massachusetts, a U.S. state with significant influence over 
health care policies and programs during the last few decades. The Massachusetts health reform 
of 2006 became the model upon which the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was based8. Positioning 
my research in Massachusetts enabled me to observe the impact of established policies that were 
just beginning to be implemented across the nation. As a result of state reform, Massachusetts 
has had the lowest rates of uninsured residents in the country since 2007. This means the 
majority of vulnerable residents had had access to some form of health insurance for nearly a 
 
8 The political history of this policy was fundamentally a conservative effort to control costs, especially 
those from the uninsured, implemented by a Republican governor, but made politically possible through 
the lengthy political maneuvers of Ted Kennedy, first with Clinton and then with Bush (the 1997-2005 
Medicaid waiver and funds for Boston public hospitals; later funds must go to insurance, not hospitals). 
Only possible due to federal support of Medicaid expansion in the state, to try experimenting with reform. 
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decade9. Rather than asking about the access to care in general, this study asked how models of 
care differed for these patient populations. It has become axiomatic to link the poor health 
outcomes, vast disparities, and high costs of care in the United States to the conspicuous absence 
of a nationalized healthcare system. After all, every other politically and economically 
comparable nation has some form of universal healthcare system, in which all residents are 
guaranteed state insurance.10 In the absence of such a system, how does the United States federal 
government understand and enact its responsibility for the healthcare of U.S. citizens? This is 
one of the central questions that guided my research. Though universal health care is identified 
as a progressive priority, Massachusetts and now federal health policy reform have preserved the 
central role of the private insurance market 11. The policies require all residents to be insured, but 
only individuals who are low income, over 64 years of age, or disabled qualify for the federally 
funded public insurance options, Medicare and Medicaid. Even these are increasingly managed 
by private insurance companies. 
In the absence of a national health system, health care is funded through an uncertain 
patchwork of grants, public and private insurance, and non-profit charity care. The federal 
government used tools it already had to expand coverage through the ACA. Rather than 
expanding public health insurance options for all, Medicaid eligibility was broadened to those 
 
9 This question is still important, particularly for immigrant and refugee populations. For example, Heide 
Castañeda’s (2017) work in Texas reveals that the individuals often in the most dire need of health care 
do not enroll, despite eligibility, due in part to fear that it will expose undocumented family members.  
10 This is often described in policy debates as countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD). The World Health Organization’s 2010 World Health Report 
placed the United States 37th out of the 191 countries considered, despite spending more of its Gross 
Domestic Product on health care than any other country. Most of these nations can be described as having 
some form of universal health care system, through insurance access, nationalized programs, or a 
combination. (WHO 2000, OECD 2014) 
11 See Horton et al. (2014) for an anthropological critique of the ACA. 
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within 133% of the federal poverty line12. Grant funding was increased to health centers that care 
for the medically underserved. Enrollment in a health insurance plan was mandated, intending to 
keep costs low by ensuring even people who don’t use very much health care are paying into the 
system. This helped address the goal of greater access to care, insofar as it dramatically 
decreased the number of uninsured in the country13. To achieve affordability, the ACA 
established requirements for greater metrics to prove the quality and efficiency of health care. 
This set the stage for the creation and activation of health data at a new level of intensity. 
I did not start by examining data collection practices. During a pilot study in 2014, I was 
told by the Director of the Health Care for the Homeless program that the future of health care 
would be outside of hospital walls in part because of the high cost of care within them. From her 
position as the head of the Community Health department, the most salient change from the 
ACA was the need to monetize how much the hospital benefits the community, so that the 
amount can be included when the hospital files its taxes, to begin the process of assessing 
whether non-profit hospitals serve the community enough to deserve their tax-exempt status14. I 
 
12 After the 2012 Supreme Court ruling declared States couldn’t be forced to expand Medicaid, 19 states 
opted not to. 
13 While the individual mandate and other provisions of the ACA did serve to increase the number of 
citizens enrolled in health insurance, and therefore eligible for care, it also resulted in new barriers to care. 
For example, Susan Shaw’s (2017) work details how accountability measures required for reimbursement 
under the ACA have made it more difficult for patients to afford and regularly take their medications, due 
to changing approved drugs, increased out-of-pocket costs, and routine clinical check ins to prove 
medication compliance.  
14 “the hospital needs to start to look, really ask itself ‘what are we doing for the community?’ I’m hoping 
within a few months that I will be able to, I can monetize, I don’t know if that’s even a word, how much 
we give in community benefits. I can come up with a dollar amount. You know, 10 million, 7 million. But 
I also want to have a formula on what it would cost us if we did pay taxes, and kind of use that as a 
benchmark. We’re also concerned that our very large healthcare system, it seems that they’re moving in 
the direction that they want to be the leaders in community benefit, so if they’re going to be a leader, then 
we have to be leaders. So they want us all to constantly think of this. So the expansion is just kind of 
looking at the needs of communities, say where can we fit in, since we have such challenging community 
around us, in many areas, whether it’s maternal child health, drugs, opiate overdose, poverty, housing, our 
goals can be endless as to where we’re going. So if I have one big goal for the department, it’s to keep 
embedding this culture of the hospital doing community things, both inside and outside of the hospital, 
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began further research under the premise that hospitals would become decentralized as a result of 
health reform. I understood this to mean that less care would take place in the main hospital 
buildings through in-patient stays, and instead providers would become established in more non-
traditional settings, broadly redefining “out-patient” as anywhere else. Health reform did result in 
dramatic health systems change. Shortly after the ACA was passed, the number of hospital 
mergers and acquisitions doubled, including hospital acquisition of physician practices. Stand-
alone urgent care centers increased by 14%. Retail clinics staffed by nurse practitioners in 
Walgreens, CVS, and Wal-Marts grew by 900%. Some hospital systems partnered with these 
large drugstores, and opened their own urgent care centers to stay competitive. Even as care 
stretched outside of hospital walls, concentration of ownership and control of care condensed, 
the words “merge or perish” repeated like a mantra.15 Saint Catherine’s was part of this shift, 
joining one of the largest non-profit hospital systems in the country just before I began my 
research. 
The answer to how the United States federal government manages its responsibility for 
the health of the most vulnerable residents, is partly answered through collection and audit of 
health care data. Before data can be made meaningful, it has to be made. Towards this aim, this 
dissertation takes as its lens the providers tasked with data production and reporting. Providers 
must manage the competing responsibilities of simultaneously caring for their patients, and 
turning their visits into data points to report to government agencies. This dissertation also 
 
constantly. And getting people to not think of that as just a form I have to fill out once a year, this is what 
we’re doing. So that’s kind of my overarching goal.” [interview August 22, 2014] 
15 These changes do not necessarily represent a new privatization of hospitals in the country. Health care 
was already largely private. From 2005 to 2015, the proportion of non-profit versus for profit community 
hospitals in the United States has remained largely consistent, around sixty and twenty percent, 
respectively. Both non-profit and for-profit hospitals are private, and they operate in largely the same 
ways. However, Medicaid expansion through the ACA resulted in many states privatizing the public 
option, paying private insurance companies to enroll low-income patients. 
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considers how the care providers are able to give is shaped by the way their programs are funded. 
This is entangled with data creation in keys ways. Reimbursement is determined by the funding 
models that the programs operate under, and all of these models require various kinds of 
reporting. The kind of data collection required for each program will depend on what the state 
deems most important to know about the program’s patient population, and which interventions 
are prioritized.  
 
Methodology 
My first official day of field work observation was supposed to begin during a staff 
meeting, but at the last minute the team decided that watching them review patient charts would 
not be a good first experience. It took months to convince them that their everyday practices, 
which include a great deal of capturing, debating, and submitting reports on data about 
themselves and their patients, were exactly what I was there to see. Despite their reluctance to 
highlight what many consider to be the drudgery of their work, it was inescapable. During my 
first week observing the clinic, one of the nurses in the program laughed as she watched me write 
a description of the space in a thin notebook. “You're like a little scribe,” she said, “You could be 
God, writing down whether we're good or bad.” I joked, “How do you know I'm not?” This 
banter was part of building rapport with my interlocutors, but it speaks to more. I was swiftly 
integrated into clinical settings because patients and providers are used to students observing 
them. Simultaneously, I was always conspicuous. As common as data collection has become for 
these providers, it is regarded with unease. External, in-person audits have only recently become 
part of their work experiences, as I will explore in chapter 4. My note taking was a source of 
constant comment. This was usually in the form of a joke; the HCH program director began 
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introducing me as “double o three point five,” a spy half the size of James Bond, and urging staff 
to check out my tiny cursive.  
 By my first clinic visit, I had secured approval through both the City University of New 
York (CUNY) and Saint Catherine Hospital Institutional Review Boards (IRB). I had also 
submitted the immunization history from my own medical records to the hospital. I received a 
Tuberculin skin test, a small bubble of bacteria extract injected under the skin of my forearm, its 
disappearance proving I did not have Tuberculosis. After a criminal background check, I was 
scheduled for an orientation with new incoming staff, students, interns, and volunteers. My 
photograph was taken in a basement office of the hospital for my identification badge. Under my 
name and picture, block letters declared me an “HCH Student.” Like all staff, my magnetized 
badge opened locked doors and passageways between campus buildings, and time-stamped my 
location with security. It opened immaterial doors as well, signifying that I was allowed to be at 
the many clinical and community sites where I followed health care providers. I was directed to 
wear it in plain sight at all times.  
To maintain anonymity, and because they are not themselves the direct subjects of the 
research, I never recorded any patient names. After the providers signed consent forms allowing 
me to shadow them as they work, they obtained verbal permission from patients for my presence 
during encounters. I shadowed every provider in the clinic for a minimum of one day, though 
some I continued to observe off and on for up to a year. I also interviewed most providers for an 
hour, for which they signed a separate consent form. By the end of the research, I had conducted 
a total of 59 interviews with 55 people, including 25 PACE staff, 16 HCH staff, and 5 staff from 
a women’s health clinic also affiliated with Saint Catherine’s. In observation of hospital and 
national patient protection policies, no identifying patient information was discussed on the 
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recordings. I conducted nine expert interviews with the nuns affiliated with Saint Catherine’s and 
the national Catholic Health Association, medical directors from area Emergency Rooms, Urgent 
Care Centers, and Community Health Centers, and members of hospital senior leadership. All 
interview subjects were assigned codes, used in interview transcriptions and field notes, and 
appear in this dissertation under pseudonyms. Once all 59 interviews were transcribed, half by 
the researcher and half by a professional transcription service, the transcriptions were emailed to 
each interviewee for approval, revision, or omissions. Observation of clinical encounters as well 
as staff team meetings enabled me to witness the problems of data collection firsthand, and how 
they discussed and worked to alleviate them. Doing this over the long term allowed me to track 
the progression of problems, whether their attempts succeeded or failed, and the outcomes of 
their efforts to satisfy funders and patients. 
 This was the protocol that was approved for patient encounters by the CUNY IRB, after 
several months of resubmissions. I was told that the anonymous reviewer for my expedited 
review was a registered nurse with concerns about my plans to conduct research in clinics for 
vulnerable patients. As a result, the portraits of patients are limited, composites constructed of 
real but common characteristics to honor their privacy and understanding of their role in the 
research. People rarely refer to themselves as vulnerable, and the patients in this text are no 
exception. It is an umbrella term used in public health and social service circles to describe a 
broad range of social, economic, and political identities. It is also the language used in ethical 
reviews for Human Subjects Research, to protect those who may be least able to consent to, or 
most at risk from research. There are a range of possible categories of people identified as 
vulnerable, depending on the purpose of the organization, policy, or professional using the term. 
In some instances, vulnerability is oriented to the position on the life cycle: infant, child, 
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pregnant woman, elder. Sometimes, it references health status: mental illness, disability, HIV 
diagnosis. Often it encapsulates an absence of privilege: immigrant, homeless, LGBT, minority. 
In this dissertation, I take up the term “vulnerable” as it is used in U.S. health policy to fund 
programs for specific categories of patients: the homeless, and the frail elderly. 
 
Vulnerability and Compliance  
 The term “vulnerable” is used throughout this dissertation to describe the categories of 
patients that the clinics I studied were designed to serve. “Vulnerable” is a classification broadly 
used in U.S. federal policy documents to describe “children, older adults, homeless individuals, 
victims of abuse or trauma, individuals with mental health or substance-related disorders, 
individuals with HIV/AIDS, and individuals with disabilities” (ACA H. R. 3590—499). The 
category of vulnerable is broad enough that it encompasses a diverse combination of individuals 
who have a greater need of care, often but not always due to legacies of structural inequity 
restricting access to resources. The term is derived from bioethics in the 1960s and 1970s, in 
response to unethical experimentation on prisoners, people of color, and ethnic and religious 
minorities (Campell and Stark 2017, Shivayogi 2013). However, in contemporary medical 
contexts, the framework of abuse by medical professionals is often no longer invoked with the 
term. Populations are often described as vulnerable without their vulnerability being explicitly 
traced back to intentional exploitation. Even when clinicians develop models to account for 
vulnerabilities that factor in inequities and neglect of particular communities, it is to better 
understand risk factors that influence disease, and the cause of the disparities remains 
unexamined. It has become more common to define vulnerability in terms anthropologists might 
recognize as environmental racism or structural violence (Checker 2005, Farmer 2004). 
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However, in medical literature, unequal exposure to pollution, green spaces, steady and well-
paying employment, meaningful education, and health care services are identified as community 
risk factors (Shi et al 2008). There is no need, in such models, to question how access to spaces 
and institutions that influence health came to be differentially accessible to different groups of 
people, or how entrenched disparities are continually reinforced.  
Often what medical experts now refer to as ‘vulnerable populations’ were historically 
referred to as ‘paupers.’ Tracking them was a necessity as towns were expected to care for 
paupers who had been born there. Even then, the costs of providing for the poor, sick, homeless, 
and frail elderly informed the way they were cared for. This was largely determined by their 
relation to labor and systems of power. Paupers and vulnerable populations are also a social 
invention. Their existence in the United States has not just required the creation of policies to 
contain and address the needs of individuals in these groups. The policies created the categories, 
rendering individuals members of new identities, in a process Ian Hacking calls “making up 
people” (2007). In his work on gender and sexuality, anthropologist David Valentine asserts that, 
the categorical power of these terms has come to be read as experiential fact; or, 
more succinctly, the experiential is subsumed and reordered by the categories we 
use to make sense of experience. Where this becomes dangerous is in the 
reordering of experience through analytic categories seen to be transparent and 
natural, a reordering that can, for all its progressive impetus, reproduce the 
invisibility and disenfranchisement of people who have had little voice, 
historically, in the debates and policies that have shaped their worlds. (2004, 219)   
If categorical definitions of gender and sexuality are considered only in theory, he argues, we 
lose sight of the process by which the categories were created as technologies for understanding 
the self and others. Without such context, those with experiences that the categories do not speak 
to are further silenced, while others are refitted to what have become accepted categories. Absent 
historical and ethnographic context, categories are reified in policy where decisions are made for 
groups of people within their defined boundaries. Such categories have been created or reshaped 
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by the systems of disparity that have structured this country – settler colonialism, white 
supremacy, capitalism, empire, and patriarchy (Maskovsky 2013). This is perhaps especially 
visible in U.S. health policy, where for example, federal funding for Federally Qualified Health 
Centers is divided into distinct program categories for migrants, the homeless, residents of public 
housing, community health centers for the poor, and tribal health programs. I situate the 
arguments made in this dissertation in this historical and ethnographic context, recognizing the 
long trajectory of categorizing populations in this country for the purpose of managing those who 
are poor and in need of health care. 
The form of care that I engage with within this dissertation is one whose character is 
strongly informed by data that reasserts and redraws the boundaries of vulnerability as a 
category. As Valentine states above, the creation of categories can serve to deepen oppression, a 
point also made by scholars like anthropologist Shaka McGlotten, who argues that data can 
compound or reinforce vulnerability, inequities, and oppression. McGlotten’s work links the 
statistical enumeration of Black people’s lives from slavery through to the present, where, 
“Black queer lives are often reduced to forms of accounting that are variously intended to elicit 
alarm or to direct highly circumscribed forms of care” (2016, 263). Anthropologists have 
identified ways in which care practices have been sharply informed by government interests 
through bureaucratic processes and collection of patient information in ways that can 
paradoxically serve to harm patients. Miriam Ticktin’s notion of “regimes of care” identifies how 
care in the context of humanitarian crisis on the French border is limited to those who can 
demonstrate experiences of trauma, and that they have, “morally legitimate suffering bodies” 
(2011, 5). As a result of the data that is collected about them, the refugees of Ticktin’s work face 
potential confinement and policing. Lisa Stevenson’s examination of Native tubercular and 
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suicide epidemics in the Canadian Arctic reveal a “regime of life” in which the goal of keeping a 
population alive supplants interest in who those people are, rendering care anonymous through 
state indifference to identity (2014, 68). Sameena Mulla’s analysis of forensic nursing in the 
United States exposes competing priorities directing care of women both as sexual assault 
victims and as legal subjects being examined for potential future trial (2014). In Mulla’s field 
site, the combined “investigative and therapeutic functions” of forensic documentation, a 
distortion of patient narratives in order to fit into prescribed formats, can become evidence in 
court to support or undermine the victim (2014, 159). Dána-Ain Davis’ investigation of medical 
racism in premature birth lays bare how life-threatening misinformation becomes entrenched in 
care policies and practices. As providers continuously reject race in favor of class as an 
explanation for disparities in birth outcomes, the experiences and concerns of Black women of 
higher socioeconomic status are silenced in ways that often lead to downplaying symptoms and 
increasing risk. In the work of all four scholars, care practices are not only disrupted and 
reshaped by standardization and data collection practices, but even jeopardized. This dissertation 
is permeated by provider anxieties that care will be endangered on the basis of reported data, and 
the funding decisions that it informs. 
 I retain the use of the term vulnerable for another reason as well: patients who are 
“vulnerable” are not necessarily considered “underserved.” Though it may seem surprising that 
the homeless and frail elderly are often comparable populations for a medical system, it was 
apparent in both my field sites and broader discussions on population health that were elevated 
by the ACA. Early on in my research, I was referred to the work of Dr. Jeffrey Brenner, a 
community physician in Camden, New Jersey, who mined patient billing data from three area 
hospitals. He identified what are referred to in public health as hot spots, or areas in the city 
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where the most costly patients were clustered, often either through violent neighborhoods or 
nursing homes with high risk patient falls. Using this data to parse out the patients who were 
using the most care and costing the most money, he made a map of “super-utilizers” to prioritize 
patient outreach. By targeting the patients with a history of using the hospital the most, he was 
able to identify gaps in services and refer patients to other forms of support such as mental health 
providers, social workers, and physical therapists that could better address their symptoms or 
underlying cause of risk. The result was that patients’ received more “appropriate” care, and 
resorted to the hospital less frequently, saving money and purportedly achieving better health 
outcomes. When Brenner’s story was publicized by influential physician-writer Atul Gawande in 
a 2011 New Yorker article, followed up by related stories attributing up to 5% of all health care 
costs to super-utilizers, health systems across the country responded by piloting similar 
programs. Saint Catherine’s was in the midst of one such program when I began fieldwork, in 
which an insurance company funded two case managers to provide coordinated care to a few 
dozen super-utilizers as a pilot study. The study started with HCH patients who were identified 
as the top visitors to the Saint Catherine’s Emergency Department, but as the program found new 
funding over the years, eventually becoming part of the system’s Accountable Care Organization 
strategy, targeted patients expanded beyond homeless individuals to those who received public 
insurance and cost the system the most money through frequent visits. Many of these patients 
were elderly. A quarter of all Medicare spending is spent in patients’ last year of life (Riley and 
Lubitz 2010, 565).  
Both patient populations discussed in this dissertation are seen as overutilizing care, even 
as they are recognized to have more complicated health conditions and worse health outcomes 
than the general population. The care they seek is not deemed to be the “appropriate” care. Their 
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vulnerability also marks them as non-compliant. Novel models of care are piloted and made into 
demonstration programs in part due to an inability to get certain populations to conform to 
standard clinical use, inclusive of routine primary care check-ups and additional services sought 
only when deemed reasonable by providers and payers. Homeless and frail elderly populations 
have in particular been identified as super-utilizers of medical care, those who appear in the 
Emergency Department frequently and generate high costs that tax-payers and hospitals will end 
up paying, due to Medicare and Medicaid, or uninsurance. The super-utilizers narrative recasts 
programs for vulnerable populations as cost-saving measures, to avoid irresponsible overuse. 
Unable to curtail their own spending like other patients, and with more public investment in this 
being done due to their use of public insurance, providers for these populations are 
responsibilized for stewarding their use of services. By cultivating a logic of costs to guide care 
provision, providers protect health systems from incurring high costs that public insurers will not 
fully pay, for poor patients that cannot be expected to make up the difference. Though such 
narratives rarely question that super-utilizers and other vulnerable people need care, the 
contention remains that they are seeking care improperly and are in need of a corrective. Patient 
care and billing data are increasingly activated to categorize vulnerable patients as endangering 
health care on local and national levels. 
 
Situating Compassion 
 The pages that follow contain multiple descriptions of health care providers, interacting 
with data even in the moments when they are face to face with patients. Every single one has at 
some time during my shadowing or interviews expressed frustration with the interruption this 
can cause. Patients who often need the reassurance of time and a steady gaze can seem de-
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centered by incessant data creation practices. Yet each one of these providers remains committed 
to providing quality care to their patients. All of those I interviewed came into care work because 
they felt strongly about making a difference in people’s lives. They began working with 
vulnerable populations because they wanted to especially care for those who needed it most, 
those whose needs mainstream medicine often is not designed to address. And they come to this 
work with a humility and an interest in such patients that demonstrates that they take them 
seriously. In a health care system where they are often brushed off as too needy, messy, mentally 
deficient, complicated, non-compliant, or even beyond help, the patients referenced throughout 
this text come to these providers because they offer respect, even and perhaps especially in the 
face of patient decisions that compromise positive health outcomes. As HCH nurse practitioner 
Patricia explained when I asked why she pursued a nursing career, “initially it was caring for 
other people, and I think through the years that’s changed. I think now I think more about the 
impact that I can have on people’s lives through them. So how I can help them to reach the goals 
they want to reach” [interview October 12, 2014]. The providers I describe understand that 
health may not be their patients’ first priority, and they work hard to understand why this makes 
sense for each one of their patients. They reframe their professional role in relation to their 
patients, acting in ways that benefit their patients’ well-being even when such actions are never 
tied directly to a metric of health improvement or illness management. I have witnessed these 
providers buy flowers for a homeless patient’s wife for their anniversary so that he would have 
something to offer, and temporarily take in another’s cat when he moved into housing that 
disallows pets so he would know his friend was cared for. These providers stretch their definition 
of health care in acknowledgement of the complex social needs that shape people’s health 
contexts. And while many of the personal acts of kindness will never become inscribed into 
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medical records or reports, they are not the only or even the most profound evidence of 
commitment and compassion.  
There is nothing overtly sweet or moving about paperwork. It lurches at each of us in 
various ways, through the mail slot, email, bills, taxes, and work-based obligations. We tend to 
know enough about it, to have our own sense of it, its banality and dreaded ubiquity, that we tune 
out to its power over our lives. So it is through the anthropological practice of viewing even our 
own lives in cultural context, making the familiar strange (Miner 1956), that I have come to 
recognize these provider’s paperwork practices for what they are. Paperwork creates added work 
burdens for providers, and frustrates their professional autonomy over how they interact with 
patients and make care decisions. And yet, the most impactful thing I observed in these 
community clinics was the providers’ commitment to the paperwork regardless. In my time with 
them it became apparent not only how that paperwork was the source of data that had 
tremendous impact over their professional lives, but that they also took personally how it might 
impact the lives of their patients. Their commitment to paperwork, to crafting and reporting data, 
was the most compelling evidence of their devotion to their patients.  
 I have been exposed to such care since childhood. My own mother was a hospice nurse, 
who worked at a Visiting Nurse Association for nearly twenty years. The trunk of our car 
typically contained printer boxes of patient files, accompanied eventually by a laptop on which 
she had to type up her reports. Like many of the providers I shadowed, my mother’s car served 
as her office. The floor of the backseat was perpetually populated by local street Atlases, her 
work badge and stethoscope hanging from the rearview mirror (for ease of access, but also to get 
out of speeding tickets when she was pulled over on her way to a patient’s home). She too was 
always doing paperwork when off duty to catch up. Before the era of cell phones, patients often 
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dialed our house when my mother was on call, prompting her to train her children to answer the 
phone by saying, “Whitten residence, may I help you?” from the time we were old enough to 
reach the receiver. And while her commitment to her patients shaped our family life in quotidian 
ways, the nursing profession transformed our lives. Being a nurse meant being in demand, and 
therefore having job security. It was a pathway for women to enter the workforce and attain 
stable pay. Though access to the profession remains racially segmented, following an origin of 
explicit racial segregation and class stratification as I discuss in chapter 3, it has many times 
served as an economic stepping stone for women. This is especially true for those who were 
lower income, ethnically white women, but also for my mother, who became more successful at 
passing as white by retaining her ex-husband’s Polish surname in favor of her own Iberian 
maiden name. From her start in community college as a single parent, through raising six 
children with my seasonally unemployed carpenter father, nursing meant financial stability16. 
And yet, my mother often used to joke that she was paid less than the garbage man. It 
was a complaint in a way, typically in response to astonishment at her long hours, but it was also 
a point of pride. She engaged in the physically and emotionally draining work of lifting patients 
and administering morphine, while explaining to their families what the process of dying would 
be like based on their illnesses. She then brought those patients’ files back home, piled on the 
kitchen table as she hand wrote or eventually typed up her notes, as her work days passed into 
evenings, weekends, and holidays. And at the time, the job did not pay that well. Low pay 
despite hard work was a testament to how much a nurse cared for her patients, a legacy from the 
earliest professional nurses, who were intentionally paid little to ensure only the purely 
 
16 This is supported by U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, which declared the nursing profession “recession-
proof” in a 2017 issue of their Monthly Labor Review. 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/nursing-and-the-great-recession.htm 
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motivated applied for the job (Reverby 1987). Seasoned nurses now bemoan how the high pay 
new nurses currently receive attract people they view as unsuited to the work. This takes on an 
added dimension in community health contexts, where the hours are often a more generous 9-5, 
unlike the variety of hospital shifts to ensure constant coverage. Suspicious of new applicants to 
their program, the nurse managers at HCH had a shadow standard for hiring: they brought 
applicants to the filthiest patient encounter location to watch their reaction. Those who balked 
were cut from consideration. Their patients deserved providers who were not openly disgusted 
by the most difficult elements of their lives, they reasoned, but they were not about to write such 
a protocol in their hiring documentation.  
My research questions shifted in response to the dynamics of the clinical field sites I 
observed, but from the beginning of this project I have sought to understand how women’s work 
dynamics in caring professions were complicated by technologies that brought them further from 
their patients in a variety of ways. My focus shifted from nurses as the quintessential gendered 
caring profession in health care, to the interdisciplinary teams of providers that characterize 
contemporary community health clinics. And while I critically examine the work lives and 
experiences of these providers, at times critiquing practices that, for example, reinforce 
racialized workplace segmentation, it is not to diminish the importance of the work they do, or to 
question the care that they provide. As I describe in more depth in later chapters, the women who 
started HCH wanted to end homelessness, and those who joined the new PACE program wanted 
a better option for eldercare. In this, they are part of a longer tradition of working to improve 
health care in this country, to alter its design to empower people who have been exploited, 
dominated, and excluded by health care in the past. Sandra Morgen (2002) described in her work 
how the feminist clinics that emerged out of the Women’s Health Movement were faced with the 
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dilemma of retaining their mission of empowering women to own their health and bodies in 
health care contexts, or conforming to professional norms in order to compete with emerging 
publicly funded health clinics. Many chose to remain open, offering access to more women, by 
altering their practices enough to become eligible for public and private insurance 
reimbursement. The providers described in this dissertation have made similar choices. HCH 
providers have pivoted repeatedly to ensure their clinic remains funded, adopting new 
documentation and reporting practices. PACE providers structure their work days around the 
various forms of documentation their funders mandate. But they have not capitulated to these 
demands, rather they have embraced them, reshaped them, and made them their own. Instead of 
allowing data creation practices to deepen the distance between them and their patients, they 
have all chosen to see their patients in every element of the work that they do. In a book review 
of anthropologist Carol Taylor’s hospital-based ethnography, In Horizontal Orbit: Hospitals and 
the Cult of Efficiency, Gustavo M. Quesada chides that Taylor, “failed to maintain [a] stance of 
objective spectator. Her sympathies are clearly on the side of the nursing profession” (1971, 
957). The same sympathies are apparent throughout this dissertation.  
  
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 discusses the integration of the “Triple Aim” model into reimbursement 
requirements for public insurance, one especially significant way that Quality Improvement 
came to dominant health care processes. The Triple Aim was designed to simultaneously lower 
costs (Cost), and improve population health (Outcomes) and patient experience (Choice/Care). 
This chapter traces the historical predecessors of these concepts, including how responsibility 
and deservingness rhetoric was sustained from English poor laws through to the ACA, and how 
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health outcomes have been tracked through census, statistical standardization, and the scientific 
management of workers. The programs discussed in this dissertation have been organized along 
the logics of “vulnerable” classifications, and these classifications have histories. In order to 
understand the significance of new models of care and frameworks for funding in U.S. health 
systems, they must be situated in past and persistent power dynamics. From that vantage point, it 
becomes clearer how the legacies of the institutions upon which this nation was built continue to 
structure health disparities and their categories in the present day.  
Chapter 3 identifies how class, white supremacy, and racism shape workplace 
segmentation in interdisciplinary work forces, even when all of the workers are women. I 
examine the language dynamics in two community health settings, where language and ethnic 
heritage are strongly linked to profession. In both cases, the Spanish speaking staff are recruited 
to engage in work due to their language skills, which influences where their work takes place and 
how flexible they need to be to fill clinical needs. In the case of PACE, Spanish speaking staff 
are often working independently in patient homes, and so are less regulated, and yet they are less 
able to directly contribute to the patient care plans at collaborative meetings due to scheduling. In 
HCH, Spanish speaking staff are re-purposed to other, less-skilled work and made to float to 
assist providers when they have exclusively Spanish speaking patients. This chapter examines 
how Case Managers and Certified Nursing Assistants create data about patients that is translated 
by higher paid providers into state-sanctioned data formats, both through verbal translation, and 
the translation of their hand-written care notes into official patient records. The chapter is also 
about silences, about the people whose words do not shape the records and reports as often, even 
though their work is essential to eliciting required information. This class and professional 
distinction is further complicated by the work of white providers in the same professional role 
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being less disrupted than Hispanic providers. The pivot that enables this to happen is often 
language, used as a tool rather than an important part of identity. Instead of Spanish language 
being seen as something innate that is part of these individuals, it is instead reclassified so it can 
be activated and regulated as Information Technology.  
In chapter 4, I analyze how charting practices in community health settings 
simultaneously reveal government investment in the care of “vulnerable” patients, and how this 
responsibility is passed off to private health care providers and insurance companies. The control 
this awards private insurers leads to increased costs and endangers continued support for 
government-funded programs. Funding for federal grants and public insurance reimbursement 
has been restructured through the twin lenses of evidence-based care and accountable financing. 
At the core of both are data collection practices that divide patient encounters into quantifiable 
pieces of health information. Data reporting requirements have been standardized, so that health 
outcomes across the country can be compared, but the patients are not standard. Ethnographic 
observation of data collection practices during patient encounters, and debates about data 
processing at staff meetings, expose the difficulties providers face in eliciting the volume of 
information expected of them. The trauma, instability, and uncertainty of homelessness decenter 
data collection. Providers are caught between prioritizing their patients, the flexibility needed to 
provide them with comprehensive care, and the rigidity of data collection demands. I examine 
how the incongruity between the financialization of patient care, and patient non-conformity to 
the standardized norms of health care practice, fuels consideration of withdrawing federal grants 
and endangers the continued existence of these programs. 
In chapter 5, I examine how clinical data is produced both by the government interests 
that delineate the format and categories of reported information, and the providers whose 
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informal system of work-arounds scaffold the assembly of those reports. The result is a 
distillation of health context down to simple numbers, that often inaccurately portray or silence 
the flexibility and invention that health care work depends on. I will examine how mandating the 
use of computerized reporting systems to quantify health care encounters can serve to 
paradoxically yield inaccurate, partial, and arbitrary data. Insufficient training, staffing, and 
access to digital tools constrain the work of providers in new ways, and they adapt through 
informal innovation. These reporting shifts, and their mirroring of business management 
strategies, illustrate a political shift preferential to private control of health care. Using the 
concept of “shadow standards,” I demonstrate how providers use routinized strategies to compile 
and report data despite a lack of resources or sufficient access to data collection and reporting 
tools. Their success in creating and submitting data despite myriad challenges conceals clinical 
deficiencies and reinforces expectations to both perform despite the lack of adequate support, 
and to produce data of uncertain quality. Committed to satisfying funding requirements as a way 
to care for their patients, providers inadvertently make data creation and reporting appear as a 
feasible and meaningful measure of the quality of care.  
Chapter 6 examines how providers in a capitated eldercare program come to view 
managing costs as an important way that they care for their patients. I describe the PACE 
program model that requires an interdisciplinary team (IDT) of providers to create customized 
patient care plans, and how this differs from the formulaic care provided in traditional nursing 
care models. Contrasting the role providers had in patient care when they worked in nursing 
homes in previous jobs, to their responsibilities as IDT members within PACE, exposes how 
they shift from aligning with patients against insurance companies, to adopting s logic of costs 
during care planning now that they serve as care providers and insurers. The constant and 
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ongoing processes of documentation and reporting encompass the myriad ways in which PACE 
providers are able to creatively tailor care plans to address unique patient needs, but also the way 
in which this model of care wholly incorporates the kind of innovations are left out of the records 
in the shadow standards of the HCH program.  
 
Conclusion 
“We loved those numbers but they didn't love us back” 17 
This dissertation has been written in a moment where the ability to rely on data has been 
shaken. In the quote above, anthropologist Crystal Biruk references the personal way in which 
public faith in polling was shattered after the 2016 presidential election results contradicted 
polling predictions. The election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States was 
accompanied and ushered by the fears (and we now know, reality18) of Russian influence and 
intervention. Charges of “fake news” undermined trust in every day data sources such as the 
news received across print and digital media outlets. This portends a rupture in the often 
unquestioned privilege quantitative data creation has experienced across U.S. institutions. 
 Furthermore, this shift in power has resulted in the dismantling of the reforms represented 
in my research. Rather than a wholesale repeal and replacement of the Affordable Care Act, it is 
being gradually destabilized instead, in what has been repeatedly reported as “death by a 
thousand cuts.” This began during Barack Obama’s presidency the moment the ACA was signed, 
and most substantially when the Supreme Court ruled that states could opt out of the Medicaid 
 
17 Crystal Biruk, “Panel: Data Performativity, Performing Health: Enumerative Practices and Building 
Health Worlds” (Discussant comments, American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting, 
Minneapolis, MN. November 19, 2016)  
18 CNN Library. 2018. Presidential Campaign Hacking Fast Facts. 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-facts/index.html, accessed 
March 3, 2018. 
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expansion needed to fund it. However, the Trump administration is further disrupting health 
reform through financial reductions. The advertising budget and enrollment assistance grants 
were slashed just before the enrollment period, and the individual mandate was eliminated in the 
tax bill passed at the end of 2017. This has been an intentional and explicit effort to “Let 
Obamacare implode,” as Trump tweeted on July 28, 2017. Insurance enrollment has already 
plummeted19.  
 However, activating data to improve the efficiency of the healthcare industry is not a 
partisan concept. Regardless of which party or person is in the White House over the next several 
years, the proliferation and use of data is unlikely to subside in influence or intensity. Whether 
the rollback of the ACA accelerates in the direction of previous fee for service models, or 
Medicare for All, data is sure to be at the center of justifications for reform. This dissertation is 
not designed to undermine or dispute the value of research, or the use of data to improve policies 
and systems of government, work, or care. My aim is to take a critical lens to what passes as 
evidence, and how it is managed and even manipulated in the interests (or disinterest) of those in 
power. If the work of science is to retain integrity in this moment of existential crisis, we must be 
constantly willing to question through which lenses and to what ends it is being directed. 
 
Chapter 2 | The Triple Aim: Patients, Populations, and Costs 
 
 
19 In the first year of Trump’s presidency, the uninsured rate rose from 10.9% to 12.2%, reversing a 
downward trend since the Individual Mandate first took effect in 2014. That 1.3 point drop represents 3.2 
million people. 
Auter, Zac. 2018. U.S. Uninsured Rate Steady at 12.2% in Fourth Quarter of 2017. Gallup, Well-Being, 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/225383/uninsured-rate-steady-fourth-quarter-2017.aspx, accessed March 3, 
2018. 
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Anxieties about “death panels” in U.S. health care were sparked by a quality standards 
tool. The term first incited panic and outrage in the summer of 2009, when former Alaska 
governor and Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin claimed on social media that the proposed 
health care bill would ration health care using a formula to determine the value of citizen’s lives 
against their productiveness. A year later, months after the Affordable Care Act was enacted, 
Micheal Tanner, a senior fellow from a libertarian think tank, statedthat “death panel” claims 
may have been exaggerated at first, but that they were substantiated with the nomination of Dr. 
Donald Berwick to lead the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). 20 At the core of 
this claim was NICE, the unassuming acronym for the National Institute for Clinical 
Effectiveness, a regulatory body of the British National Health System that produces guidelines 
for health care practice. In effect, NICE promoted a tool for doctors that assesses diagnoses and 
helps them choose the best treatment option based on the effectiveness of both treatment and 
cost. That Berwick had publicly praised this tool was presented as evidence that he would ration 
Medicare and Medicaid services, and potentially withhold life sustaining care. The fear that 
patients would lose control over care options, and be considered as part of a population instead 
of as individuals, was voiced loudly and on a seemingly clear partisan basis. 
 Months later, Republican Minority Leader Mitch McConnell faced the Senate upon 
returning from a holiday recess. “Today I’d like to talk about something that happened last week, 
while we weren’t here” he said at a podium in July of 201021. “I’m referring of course to the 
President’s truly outrageous decision to sneak Donald Berwick in as the new head of Medicare 
and Medicaid.” He claimed there was bipartisan concern about Berwick’s “past praise for 
government-run systems that ration healthcare” and the President’s avoidance of an appointment 
 
20 Tanner, Micheal. ‘Death Panels’ Were an Overblown Claim – Until Now. Daily Caller 5/27/2010 
21 https://www.c-span.org/video/?294460-4/berwick-recess-appointment 
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process and confirmation vote. Berwick was first nominated to lead the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS) in April of that year, but as his comments from throughout his career 
surfaced, the Obama administration opted to sidestep their public re-examination, which was 
already roiling. Instead, Berwick was appointed as the Senate was in recess for July 4th. 
 There was backlash against three interrelated subjects: redistribution, rationing, and 
nationalized healthcare models. First, in a 2008 speech celebrating the 60th anniversary of the 
British National Health System (NHS)22, Berwick said, “any health care funding plan that is just, 
equitable, civilized, and humane must redistribute wealth from the richer among us to the poorer 
and less fortunate. Excellent healthcare is by definition redistribution,” and he credited the 
British NHS with achieving this. In an interview the next year23, Berwick noted that the U.S. 
health care system already rations health care, and that, “The decision is not whether or not we 
will ration care — the decision is whether we will ration with our eyes open.” He argued for use 
of models such as those promoted by NICE that compare existing health interventions to 
determine which are most effective, in terms of both patient outcomes and expenses. Finally, in 
both of these contexts, Berwick praised nationalized health care systems, such as those in Britain 
and France, for providing care to all of their citizens, while using evidence-based models to 
control costs and limit spending. Those opposing Berwick’s appointment latched onto key terms 
from these comments to stoke anxiety that under his control, CMS would take care resources 
away from some in order to give them to others, and limit access to life sustaining procedures if 
they were formulaically deemed to cost too much.  
Two months after his CMS appointment, Berwick announced in his first public address 
that the “Triple Aim” framework [Figure 1] would be his “main focus”: improving the health of 
 
22 https://khn.org/news/berwick-british-nhs-speech-transcript/ 
23 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2799075/ 
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populations and the experience of care, while lowering per capita costs. The Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) was the foundational reform upon which the “Triple Aim” approach could build. The 
ACA expanded access and created new patient protections, addressing some problems of equity 
in insurance. The reform and the framework together were posed as solutions to the central 
problems of health care in the United States: unequal accessibility, astronomical costs, and poor 
health outcomes when compared to other nations. CMS adopted the term “three-part aim” in the 
“Value-Based Programs” section of their website [Figure 2], and detailed it in a 2014 publication 
about their “CMS Quality Strategy.” However, it is the same thing, and the health care industry 
has adopted the “Triple Aim” language with abandon as they refigure their policies and 
procedures to comply with ACA requirements. 
   
Figure 1: Institute for Healthcare Improvement   Figure 2: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Three Aims24 
Triple Aim Initiative25 
The force of this framework is that it is tied to reimbursement. At the time of this 
research, the goal was to make 50% of reimbursements from Medicare and Medicaid dependent 
on “quality outcomes” by the end of 2018. In effect, the numbers that hospitals report need to 
remain stable or improve, indicating that people are healthier and providers have done a better 
job, in order to receive full payment from these federally-funded insurers. This is not 
 
24 https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-
Instruments/QualityInitiativesGenInfo/Downloads/Slides-for-CMS-Grand-Rounds-on-CMS-Quality-
Strategy-held-on-06-02-2014.pdf  
25 http://www.ihi.org/Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/Pages/default.aspx  
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insignificant: the American Hospital Association estimates that more than 60% of all hospital 
care is provided to patients covered by these programs. As a result, the Triple Aim language has 
entered the business and care plans of U.S. hospitals, which are restructuring their data collection 
policies and practices in order to perform well in their reporting, and thereby secure higher 
reimbursement. The reporting process consequently has tremendous influence over care 
structures for low income patients. As a result of “Triple Aim” oriented changes, hospitals are 
required to annually report their progress in a selection of categories, quantified patient outcomes 
for a variety of health conditions and events. These are meant to indicate improvement or decline 
for individual hospitals, and when aggregated, for the U.S. health system as a whole. 
Furthermore, under the “Triple Aim,” health care providers are required to consider health costs 
more than ever before as reimbursement paradigms shift away from fee-for-service and towards 
“value-based” payments and capitation. Providers must develop a logic of cost to guide their care 
decision-making. 
The changes Berwick set in motion while he led CMS were not simply a politically 
liberal gesture towards the values ostensibly held by the Democratic party, even if he personally 
allied with such a position. Despite the controversy surrounding his appointment and short term 
at CMS, Berwick was able to make a dramatic and lasting impact on the shape and ubiquity of 
health data, because the foundational assumptions underlying his approach to care improvement 
were neither new nor partisan. All three aims have strong roots in U.S. ideologies about personal 
responsibility and deservingness, the need for public health measures to monitor and control 
populations, and use of industrial models to improve efficiency. The Triple Aim approach, which 
was largely inspired and shaped by business management models from the automotive industry, 
follows in the grooves of a longer trajectory. Grouping individuals into classifications, tracking 
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shared elements about their lives, and then using the aggregated results to make decisions about 
them is a process that can be found in the evolution of care for the poor, public health, and 
industrial management. I will unweave and follow these three genealogical threads in this 
chapter in order to locate the development of the current dominance of health data policy within 
a specific North Atlantic history and to dispel generalizing claims about universal ideals of 
efficiency.26   
I map these histories in order to contextualize the Triple Aim, and related contemporary 
paradigms, with the insights of scholars about the long trajectory of neoliberalism in U.S. policy. 
Rather than creating a unique, critical rupture that dismantled or subcontracted what had been 
comparably strong social systems, social scientists have outlined how current iterations of U.S. 
policy have been shaped from a much older foundation captivated by the rhetoric of work-based 
deservingness and responsibility of the poor, reliant on the private sector, and convinced of the 
value of data creation, collection, and use to govern people. Rather than attempting a complete 
historical account, I rather use examples to draw out how, in the words of Frances Fox Piven and 
Richard Cloward, “the historical pattern is clearly not one of progressive liberalization; it is 
rather a record of periodically expanding and contracting relief rolls as the system performs its 
two main functions: maintaining civil order and enforcing work” (1971, xv). In the vein of 
sociologists and anthropologists who have examined the transformations in health care and social 
services over the last several decades (Collins and Mayer 2010, Davis 2012, Hyatt 2011, Lyon-
Callo and Hyatt 2004, Morgen and Maskovsky 2003, Piven and Cloward 1971) this account 
identifies neoliberalism as an intensification of what has been, from the nation’s founding, a 
 
26 That said, there are significant ways in which empirical models of data collection have proliferated 
internationally, largely through global health and aid organizations (Adams 2016, Biruk 2018, Merry 
2016) 
 44 
classical liberalist political tradition with a decentralized government that relies heavily on 
private industry to address national health needs, with policy to guide it.  
The Affordable Care Act empowered the federal government to mandate a new level of 
data collection under the guiding light of the “Triple Aim,” but the source of health care delivery, 
funding, and assessment tools — such as hospitals, insurance, and electronic medical record 
companies — remain private. Though the government provides funds in the form of grants and 
public insurance, they do not own, operate, or directly manage the organizations that patients 
interact with to benefit from such funds, as even public Medicare and Medicaid are often 
subcontracted. The government has altered care reporting expectations without directly 
providing the support health care providers would need to successfully satisfy the new 
requirements. Instead, the providers must innovate stopgap strategies to ensure data is collected 
and reported to secure their funding, in ways that become routinized within clinics into shadow 
standards. The “Triple Aim” has become an engine for the proliferation of shadow standards in 
health care clinics, due to increased data reporting requirements, and incentivized through the 
“value-based” connection between funding and patient outcomes or compliance with screenings.  
 
First Aim: Patients 
The clinic in this homeless shelter is a single room, recently outfitted through a grant with 
pinkish-beige wall paint and new furniture. Plastic blinds provide some privacy against the 
window looking into the main room, where reception and dining tables are separated only by a 
few tall wardrobes from twenty-eight beds. No one is allowed to return to the sleeping area until 
4:00 pm, so a few men and women cluster outside by the front door smoking, while others play 
cards or read at the tables in front of the kitchen. The layout is intentional, allowing the manager 
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to view the entire room from behind the counter, and to call out any perceived infraction to the 
many rules taped to the walls. With voices garbled under the drone of a white noise machine 
strategically placed by the closed door, the clinic offers more privacy than the rest of the 
building. 
 After the first patient comes and goes, Registered Nurse Francis reflects, “When I started, 
they said in ten years we’ll end homelessness, but it’s gotten worse” [Interview August 8, 2014]. 
Like most of her colleagues, she identifies this as a structural problem; as an amateur historian, 
she knows it’s not a new one. In brief moments between patients, she conjures the greying brown 
and faded red tobacco barns that still frame the farmland of New England, where she worked in 
summer as a teenager sewing together the leaves that would become cigar wrappers. She speaks 
of the migrant farmworkers who often do the work now, and the many temporary jobs her 
patients have taken on in exchange for somewhere to stay. She gestures behind me, drawing the 
road through town in the air with her index finger, “Westfield had poorhouses on Route 20, 
Russell Road.” She tells me she has a book of vital statistics at home from the 1900s that lists the 
numbers of “vagabonds,” and that many would have worked at the poor farm to earn their keep. 
She explains that they developed poor farms so that the able-bodied could work to earn their 
room and board in meager accommodations. “It’s interesting in theory if towns took care of their 
own homeless,” she says, “but the resources aren't there for that, so they regionalize it now.”  
 The work of sociologist Jill Quadagno (1984) confirms Francis’ account, and that it was 
widespread across the colonies, and the states that they became. The earliest systems of care for 
the poor in the United States were ostensibly based on this principle that families and 
communities were responsible for their “own.” However, while this system is sometimes 
remembered in idealistic if paternalistic terms, it was in fact a fragmented importation from 
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England, along with large portions of the legal system, and accompanying moral perceptions of 
poverty. The English Poor Laws are based in the older Ordinance of Labourers of 1349, 
centering the relationship between work, health, and poverty. This policy directly followed an 
outbreak of Black Death that killed approximately half of England’s population, and made work 
compulsory to address the resulting labor shortage. It also capped wages to pre-plague levels in 
an effort to slow inflation of labor and good costs, and criminalized charitable giving to those 
labeled “able-bodied.” A few years later, the 1388 Statute of Cambridge criminalized vagrancy 
and the act of laborers leaving the city (or other designated regions) in which they lived without 
written permission. Vagrants had to either stay in the town where they were arrested, and hope 
the residents would agree to provide for them, or return to the town where they were born, if it 
could be identified. 
 Though the English Poor Laws were amended several times over the following centuries, 
the foundational relationship between work and eligibility for care and assistance remained. The 
assignment of responsibility to manage that care was maintained at the family and local levels. 
The Old Poor Law of Elizabethan England established a parish system for care of the poor, 
compelling communities bounded to a central church to nurse the sick and provide resources to 
the poor that lived there. With the Dissolution of the Monasteries during the Reformation, 
hospitals that had been funded through the Catholic Church were reopened and secularly funded 
through the 1547 Poor Rate tax on parishes instead of through Church tithes. The Elizabethan 
Poor Law of 1601 clarified levels of responsibility, and categories of the poor: “the able-bodied 
and the impotent poor” (Quadagno 1984, 418), or those who could work and those who could 
not. Families were legally responsible for their relatives, including those who were older and 
unable to work due to illness or disability. The state initiated a parish-level tax to open and 
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maintain workhouses for those without family. The 1662 Act of Settlement, “stated that only 
paupers who were settled in a parish (the settled poor) had a right to the poor relief provided by 
that parish” (Charlesworth 1999, 151). This act mandated that everyone live in a community, but 
towns routinely sent poor people without local family to attest to their residence on to the next 
town. 
 Elizabethan laws and ethics crossed the Atlantic. As the colonies of Massachusetts Bay 
were settled in the 17th century, first families and then towns were held responsible for providing 
for the poor amongst them. Work remained central. Aid was not always room and board, and 
could consist of helping someone find a job. Though the frequency of the practice is disputed, 
England sent “vagrants, paupers, and convicts” (Quadagno 1984, 424) to the colonies. Colonial 
communities responded with inhabitancy regulations and the practice of “warning out” vagrants, 
to prevent the town from becoming responsible for providing aid for additional people. Refugees 
from King Philip’s Wars in the late 17th century disrupted this practice, and workhouses27 were 
built across the colonies to provide work and lodging for those who were displaced. This 
presented another distinction in “pauper” types: locals cared for with town funds, and outsiders. 
Quadagno asserts this division led to the creation of ethnic and religious philanthropic societies, 
and, in the mid-18th century, to less differentiation made between pauper types overall. The sick 
 
27 I use the term “workhouses” here to emphasize the compulsory labor entailed in admittance, and 
because, as Heli Meltsner has explained, there were several related terms that came to be used 
interchangeably: “The slippery vocabulary used from the seventeenth to the twentieth century to refer to 
institutions, buildings, and properties devoted to public charity presents several difficulties for the 
contemporary reader. The ‘work house’ (later ‘workhouse’) meant a building, usually but not always 
residential, in which a town forced its able-bodied paupers and petty criminals to labor. But it often 
confined the virtuous poor and their children as well. The ‘alms house’ (later ‘almshouse’) was intended 
to shelter the virtuous elderly, sick or handicapped paupers, but usually included able-bodied paupers and 
tramps. As the two institutions could occupy the same building, the terms became nearly interchangeable, 
and eventually ‘workhouse’ faded from use. The ‘town farm,’ also called the ‘poor farm,’ was an 
almshouse with a farm attached. The phrase could refer to the entire property, but frequently separate 
accounts were kept for the almshouse and the farm. ‘Poor house’ was sometimes used officially but was 
essentially a vernacular phrase; ‘almshouse’ was preferred for written reports.” (2012, 5) 
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and elderly were sent to workhouses along with impoverished strangers looking for work 
(Quadagno 1984). Changing dynamics of labor in the colonies led to poor laws being amended 
further. Massachusetts ended “warning out” in 1767 so strangers could become residents and 
grow the labor force.  
 The provisions of work-contingent aid were not equal for everyone living in the colonies. 
Black people received care in Workhouses, but access to care was narrower due to policies and 
practices of segregation. It was this that inspired prominent mid-19th century Black landowner 
Primus Mason to create an integrated facility for the care of poor and elderly men in Springfield, 
in a neighborhood now named Mason Square in his honor. Though plantation economies of the 
South started in the 17th century with labor from indentured poor men and women, they were 
eventually freed and assigned land in recompense (Wood 2003). Those indentured included the 
first Africans in the colonies, who became free Blacks that by 1790 comprised 7.9% of the Black 
population in the colonies (Abramovitz 2018, 37). Settler colonialism began a process of 
strategically eliminating indigenous populations through killing, physically relocating, or 
assimilating them, and repopulating their land with English colonists (Wolfe 2006). Despite early 
attempts, it was determined that Native Americans could not be forced to labor in the numbers 
needed to continue and expand plantation economies; thus labor needs were used to justify the 
ethical contortion that resulted in chattel slavery being perceived as not only morally permissible 
in the colonies, but necessary (Smallwood 2019). Historian Marcus Wilson Jernegan argues that 
the need for poor laws emerged at this point due to changing need for agricultural laborers, and 
the enclosure movement as wool exports and pastures became more important economically 
(1929, 2). He writes of Black and White paupers, those enslaved, indentured, and free, all relying 
on poor relief, though their experiences reflected racist hierarchies of treatment (1929, 5). Poor 
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relief was characterized differently in the context of slavery, as those who were enslaved or 
indentured were deemed to be the responsibility of those who owned them or their contracts 
(Rice and Jones, Jr. 1994). Though plantation hospitals have been credited with improving the 
health of enslaved Blacks in comparison to those who were free and lacking access to care, they 
were also the site of experimentation and other abuses (Owens 2017). The subjugation of 
enslaved patients to medical authority is perhaps the most extreme iteration of the care of the 
poor and vulnerable being secondary to their use as objects for medical training and research. 
 The question of responsibility and deservingness were central to the provision of aid. 
Those who were sick, elderly, mentally ill, or otherwise homeless were usually housed together, 
and all were expected to exchange their labor to the degree possible for care, room, and board.  
  
Figure 3. The Springfield Almshouse and City Farm  Figure 4. The City Hospital, on Boston Road   
from King's Handbook of Springfield 1884, page 221 from King's Handbook of Springfield 1884, page 220 
The workhouses were early hospitals. In Springfield, Massachusetts, the land and buildings that 
contained the first Almshouse and City Farm [Figure 3] vacillated between housing the poor, 
serving as City Infirmary, containing the mentally ill before state asylums were built, and 
isolating patients with contagious diseases such as tuberculosis (King 1884). This eventually 
became the City Municipal Hospital, and was then purchased by private companies specializing 
in long-term care. Though its initial occupants were often expected to work on the attached farm, 
a separate hospital was built “where young working-people could be sent while sick, without 
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great expense” (220). The City Hospital [Figure 4] was opened and managed publicly in 1870, 
but was privatized by 1883. Public institutions were suspect, but before the professionalization of 
medical occupations and the transformation of hospitals due to technologies, techniques, and 
pharmaceuticals, private hospitals were still not desirable on their own. The most impoverished 
resorted to workhouses and then the public hospital facilities that they became, but even private 
hospital facilities were initially for the workers who could not afford to be cared for at home, or 
who did not live near relatives. Private philanthropy was the norm, as city and state facilities 
were typically underfunded, understaffed, and poorly maintained. Only those with no other 
recourse would resort to a workhouse or public city hospital. Belief in the inefficiency of public 
management is not new, and social services were also typically provided by private aid and 
religious organizations. 
Except for [the Springfield] almshouse, the progress of organized social service 
until recent years has been primarily in the hands of private charities, formed by 
philanthropic men and women to give more adequate help to unfortunate people, 
many of whom were victims of changing conditions. The growth of these private 
charities was stimulated by the poor treatment of unfortunate families in the 
‘pauper house.’ People of all kinds, in all conditions of health, of all ages, were 
sent there, sheltered and fed, with no attempt to help them permanently out of 
their difficulties and put them back on their feet. (Dickey 1936) 
The distinction between private and public health care accommodations and their conditions 
were tied to work. Those deserving of charity were those who were unable to support 
themselves, either permanently or just at present but who, with the right kind of society 
assistance, would be able to again.  
 The earliest patient experience in the United States, outside of the home, was 
differentiated based on work: a worker, someone who has worked, someone who has the 
capacity to work but is not, and someone who is unable to work. Work-related distinctions have 
persisted in ideologies of responsibility for and deservingness of care, and substantiated in policy 
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and resource allocation. Though public hospitals were free, private hospitals required payment 
both in exchange for services and to enforce personal responsibility among the poor. The poor 
who gained admission to private hospitals did so upon referral and sponsorship from a wealthy 
patron who could testify to their respectability and worthiness, while paying for their care 
(Rosenberg 1987). A distinction was made between those impoverished due to their own moral 
shortcomings, and those who were destitute as a result of age or illness that did not stem from 
their own behavior. Only the latter were the deserving poor, but those who were incurable or 
chronically ill also were not admitted to private hospitals unless they could afford to pay for a 
long-term stay at an inflated rate and still resorted to public facilities (Katz 2013, Rosenberg 
1987). It has never been easy to demonstrate deservingness, and the default was the belief that 
vice or laziness led to poor health and poverty.  
 The alleged moral shortcomings that barred entry from private hospitals, unless one had 
sufficient funds to pay extra for admission, included women who were categorically assumed to 
be prostitutes if they were pregnant while unmarried, or diagnosed with a venereal disease 
(Rosenberg 1987). Though they were admitted at public hospitals, these women were treated 
punitively. Social work scholar Mimi Abramovitz identifies such treatment as the result of a 
“family ethic” that colonial women were expected to exhibit, parallel to the work ethic that the 
deserving poor were required to demonstrate. The family ethic included marriage and children 
within the confines of a patriarchal family, subordination to their husbands, economic 
productivity within the home that benefitted their family, and reproductive labor. Structurally 
prohibited in most instances from the “opportunity to comply” with the family ethic, such 
standards were even more damaging for Black women as they, “only deepened their oppression 
as women as well as [B]lacks” (Abramovitz 2018, 52). It was thus more difficult for poor women 
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to establish themselves as deserving of aid, as they had to both prove that they were not idle 
despite limited wage-earning opportunities for women, and also conform to the family ethic. 
Women who were not married nor widowed were more likely to be denied assistance. 
 Medical historians and sociologists typically identify a break with the moralist, patronage 
traditions of hospital access as hospitals increasingly vied for acclaim. Medical 
professionalization, specialization, the introduction of cutting edge technologies, and new stately 
accommodations on their paying wards transformed the hospital reputation at the end of the 19th 
century from a place of last resort, to a place that could for the first time offer more effective 
treatment than home care. These enhancements were expensive. As the hospital shifted at the 
turn of the century, the role of patients changed as well. Rather than poorer private hospital 
patients being recipients of charity from wealthy benefactors,  
commitment to charity care was lost in this transformation. Private patients were 
now expected to bear larger hospital bills, and potential patients unable (or 
unwilling) to do so were now more frequently referred to the local municipal 
hospital. The distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor was lost; 
now there were simply those who could pay, and those who couldn’t. Although 
private hospitals did continue to provide substantial amounts of uncompensated 
care, this was now seen as an ancillary goal of the hospital rather than the central 
goal in and of itself.       [Engel 2006, 13] 
There were separate wards for the poor and the wealthy, distinguished by fewer patients per 
room, quality of the food and furnishings, and attentiveness of the staff.  
However, moralizing poverty did not end as paying patients became more prevalent. It 
retained a connection with social class through work-based payment schemes. Company-
controlled physician care coupled with the earliest forms of accident insurance, such as those 
provided to railroad workers in the mid-19th century28, was an arrangement that benefitted 
 
28 After the Public Health Service subscription for health care for seamen, described below, the earliest 
health insurance policies in the United States were created in 1850 by the Franklin Health Insurance 
Company of Massachusetts to provide accident insurance to railroad and steamboat workers. 
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workers but also their employers who had some assurance of maintaining their able-bodied 
workforce (Scofea 1994, Starr 1982). When the federal government capped wages during World 
War II, offering health insurance as a fringe benefit was a crucial way companies competed for 
scarce workers. Departing from paternalistic industrial insurance, by the 1950s unions, 
“negotiate[d] the purchase of a fourth of the health insurance in America” (Starr 1982, 313). 
Though it may seem paradoxical, union bargaining power is part of the reason a universal health 
system failed to be established in the United States. Though weaker labor than that found in 
European countries is often blamed, organized labor has been strong enough in the United States 
to prevent attempts to create a national health system in order to retain employer-based insurance 
benefits within their domain of influence (Gottschalk 2000).  
Physical ability has persisted as a way to distinguish between categories of people in need 
of care, tied to working status. When public health insurance was finally established in the 
1960s, it was only for those who were elderly and presumed to be retired from their working 
lives, those who were disabled, or those who were poor and did not receive insurance through an 
employer. The parallel programs of Medicare and Medicaid retain Elizabethan conceits about the 
dangers of providing assistance to the “able-bodied.” While all those who are over a certain age 
or who have disabilities receive permanent insurance coverage through Medicare, demonstrating 
eligibility for Medicaid is more difficult, must be renewed, and has been redesigned many times 
due to fears of misuse by the undeserving. When these policies have been threatened over the 
years with calls for austerity, Medicare is often defended more vigorously as the more popular 
program, as recipients are culturally deemed to have earned their benefits over the course of their 
lives, or as a result of infirmity for which they are blameless29. Medicaid has been more fraught 
 
29 In emphasizing the long trajectory of differentiating between the deserving and undeserving poor in 
relation to ability to labor, I do not wish to imply Medicare has never been targeted as an expensive 
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with controversy. Just as welfare programs have been frequently targeted and redesigned with 
work requirements as a requisite for state benefits (Davis 2012, Mulligan and Casteñeda 2018), 
contemporary reform proposals, already enacted in some states, would require Medicaid 
recipients to secure employment in exchange for coverage30. Though this is the first time work 
requirements were applied to the health program, other measures intended to enforce personal 
responsibility such as requiring small, symbolic co-payments and premiums have been used for 
decades (Dao and Mulligan 2016). Responsibility for the care of the poor has transitioned in the 
United States from family and town, to state institution, to state-run federal programs. But this 
responsibility has been abstracted, as poor patients must increasingly engage with the health care 
market for their care.  
 In one sense, patients have been considered customers whenever there was payment 
exchanged for care. In early hospital contexts, the distinction in patient treatment based on 
whether and how much they were paying makes this especially apparent. In the context of state 
institutions such as workhouses and municipal hospitals, the patients did not pay for their care 
themselves, and were not conceptualized as customers. By creating insurance programs that such 
patients must enroll in in order for their care to be provided by private care and paid for publicly, 
the patients effectively became consumers financed by the state. This coincided with the first 
consumer-based movement at the turn of the century aimed at product safety, and led to the 
creation of the Food and Drug Administration (Tomes 2006). Conceiving of patients as 
consumers was intended to be empowering, emphasizing their right to information about their 
health and choice over their care: 
 
government program, or faced redesign as a cost-saving measure, rather that it is more popular and harder 
to malign than Medicaid due to its patient population.  
30 https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/understanding-the-intersection-of-medicaid-and-work-what-
does-the-data-say/ 
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Policy analysts began to think about the potential role of patients as customers in 
the 1930s, in response to the rapidly rising costs of medical care. Medical law and 
ethics embraced an implicit consumerist ethos starting in the 1960s, as an aspect 
of the patients' rights movement that challenged physician paternalism. The 
consumerist view gained additional force in the 1980s when public policy 
embraced market dynamics to restrain and rationalize medical expenditures. As 
debate ensued over the need to shield patients from various undesirable features 
of managed care that emerged from competitive health insurance, scholars 
focused on whether such laws should be expressed paternalistically, as patient 
protections, rather than in the more autonomy-enabling parlance of consumer 
rights. [Hall 2007, 586] 
Such legal arguments defined patients as consumers with consumer rights against a paternalistic 
medical model, maintaining worker/consumer relationship to care, rather than a human rights 
demand as seen in other countries (Biehl 2013, Petryna 2013). Neoliberal restructuring of public 
forms of support is a more recent influence in casting patients as consumers, part of a process 
often located in the 1980s shift to reliance on managed care in the U.S. rather than direct federal 
responsibility for patient care (Davis 2012, Hyatt 2011, Lyon-Callo and Hyatt 2004). 
Anthropologist Louis Lamphere has argued in relation to health care that the federal government 
“devolved” responsibility for care to the state level, where state governments then privatized and 
contracted out, “state services, assets, and functions to the private sector” (2005, 5). 
Responsibility for good care is then situated in patients based on the choices they make in the 
health care market (Craven 2007, Maskovsky 2000, Rosemary et al. 2006). Part of this 
responsibility takes the form of participating in government auditing practices of their care. 
Health care providers, particularly those working in programs for federally-defined categories of 
vulnerable populations, are also made responsible for justifying the need for special programs 
and funding for these populations, as will be discussed in later chapters.  
In contemporary health care settings, patients are in many ways defined by the ways in 
which their care is reimbursed. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) authorized the “Hospital Value-
Based Purchasing Program” for Medicare as a primary avenue through which U.S. healthcare 
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would be shifted from a “volume-based” to a “value-based” model of care. These terms 
reference a key problem within U.S. healthcare and the teeth of Value-Based Purchasing: 
reimbursement. Fee For Service has been the dominant reimbursement model in the U.S., 
rewarding hospital volume with more money. This is especially the case for Medicare, which 
typically reimburses at a higher rate than Medicaid, and is therefore a more attractive form of 
insurance for providers to bill. A central contention of the ACA is that this incentivized the 
provision of more clinical interventions and repeat hospital visits, regardless of patient need or 
most effective treatment options, simply to get more “heads in beds” and greater reimbursement. 
The transition represented by Value-Based Purchasing is ostensibly to shift the incentive to 
“value” instead, ideally providing care so effectively that patients will need fewer costly 
interventions in general, receiving the “right” care the first time so they do not need to be 
readmitted with a related complaint in the near future. In order to incentivize the shift from 
“volume” to “value,” Medicare began to withhold 1% of all hospital reimbursements to be 
redistributed based on how each hospital scored on related data sets reported annually to 
Medicare meant to quantitatively rank the value of care provided to patients. Once all the 
hospital scores were tallied, highly scoring hospitals would receive extra reimbursement as a 
bonus, using penalty funds culled from more poorly performing hospitals. 
To achieve this transition, Medicare began in 2012 by measuring two key aspects of 
patient care: the clinical process of care, and patient satisfaction, elicited through patient 
satisfaction surveys. In the first year, these two indicators were used to represent the value of 
care provided to patients. Over the next several years, clinical outcomes were added to the 
scoring, and then cost of care, until clinical outcomes, safety outcomes, costs, and patient 
satisfaction each received an equal 25% weight in the Value-Based Purchasing program scoring. 
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Patient satisfaction therefore retains significant influence over Medicare reimbursement. This is 
not a dynamic that is popular among health care providers. Using patient satisfaction to 
determine quality of care is frequently critiqued on the basis that patient perception of care often 
inaccurately reflects the reality of clinical care outcomes31. Giving patient voices one quarter of 
the scorecard over how the quality of their care is determined is an example of patients being 
construed as consumers, and this is born out in the strategies hospitals have adopted in order to 
raise their patient satisfaction scores32. In the context of Medicare and Medicaid, the patient has 
become a customer, making choices and assessing care experiences in a way that informs how 
that care is paid for.  
 
Second Aim: Populations  
 Patients do not just create data as individuals in ways that inform the shape of health care 
delivery and financing. Patients are also assessed in aggregate. The details about patient health 
and care are elicited routinely in standardized ways that are entered, typically in quantified form, 
into their health records. Patients provide information, or it is assessed about them, without an 
explicit focus on how their vitals, histories, and experiences are rendered into statistical 
information about larger groups of patients. Such records are compiled and fractionated, the 
elements of individual health peeled apart from the context of unique lives. In each record are 
boxes and lines to be checked and numbers entered, of blood pressures, body weight, smoking 
 
31 There has been a strong pushback by the medical community to this position, most dramatically in a 
study published by the American Medical Association, showing a strong correlation between high patient 
satisfaction survey scores, and higher rates of cost to the patient, over-medicating, and even death 
(basically, pressure to treat the patient as a customer who is always right leads to unnecessary hospital 
admissions, excessive costly tests, higher doses of pain medications, etc.) (Fenton et al 2012). 
32 Strategies have included scripting clinical interactions, and hiring consultants from companies like 
Disney to train health care providers in customer service and hospitality techniques (Boerner and Hwang 
2010, Hobbs & Mason 2012, Kowalczyk 2012). 
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habits, disease trajectories, and treatment regimes. Data of these details are used to make 
generalizable claims about groups of patients with particular diseases, socioeconomic or racial 
background, from particular neighborhoods, or being treated by different medical institutions or 
practices. Care of patients then is not just about the individuals who present with acute symptoms 
or chronic ailments in need of treatment, but the maintenance of aggregated patient data, and the 
categories of people that it represents. And just like individual patients, tracking them at the level 
of populations also has a history embedded in labor.  
Health records existed long before tools were developed to interpret them. Employers 
tracked worker absences, and cities collected cause from death certificates. Yet no statistical 
analysis was applied to health records until the 1820s; such a thing did not exist. The House of 
Commons in England first demanded a law of sickness be produced so insurance rates could be 
set according to the probability of risk. The actuary of the National Debt Office said it was 
impossible. Once it was determined that records of health information could be used to predict 
the chances of worker illnesses, the result was “an avalanche of printed numbers” (Hacking 
1990, 2). Within a few decades, the proliferation of information made it possible to define 
“normal” behavior, and to classify ever more deviancies and illnesses. It also necessitated new 
bureaucratic systems for collecting, storing, and creating meaning from collections of numbers.  
Labor and government oversight were two crucial catalysts for the creation and use of health 
statistics. The English government demanded a law of sickness be created because they were 
worried about the potential fraud and unionization that early insurance companies posed 
(Hacking 1990). From the first, statistics were used to enforce accountability and control labor.  
The use of statistics expanded, and logics of quantifying information about individuals so 
that generalizations and predictions could be made about populations spread. The avalanche 
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advanced quickly into business management. Following engineer Frederick Taylor, the actions 
of workers were broken into segments, quantifying the processes leading to the production of 
goods, and changing practices in order to maximize efficiency. Industrial factories and mills 
adopted Taylorist scientific management strategies, weakening laborers’ control over their work 
by simplifying, fragmenting, and standardizing it (Braverman 1998). Such strategies served to 
strengthen the influence of managers, who could compel workers to produce more in shorter 
amounts of time, reorganizing labor practices to maximize capital gain. This was made possible 
in part by cost accounting, when costs were standardized at the turn of the 20th century (Miller 
2001). Standardization lends itself to prediction. With set costs, managers could determine how 
much workers could produce over time, and more directly control efficiency.  
The principles of productivity and standardization were imported into the field of 
medicine, as hospitals have been increasingly led by executives with business degrees instead of 
medical licenses (Howell 1995). This has impacted hospitals and clinics in much the same way 
as it did factories. By demanding constant inscription of their activities, workers must make the 
value of their labor tangible, “as a vast paper empire which under capitalism becomes as real as 
the physical world, and which swallows ever increasing amounts of labor” (Braverman 1998, 
210). Efficiency calls for more records, and more standardization. As a result, “people who 
worked in the early twentieth-century hospital between 1900 and 1925 saw a 438-fold increase in 
the use of forms” (Howell 1995, 48). Patient records became longer, they required more people 
working within the hospital to add to them, and collecting consistent information about each 
patient became more imperative.  
 In addition to hospital patients assessed in the aggregate, population health also includes 
public health. However, in the context of the United States, the government never took control 
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over the health of populations to the degree of England or other European countries, instead 
largely exerting policy guidance and some oversight to private public health efforts. There were 
periods of more robust public health departments and public health facilities than exist currently, 
but they were always accompanied by private charitable organizations and services. The earliest 
examples of government medical facilities is a case in point. The very first federal health law in 
the U.S. was the creation of the U.S. Marine Hospital Service in 1798. The mission was one of 
public health from the start, serving as quarantine facilities for returning seamen, though the 
name was not changed to the Public Health Service (PHS) until 1912 reforms. At this time, the 
PHS was expanded, but given “few functions and little authority. The federal government 
continued to leave such matters to state and local government, and the general rule at those levels 
was to leave as much to private and voluntary action as possible” (Starr 1982, 240).  
 Public health for the poor was typically provided by wealthy women who formed civic 
societies, and visited the sick poor at home to promote “physical and moral hygiene” (Buhler-
Wilkerson 1989, 5). Protestant proselytizing was also common in early public health visiting, 
especially as poverty was seen as the result of moral deficiency. Such efforts of “scientific 
charity” followed the premise that poverty stemmed from immoral behaviors that, if addressed 
and altered in the right ways, could lift people out of poverty. Case management, now standard 
in social service work, is derived from this influence, as keeping records of the poor was part of 
their method. Catholic health and social service institutions were established in part to counteract 
the reach of such evangelism, and provide care for poor Catholics that did not endanger their 
faith (Katz 1986). The logics behind scientific charity, which were inspired by eugenics and 
social Darwinism, can be seen in contemporary work-based reforms for federal assistance.  
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Public health nurses in the United States, departing from the public financing of the 
district nursing model of England, were often initially funded by life insurance companies, not 
the local, state, or federal government33. The relationship between saving money and attending to 
the health of a population of people was clear, as was the relationship between work and those 
deserving of care. Visiting nurses were funded by businesses such as the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company to keep their industrial subscribers healthy for longer, protecting the 
business from making life insurance payments. This dynamic ended in the 1930s as, “from an 
insurance company’s perspective, the visiting nurse no longer seemed an economical method for 
preventing death. The reality was that as the care of the acutely ill increasingly became the 
responsibility of hospitals, the company found itself paying for the care of the chronically ill at 
home” (Buhler-Wilkerson 1989, 219). State-funded public health departments took over some of 
this role, but as Medicaid was expanded and the number of uninsured dropped dramatically, 
patients began receiving well-baby care from private maternity organizations, and immunizations 
from pharmacies and community health centers, reimbursed by insurance rather than free care 
provided by the state. The job of the city public health nurse is now largely administrative, 
tracking immunization and teen pregnancy rates that are treated by local private hospitals and 
clinics, rather than staffing a team of nurses to provide care directly, though a small number of 
vaccines are provided for refugees, immigrants, and others who may have difficulty becoming 
insured.  
 One of the most significant ways in which the federal government provides oversight 
over private hospitals is through routine auditing, however this work is also subcontracted 
through private organizations. One of the most influential, now called Joint Commission, 
 
33 For example, the Holyoke District Nursing Association was variably funded by the Massachusetts 
Mutual Life Insurance Company, private payments, and donations for charity cases. 
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developed through a century of efforts to standardize medical care and professions. In 1906, the 
Council on Medical Education, sponsored by Carnegie, commissioned a survey of all medical 
schools to establish quality control measures. This resulted in the Flexner Report, which 
established ratings for hospitals, and spurred the creation of medical professional quality 
committees, which produced the first hospital standards34 (Baer 2001, 36). These committees 
merged to form the Joint Commission35 in 1951. Though hospital review by this private body 
was completely voluntary, participation boomed as Congress declared Joint Commission 
accreditation sufficient for Medicare Conditions of Participation when it was created in 1965. 
President Lyndon Johnson wanted a smooth transition to Medicare, and relied on the existing 
Joint Commission review process so as many hospitals could participate as quickly as possible. 
Rather than create an entirely new system, the federal government relied on this private 
professional organization to audit health care quality in hospitals across the country. At this 
point, the government required no oversight of the Joint Commission’s accreditation decisions, 
unable to even access the reports they were based on. From the beginning, the provision of 
public health care was evaluated through a collection of private corporate interests. This was part 
of a larger shift in political ideology, strengthening the contention that private enterprise is a 
superior manager. By 1972, as Richard Nixon ran to serve a second term as President, Congress 
amended the Social Security Act to increase government oversight of the Joint Commission. This 
was spurred by charges of corruption and a lawsuit about the power and authority over care 
given to a private organization, led by consumer interest groups. Joint Commission retained 
control, with some adjustments. The new legislation required the accreditation body to share its 
 
34 American College of Surgeons, American Hospital Association, American Medical Association, 
American College of Physicians, Canadian Medical Association. 
35 Originally named Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), then Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) in 1987, and then The Joint Commission in 2007. 
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data with the federal government. Joint Commission instituted medical audits to assess quality of 
care, requiring accredited hospitals to be trained in quantitative reporting practices. At first, this 
was a meeting where clinical staff discussed medical cases to determine if the correct care 
interventions were made, but the documentation requirements intensified from there.  
 Through the Triple Aim, population health is viewed as a way of understanding the 
health of communities as a whole, a way to use data to identify health disparities and link them 
to structural deficits in access to health-promoting resources. The lens goes beyond access to 
care and focuses on what are called social determinants of health, such as access to education, 
employment, and opportunities to engage in healthy behaviors like physical activity and eating 
nutritious food. The broader context of health captured within social determinants of health are 
often referred to as environments. Furthermore, in order to address the health of populations and 
environments, the contemporary population health framework demands data. The Triple Aim has 
increased the quantity of screening questions related to social determinants of health that are 
collected during health care encounters. One way of capturing this data is through the use of Z-
codes in the most recent version of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems, or ICD-1036. Z-codes capture information about a patient that informs 
their health, but may not be a diagnosis in and of itself. For example, there is a Z-code for 
homelessness. As my research concluded, Saint Catherine’s hospital was training hospital staff to 
properly screen for and use the homelessness code when admitting patients, so the hospital could 
more easily assess how many homeless patients they treated in a month, or for referral to 
resources like Health Care for the Homeless (HCH). Without the standardized screening 
questions and code, staff just asked for a patient’s address. HCH staff would then comb through 
 
36 ICD is a categorized list of medical classifications coded by the World Health Organization, currently 
in its tenth revision. These codes are standard across all EMRs, as they are used for reporting and billing. 
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these entries later for shelter, soup kitchen, food pantry, or other known addresses homeless 
patients would use. Population health measures such as Z-codes were not taken up as urgently by 
health care providers as other Triple Aim-aligned methods in large part because they are not 
currently linked to reimbursement. However, as states experiment with large-scale capitated 
payment models such as Accountable Care Organizations37 to address the health needs of 
vulnerable populations, population health tools will likely multiply. 
 
Third Aim: Costs  
 Addressing the health of populations is often justified as being a cost saving measure in 
the long run, as preventing disease is more affordable than treating it. This is especially true of 
vulnerable populations that, as described in chapter one, are often costlier to treat. The moral 
deficiencies that were imagined to cause poverty have been recast as “health behaviors” that lead 
to worse outcomes and higher costs. No longer paupers, the poor who are not insured through an 
employer or otherwise wealthy enough to privately purchase coverage are still separated into a 
category of care for which they must demonstrate their need, proxy for their deservingness. The 
cost of their care sets institutional policies, as significant proportions of hospital reimbursement 
is derived from Medicaid and Medicare patients. As Donald Berwick and his colleagues wrote in 
the years preceding his appointment to CMS, “the great task in policy is not to claim that 
stakeholders are acting irrationally, but rather to change what is rational for them to do” (2008, 
761). Changes to the payment structures are often techniques to change behaviors and demand 
responsibility rather than just achieve efficiency in numbers.  
 
37 Accountable Care Organizations, or ACOs, are a payment model outlined within the ACA that applies 
quality-based payment plans to networks of doctors and hospitals, who are collectively responsible for the 
health outcomes and costs of a population of patients.  
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Just as the identity of patients and methods for tracking population health were connected 
with labor, so are the methods for assigning costs to and paying for care. As Frederick Taylor 
was developing scientific management, there were aligned movements in calculating 
technologies. In 1885, Dorr E. Felt invented the “comptometer” adding machine for calculating 
large numbers. Four years later, statistician Herman Hollerith invented the punch card, used to 
record data that could be read by a machine, and a technology that would contribute to the 
invention of modern computers. These innovations aided cost accounting, used in hospitals to 
“emulate businesses, including not only railroads but also factories, the arena in which many 
Americans at the turn of the twentieth century saw science as having its most visible successes” 
(Howell 1995, 34). By the late 19th century, there was generally one superintendent in charge of 
all hospital finances and bookkeeping. By this time, costs had been standardized, making “it 
possible to govern the future actions of the individual according to prescribed standards and 
deviation from an economic norm” (Miller 2001, 385). Setting the cost of medical interactions 
enabled care to be assessed, designed, and critiqued on the basis of the financial efficiency of 
each incidence of treatment. In other words, “as a technology of government, one of the principal 
achievements of management accounting is to link together responsibility and calculation… 
accounting has become a body of expertise focused on exacting responsibility from individuals 
rendered calculable and comparable” (Miller 2001, 380). From this source stems all the efforts to 
reorganize payment models and incentives to reduce health care costs, as patient and provider 
behaviors can be linked to financial figures, and tracked over time and compared to others in 
order to establish patterns. 
 Over the course of three U.S. presidencies, greater government interest in the storage and 
transmission health care information also indicated a shift in its role. President Bill Clinton 
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called the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) a step towards “health 
care security,”38 as the health records covered by the act were deemed personal and in need of 
protection. President George W. Bush called EMRs an improvement in the “quality and 
efficiency of health care.”39 Obama called the expansion of their use necessary to, “reduce the 
duplication and waste”40 of health care costs. By this point, the imagination for health 
information had expanded. Instead of being just a more confidential version of paper files, 
records became dynamic tools. Once computerized, they could be used to improve the health 
care process itself. They were no longer merely records of what occurred within hospital and 
clinic walls, but evidence that could be used to transform how care was delivered and paid for.  
 This framework was borrowed. The idea that information about how health care is 
provided could improve efficiency and quality, and reduce duplication and waste, are derived 
verbatim from business management models, and particularly those from industrial contexts. 
This is not a coincidence. By the end of Bill Clinton’s presidency, the Japanese business models 
honed by and often attributed to the Toyota car company had been imported to the United States, 
largely through Cambridge, Massachusetts. Organizational studies of car manufacturers around 
the world demonstrated that the most successful shared philosophies about kaizen, continuous 
improvement at every level. In 1990, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
 
38 William J. Clinton, “Statement on Signing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996,” August 21, 1996. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53211. 
39 George W. Bush, “Executive Order 13335—Incentives for the Use of Health Information Technology 
and Establishing the Position of the National Health Information Technology Coordinator,” April 27, 
2004. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=61429. 
40 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President and Vice President at Signing of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act” (speech, Denver, Colorado, February 17, 2009), Obama White House Archives, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signing-
american-recovery-and-reinvestment-act 
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International Motor Vehicle Program published the results of a collaborative, international study 
of hundreds of businesses in the automotive industry, including design, supply, and manufacture 
(Womack et al 1990). This text popularized the term “Lean” to describe the collective 
innovations of Japanese business management techniques. In the same year, Harvard Pilgrim 
Health Care’s Quality-of-Care Measurement Department published the preliminary results of the 
National Demonstration Project on Quality Improvement in Health Care from hospitals and 
clinics across the United States (Berwick et al 1990). Both volumes conclude unequivocally that 
Japanese business principles can and should be used to transform other industries for maximum 
value and quality. These ideas, and the people who imported and tweaked them, have become 
prominent in health care management.  
  Lean manufacturing had been known in some sectors of the U.S. for decades, having 
been originally introduced by the Japanese engineer Taiichi Ohno, who is largely responsible for 
its innovations. However, Lean was marginalized due to frequent criticism that it was “too 
Japanese,” or otherwise less compatible than models developed in the U.S. It was not until 
American industries began importing Toyota’s management ideas, and rebranding them,41 that 
they began to take hold. Part of this process was historically identifying the roots of these models 
in the U.S. These genealogies typically situate W. Edwards Deming and Joseph Juran as the 
Americans who brought quality control methods to Japan in the wake of World War II. Further 
back, the origin of constant quality improvement is identified in the early automotive industry. 
Henry Ford is identified as a forefather, credited for innovations like interchangeable parts, 
 
41 While there are nearly a dozen names attributed to Japanese-inspired models, “Lean” (Womack et al 
1990) and “Six Sigma” (Motorola, General Electric) are the most influential in health care, where they are 
often combined. Lean was coined to emphasize waste-reduction, contrasted with the glut of materials 
used in mass production. Six Sigma references statistical analysis in manufacturing modelling, and is 
used to describe the ideal percentage of errors. 
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assembly lines, and a division of labor that radically decreased the skill and training required of 
employees. This sped up the production process, and lowered the cost of the final products, 
opening them to a broader base of consumers.  
In many ways, a Massachusetts Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) is responsible 
for the translation of these business models into the Quality Improvement processes that have 
become standard across the fragmented U.S. health system. The Dean of Harvard42 Medical 
School created the first non-profit health plan and HMO in New England in 1969, Harvard 
Community Health Plan. Businessman Thomas Pyle became CEO in 1978. He made many 
changes at the insurance company, including “giving nurse practitioners a greater role, 
embracing computerized medical records in their nascent days, and -- to the chagrin of many 
doctors -- finding ways to measure the quality of care.” Pyle was convinced that health care 
would be more efficient and affordable if it conformed to the same business logics of other 
industries. His last effort towards this alignment was an attempt to reimburse providers based on 
their productivity, or the number of patients they saw, a piecework approach imported from 
industrial production. He resigned in 1991 due to protest from the HMO’s physicians that this 
was “assembly line medicine.” Upon resigning, he moved to competitor MetLife Insurance 
Company, and was invited by President Bill Clinton to contribute to his administration’s health 
reform plan in 1993. Though this plan was ultimately unsuccessful, Pyle’s perspective would 
influence the next great federal reform of health care. 
 Quality-of-Care Measurement was a brand new department at Harvard Community 
Health Plan when pediatrician Donald Berwick was appointed its Vice President in 1983. Pyle 
 
42 Harvard remains influential in the state. As I returned to my field site in 2015, Charlie Baker was 
inaugurated as the Governor of Massachusetts. He had been CEO of the renamed Harvard Pilgrim Health 
Care from 1999 until 2009, when he left to run unsuccessfully in his first gubernatorial election. 
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created the department specifically to standardize health processes, and pushed Berwick to mine 
companies in other industries for ideas. Berwick was angry, at first, that Pyle required him to 
attend monthly modules from business schools for two years. It was in this role that Berwick 
would become inspired by the business philosophies of Japanese manufacturing. “Quality” had 
become a central concern in U.S. health care by that point, and Berwick sought a process that 
would improve efficiency without being punitive to physicians. He tested gemba kaizen43 
principles of Continuous Quality Improvement in health care settings, as principal investigator of 
the National Demonstration Project on Quality Improvement in Health Care from 1987 through 
1991. He proposed that this system of management, in which every employee is charged with 
maintaining the highest standards in every element of their work, could be applied to health care. 
It requires constant assessment, reporting, testing, and improvement. At the end of four years, he 
was convinced that Total Quality Management was the solution to escalating costs and 
stagnating health outcomes. The John A. Hartford foundation, which funded the project, offered 
Berwick continued funding to open a non-profit to extend this work. The Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement (IHI), and Berwick as its CEO, became very influential.  
In an interview with Managed Care Magazine in 1999, Berwick identified the division 
between finances and patient care as a central problem in health care (Mullen 1999). Doctors 
controlled patient care, and managers controlled resources and finances. This, Berwick argued, 
set up a contentious relationship, in which doctors were perceived as caring only about patients 
regardless of cost, and managers concerned only with finances. Referring to patient care as the 
“core product” of health care, he declared that if healthcare were to follow other industries, 
 
43 “Kaizen” is a Japanese word meaning positive change that has become central to the business 
philosophy of continuous quality improvement at every level of business, with “gemba” referring to the 
site of the change.  
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managers would know more about medicine, and doctors would be more responsible for costs. 
The balancing of cost and care was not a new concern, as managed care organizations had tried 
innovating solutions to the perceived crisis of health care costs since their rise to ubiquity in the 
1970s (Mulligan 2014). Capitation reimbursement, in which physicians received a set amount of 
funds to treat each patient, regardless of intervention, was one such attempt that became a 
managed care standard in the 1980s. What the industry needed, Berwick argued, was a system-
level change. Instead of only altering reimbursement or practice, all elements of patient care and 
health provision would need to be reworked into a coherent structure.  
This is the argument that led to the ‘Triple Aim,’ the most significant framework of the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement44. Created in 2007 while Berwick still led the institute, it 
was designed to simultaneously lower costs, and improve population health and patient 
experience. When President Obama passed the Affordable Care Act in 2010, he appointed 
Berwick the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as a result 
of his work at the Institute for Healthcare Improvement. As specified in the language of the 
ACA, CMS is one of 22 government agencies or departments45 tasked with forming an 
Interagency Working Group on Health Care Quality. Quality measures are defined in the 
Affordable Care Act as “a standard for measuring the performance and improvement of 
 
44 The Triple Aim framework did not appear overnight. Berwick mentioned a four aim approach as early 
as the 1999 interview, but “staff morale and satisfaction” had since been removed (Mullen 1999). In the 
2008 article announcing the framework44, Berwick and his colleagues said that equity should be 
prioritized in health policy change: “the gain in health in one subpopulation ought not to be achieved at 
the expense of another subpopulation. But that decision lies in the realms of ethics and policy; it is not 
technically inherent in the Triple Aim” (Berwick, Nolan, and Whittington 2008:760). This demonstrates 
that though Berwick believed that staff morale and equity were important for health care delivery, he 
intentionally left them out of his framework, deeming it the responsibility of government policies. This is 
ironic, considering his contention that a physician/manager divide in obligation between responsibility for 
care and costs was part of the motivation for developing this approach. 
45 HHS, CMS, NIH, CDC, FDA, HRSA, AHRQ, ONC HIT, SAMHSA, DOC, OMB, USCG, FBP, 
NHTSA, FTC, SSA, DOL, OPM, DOE, DOD, VA, VHA, etc. (HR 3590 – 263) 
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population health or of health plans, providers of services, and other clinicians in the delivery of 
health care services” (HR 3590 – 263). CMS and the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) were specifically charged with helping the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) identify quality measurement gaps three times a year, and help create new 
measures to address them. This positioned Dr. Berwick to make the quality frameworks he 
developed at the Institute for Healthcare Improvement into national health standards. 
 
Conclusion 
Introduction of the Triple Aim framework was not a new break within the context of a 
formerly strong system of federally guaranteed and provided health care, but rather a moment of 
intensification that reflects Liberal ideologies of personal accountability and preference for 
private benefactors and industrial business models traced back through the founding of the settler 
colonial state, and across the Atlantic to English laws governing the poor. These policies defined 
responsibility to care for the poor and the sick against the individual’s ability and responsibility 
to be employed as early as the 16th century. There is a similarly long trajectory for tracking, 
aggregating, and using health information as a means for making generalizing claims about 
populations, organizing plans to address their needs, and instituting policies to influence their 
behaviors. Data is newly “big”— ubiquitous, constantly collected, and shared instantaneously 
(Beer 2016)—but it has permeated health care and informed the treatment of patients and the 
payment of care for over a century. The longevity of these dimensions of care in the U.S. reflect 
the depth of their influence. It is within this context that health care providers treat vulnerable 
populations today, and innovate ways of reporting that enable them to help sustain systems of 
care for their patients. 
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Chapter 3 | Authoring Data: Back Walls & Front Desk Girls 
 
Health Care for the Homeless 
“This is the part of town where you read about the shootings,” the nurse practitioner 
Clara tells me from the driver’s seat of her car. It’s 7:45 on a July morning. We pass the skeletal 
frames of burnt out buildings, dusty vacant lots, and a police station flanked by cruisers. We pull 
between two buildings, the homeless shelter and the newer resource center, where the main 
Health Care for the Homeless (HCH) clinic is housed. As we enter, a staff member nods from 
behind a reception window to the left. A security guard stares blankly from his stool next to the 
large cafeteria ahead. My guide turns right. The clinic door snaps unlocked with the wave of her 
magnetic key fob, first upon entering the waiting room, and again as she passes through another 
locked door into the clinic itself. A woman wipes down the reception counter with a disinfectant 
cloth. She’s introduced as Marta, a case manager who frequently fills in as a receptionist. Clara 
explains, “we don’t have a separate position for that.” Clara guides me past a nursing station, 
where nurses do intake assessments and case managers check MassHealth46 enrollment status on 
two black computers. There is a small break room, a lab room for blood draws and 
immunizations, a room for mental health visits, and three exam rooms with paper-clad 
examination tables. The last few rooms hold the dental clinic, which is only staffed a few days a 
week, and a bathroom. 
By 8:00 am, all staff working at the Springfield site that morning stand in a circle behind 
the locked clinic door for their daily morning “huddle.” Patients wait at empty tables in the 
shelter cafeteria, or smoke cigarettes by the main entrance where they greeted the providers as 
 
46 MassHealth is Massachusetts Medicaid  
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they arrived for the day. Nurse practitioners, registered nurses, case managers, and mental health 
counselors, quickly discuss updates about the patients they may see today, both those scheduled 
and those likely to walk in for impromptu visits. The staff share information, naming patients 
who recently had their medication changed, those who are in jail or detox, and how they can 
cover each other’s patients when a few providers take upcoming vacation days. They disperse, 
mainly filing away into the various clinic rooms. Marta remains at the front desk, checking the 
status of MassHealth applications that she has filed for patients online before sliding open the 
glass reception window to speak to queued up patients. Once the first checks in, Marta pushes a 
button that unlocks the clinic door, and a waiting nurse guides him to the nursing station to check 
his vitals and begin asking questions to be recorded in his medical record. Marta answers the 
phone. She switches to Spanish, pulls up the patient schedule in the reception computer, and 
creates a new appointment. She reaches for her folder of paper MassHealth files, filled out earlier 
in the week but still needing to be faxed to the state office,47 when more patients arrive at the 
window. She checks them in for appointments, adds some to the walk-in schedule, passes some 
their medications that are kept at the clinic for safekeeping, and answers yet more phone calls.  
She is finally faxing the MassHealth forms during a mid-morning lull when the nurse 
practitioner Patricia calls her over to an exam room to translate. Marta sits between the nurse 
practitioner and the patient. Eyes flick to Marta periodically during the visit, but for the most part 
she is facilitating conversation for others. Patricia looks into the medical record on her computer 
and asks what each listed medication is being taken for. As the patient explains, Marta translates, 
waiting for the pauses the patient leaves every few sentences so she has an opportunity to catch 
 
47 MassHealth applications are typically digital, but after Massachusetts joined the national health 
insurance system, the changes slowed the digital enrollment platform dramatically. Enrollment specialists 
began filling out paper copies of the enrollment forms and faxing them in because it was faster and more 
reliable than the digital application.  
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Patricia up in English. This ebb and flow is practiced, and all are used to this reliance on a third 
person for communicating health information. From my corner between the examination table 
and the sink, I catch about half of what is said in Spanish, my fluency limited to a few years of 
high school courses and the many cognates shared by conversational Portuguese. Sometimes 
there is much more said in Spanish than is eventually relayed in English, Marta explaining 
questions in more detail or responding directly to clarifying questions without checking in with 
Patricia, who seems unconcerned. It is a skill Marta will later tell me she honed as a child, 
standing beside her parents in Massachusetts clinics after they moved from Puerto Rico, 
translating their words to doctors. Patricia types Marta’s words into the patient’s medical record, 
the patient’s account of her own health distilled through Marta’s skill and experience as a 
translator, a case manager, and from a previous job as a certified Medical Assistant.  
Marta has very little to translate in the last several minutes of the visit, so she sits quietly 
and waits to return to her files. Patricia, who took an introductory Spanish course a few years 
ago, recites Spanish cues for the physical exam. “Mira” she says, and looks in the patient’s eyes 
with the scope. “Abre la boca y repete ‘ah,’” and looks in her open mouth. When listening to the 
patient’s chest, Patricia instructs her to take a few deep breaths, “Abre la boca y 
respire profunda. Otra vez. Otra vez. Esta bien.” Then prodding different areas of the patient’s 
body to locate any pain, she asks, “Dolor aqui? Dolor aqui?” She checks the patient's reflexes 
with a plastic hammer. Then Patricia tells the patient to call her, “Llámeme!,” when she needs 
her next refill, and Marta translates the context as she leads the woman out of the exam room. 
Patricia later explains that it is important to her to speak to her patients directly when she can, 
but that she relies on Marta and other fluent case managers to get through the details of visits 
such as these. She believes going through the physical examination in Spanish helps her establish 
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trust with exclusively Spanish-speaking patients, but the amount of information she needs 
conveyed both to and from the patient in each visit necessitates additional support. 
Marta’s pattern repeats – answering calls, checking in patients, translating for the 
providers – so that by the end of the day, Marta has completed very little of her own case 
management work. Yet, she has facilitated the clinic running smoothly, patients being seen and 
understood by providers, and being scheduled for future visits. Eventually, when she has time to 
complete her MassHealth files, she will also have made it possible for the clinic to be reimbursed 
by insurance for the care they have provided. The complex assortment of her daily tasks enables 
patient care to take place, be recorded, and submitted in reports. However, it shoulders a vital but 
unspoken role in producing the data itself, as patient and provider words are distilled, clarified, 
and enhanced through the case manager. Marta’s work is part of the shadow standard, unseen but 
undergirding the health data that is submitted to funders and auditors. 
 This chapter describes the organization of work at the two clinics at the center of this 
dissertation in order to identify who is at the table and who is in the shadows in the production of 
health care data. Like many community-based programs, both Health Care for the Homeless 
(HCH) and the Program for All-Inclusive Care of the Elderly (PACE) rely on a team-based 
approach of “wrap-around” care, that acknowledges and seeks to address many factors that 
influence a person’s health beyond pathogens and injuries. Yet not all team members are equally 
present as patient records are created or reported. The HCH case managers are diverted from 
their work assisting patients with housing and health insurance applications, in order to do work 
that enables the health care encounters where health information is elicited and recorded, as they 
manage patient appointments, fax, scan, and attach into digital files referrals and patient records. 
The influence of PACE certified nurse assistants (CNAs) often enters the records indirectly, 
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through handwritten notes about elderly patient behavior in the margins of their timesheets, or 
securely emailed or texted to their Registered Nurse (RN) supervisor, who attends team 
meetings. CNAs and case managers provide Spanish language translation for patients and 
providers. At both clinics, the insights of these workers are thus refracted through the lens of 
more highly paid professionals.  
Where other studies on the staff dynamics of community clinics have similarly 
emphasized professional hierarchies in medical fields limiting the power and consideration of 
case managers (Brodwin 2013), the roles of language and race in this field site were so pervasive 
that they deserve to be analyzed in their own right. Language maintains these professional 
dynamics in two central ways. First, many patients in these settings speak only Spanish, and the 
registered nurses and other medical professionals rarely do. This places greater dependence on 
the support staff, often case managers or certified nurse assistants (CNAs), who are more often 
bilingual as a preferred condition of being hired. Second, in the process of inscribing the medical 
records with information about patients, the nurses often rely on the verbal or unofficially written 
reports of the case managers and CNAs to populate patient records. In both cases, these workers 
are essential for eliciting information from patients, and delivering it to the nurses and other 
providers who control the patient records, both their creation and their modification into reports 
for compliance and reimbursement. However, this does not ensure a higher valuation of these 
workers. Structurally, the professions are racially segmented in line with national norms, with 
white and Asian women most often in the higher paying roles of registered nurse, nurse 
practitioner, physician, or other health profession requiring a college degree rather than a 
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certification program48. Furthermore, despite the reliance on and spoken valuation of these 
workers for translating patient words and experiences, the way the documentation process is 
organized results in their role being silenced in the records. There is a process of muted 
racialization (Davis 2007) at play in these clinics, in which the value of Spanish is ideologically 
restricted to a reporting tool, and providers actively avoid identifying race as a central way in 
which their work spaces and colleagues are organized. This process is part of the shadow 
standard in U.S. health care, the unofficial work that is routinely done to make data creation and 
reporting appear consistent and comprehensive to funders and auditors. Latina women are 
sidelined, often literally, in the creation of data that they are critical for producing, and their 
professional roles become part of the shadow. Their exclusion is verbalized and condoned as 
mere professional boundaries, but reinforces a clear racial distinction in roles, authority, and 
voice. 
 Anthropologists have spent the last few decades reflecting on authorship practices within 
their own discipline and professional activities. This is often in response to feminist or post-
modern anxieties about scholarly representation of our interlocutors, and the way this reflects the 
exploitative patriarchal and colonial ancestry of the discipline, and how our work can instantiate 
unequal power dynamics (Clifford and Marcus 1986 , Mascia-Lees, Sharpe, and Cohen 1989, 
Watanabe 1995). However, recently anthropologists have looked at their collaboration with 
colleagues as well, from shared research endeavors to attribution in personal conversations 
(Graber 2010, Gupta 2014). Questioning the degree to which the insights of research assistants 
shape the pursuit and interpretation of data, Akhil Gupta writes, “What emerges in print and in 
 
48 For example, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of 2018, 70.1% of all physicians and 
surgeons were White, and 19.8% were Asian. This is compared to 7.6% and 7.4% of Black and Hispanic 
or Latino people in this profession, respectively.  
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presentations, therefore, is a highly mediated product, the result of the labor of many different 
people. And, yet, the conventions of academic writing privilege only the labor of one individual 
– ‘the author’” (2014, 396). Many contributors being overshadowed to privilege one voice as 
author is mirrored in the clinical dynamics. I argue that authorship bears an important role in the 
creation of shadow standards, as the exertion of power and influence is not just being credited 
with the text and final analysis, but also the decisions about patient care that the documents 
represent. The providers who type, edit, and submit patient records and care plans do not expect 
or receive personalized acknowledgment to add to their resumes, but their authority is co-
constituted in authoring the data. Simultaneously, those whose work and insights shape the 
records that the providers create, but who do not type them up themselves, experience an erasure 
of their contributions that is made tangible through the recording process.  
 
Program for All-Inclusive Care of the Elderly 
The Program for All-Inclusive Care of the Elderly (PACE) is located in an old building 
on a hill that the Sisters of Saint Catherine’s initially built as an orphanage. Upon entering, after 
being dropped off at the door by a small fleet of transport vans, participants are greeted by the 
receptionist Gabriela, who clips a photo ID to their shirts before guiding them to the right, to the 
main activity room. Black and white photographs of the children who grew up here line the 
walls, interspersed by black and white portraits of elderly participants in the current program. At 
least one person is pictured twice, once as a young orphan, and again as an old man, now a 
fixture in a building where he has spent the beginning and end of his life. Gabriela guides them 
to tables where they will have breakfast and coffee. Later they will transition to activities like 
games of dominos or billiards, prayer services, or arts and crafts. The room leads to a smaller 
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indoor activity room that is often used for exercise classes like yoga. Next is the gym, where the 
occupational and physical therapists work with participants to maintain or improve their mobility 
and functionality, or where participants can come to use the exercise equipment independently. 
A small memory care room is decorated with subdued colors and abstract patterns for 
participants with advanced dementia. There are also small rooms for napping, meditation, and 
personal care. Washing machines and dryers hum in the laundry. The rooms to the left of the 
reception desk are for staff: family and employee meeting rooms, social worker and homecare 
offices, and a clinic. The outpatient clinic has a waiting room with reception, four exam rooms, a 
lab for bloodwork, utility rooms, and a medication room mostly stocked with antibiotics. Further 
down the hall, through a locked glass door, are administrative offices. 
 At 8:30 am, like every weekday morning, the PACE staff that begin their shift at the Day 
Center crowd into the large conference room before the participants arrive. The Program 
Director, Registered Nurse Alison, reads a morning reflection, and then declares it “staffing” 
time, listing which staff members are out today. The enrollment specialist, Jazmin, announces 
the names of patients visiting today for assessment, and their schedule. To enter PACE, Jazmin 
assesses whether candidates qualify financially, meeting the standards to enroll in both Medicaid 
and Medicare, or if they could meet these standards if they rearranged their assets49. Candidates 
aged 55 years or older then have to be assessed by a Registered Nurse to determine if they would 
qualify for nursing home care, requiring assistance with “Activities of Daily Living,” or ADLs, 
such as dressing, feeding, walking, movement in bed, transferring out of bed or a chair, and 
toileting. The staff then discuss each candidate individually to decide if the program can 
 
49 Similar to nursing home eligibility, participants who do not immediately quality for Medicaid must pay 
the facility or program out of pocket after Medicare, until they have spent down their resources and 
become considered low-income enough to qualify for Medicaid. Alternatively, participants can shift 
assets like homes to others in order to qualify for Medicaid sooner. 
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adequately provide assistance so the person can safely remain living “in the community,” which 
typically means in their own homes, in a relative’s home, or in an assisted living facility, instead 
of being institutionalized in a nursing home. Next in the meeting, the Program Director Alison 
says, “thank you,” and half of the staff leave. The bus drivers, predominantly middle-aged men, 
head out to pick up more patients from their homes. The Day Center aides, female Certified 
Nurse Assistants (CNAs) by training, walk down the hall to prepare the main activity room for 
the incoming patients who will be attending the Day Center today. The receptionist takes her 
place at the front desk to answer phones and greet patients. The Medical Assistant crosses the 
hall to the clinic to prepare her paperwork for the morning’s scheduled patients.  
 In the large conference room, the daily Interdisciplinary Team (IDT) meeting begins. The 
staff that remain in the room are health professionals from a variety of disciplines: physicians, 
nurse practitioners, registered nurses, clinical social workers, physical therapists, occupational 
therapists, and registered dietitians. Sometimes schedulers sit in as well to help coordinate 
changes to patient schedules for transportation or home care. They sit around a long table facing 
the Electronic Medical Record (EMR) projected onto a screen. Usually during these meetings, 
the providers create care plans for approximately eight new patients that are enrolled each 
month, and then update current patient care plans on a six-month cycle. They discuss care 
requests that their patients make, asking for ramps to be added to their homes, more in-home 
assistance for dressing and bathing, or medical devices like dentures. They decide whether to 
approve more CNA hours for laundry for one patient, and pain medication for another.  
When the conversation begins to turn to hospitalization prevention or changing goals of 
care, they decide to defer it to the back-to-back Thursday afternoon meetings called Morbidity 
and Mortality (M&M) and Participants At Risk (PAR). For PAR especially, they prefer to have 
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the CNAs that work as Aides in the Day Center and patient homes in the meeting, as they see 
more of the patients than any other staff, and often speak with patients more, in part due to 
Spanish language fluency. The CNAs shuffle in towards the end of the M&M meetings, dipping 
their hands into bags of the eponymous chocolate candies ironically circulated each week. The 
seats at the long table at the room’s center are taken by the predominantly White IDT providers, 
who have been sitting there for the last hour discussing how to prevent unnecessary 
hospitalizations for patients who recently ended up in the Emergency Department. The 
predominantly Puerto Rican CNAs settle into the seats on the periphery of the room, a second 
ring of chairs behind those at the table, pushed up against the walls. When they are invited to 
PAR at the end of the day on Thursdays, something has already gone wrong with a patient. The 
CNAs are never in the room for morning IDT meetings. They do not directly collaborate on the 
design or updates to care plans in the EMR. Those who are working in patient homes are 
assisting with showers, finishing loads of laundry, and helping patients get onto the vans on time. 
Those in the Day Center are welcoming patients off the vans, assisting with breakfast and 
scheduled morning activities. Their work is represented in the Inter-Disciplinary Team by their 
managers, an RN that visits patients at home to check on medications and home safety, and 
another who assesses the patients who come into the Day Center. Their verbal and written 
reports, sometimes hand-scrawled details on the back of timesheets or texted in a secure phone 
messaging application, become part of the RN manager’s understanding of each participant, and 
helps managers to more accurately represent participant needs in IDT meetings, so their care 
plans can be constantly adjusted and customized. Their insights are routinely infused into patient 
records in this way, but they do not directly write care plans or make the decisions that they 
reflect.  
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Segmenting the Nursing Profession 
The racial separation in occupation represented here is not unique to these programs, the 
region, the state, or this moment in time. Just under 90% of all Registered Nurses (RN), Licensed 
Practical Nurses (LPN), and Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs)50 in 2018 were women, 
testifying to the persistence of the intensive gendering of these professions. However, the racial 
and ethnic breakdown of these roles, as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, reveal a 
distinct pattern.51 Three quarters of all RNs are white. However, their representation in the other 
two nursing roles drops in line with the decrease in reimbursement, professional status, and 
educational attainment; 62% of LPNs and 55.8% of CNAs are White. The direction is reversed 
for Black and Hispanic or Latino nurses: 13.1% of RNs, 30.4% of LPNs, and 35.8% of CNAs are 
Black; 7.2% of RNs, 11.5% of LPNs, and 16.3% of CNAs are Hispanic or Latino.  
Three racial and one ethnic category cannot accurately represent the identities and 
experiences of the entire U.S. workforce. For example, there are a large number of Filipina RNs 
in the U.S. as a result of a combination of colonialism, privileged immigration, and targeted 
training programs to address U.S. nursing shortages (Choy 2003). By the 1970s, 60% of all 
immigrant nurses in the U.S. were Filipino Americans (Choy, 2003, 168), but this is not 
 
50 Certified Nursing Assistants, and other service occupations classified as “Nursing, psychiatric, and 
home health aides,” by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
51 These numbers should be considered within the context of overall workforce participation: women 
made up 46.9% of the labor force in 2018 (which demonstrates that 90% of the nursing workforce being 
women is significant). Similarly, 78% of the workforce was White, 12.3% was Black, 6.3% was Asian, 
and 17.3% was Hispanic or Latino. This does not take into consideration that the population overall, 
according to the Census, contains more White people – according to the Demographic and Housing 
Estimates from the 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, 75.5% of the U.S. 
population identified as White, 13.9% identified as Black, 6.3% identified as Asian, and 17.6% identified 
as Hispanic or Latino. This demonstrates comparable workforce participation by race or ethnicity. By the 
logic of official U.S. statistics, these numbers do not add up to 100% by profession because Hispanic or 
Latino is designated as an ethnicity and not a race, and therefore someone identifying as Hispanic would 
also have to choose either White, Black or Asian, and also be represented under that racial category. 
Respondents can also select more than one race, and also often leave race blank. 
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generalizable to all those categorized as Asian on the U.S. Census, where just one fifth of all 
those who marked Asian as their racial category specifically identified as Filipino in 2010. It is 
also not generalizable across the map. The populations that make up these broad census 
categories are spread across the U.S. in a variety of patterns. Massachusetts has the fifth largest 
population of Puerto Ricans in the U.S, and they represented a third of the population in the city 
of Springfield, where this research largely took place. Though 16.3% of CNAs are Hispanic or 
Latino in the U.S. overall, it is much higher in a city like Springfield. 
Contemporary statistical data affirms that the occupational divisions seen in the HCH and 
PACE programs are not unusual. Historical scholarship confirms that they are not coincidental. 
Despite the interdisciplinary structure of the two clinics discussed in this dissertation, both are 
largely staffed and managed by different categories of nurses. Therefore, examining the 
trajectory of nursing professionalization sheds some light on the present segmentation of the 
workplaces in question. According to sociologist Nona Glazer, “Segmentation refers to 
hierarchically ranked labor markets across which there is virtually no worker mobility; these 
markets differ from each other in wage levels and benefits, steadiness of employment, job 
autonomy, and other conditions of employment” (1991, 352). Following anthropologist Leith 
Mullings, we can examine the ways in which labor market segmentation reflects race, class, and 
gender “as axes of stratification… fluid systems that intersect in different ways for different 
populations at different historical periods” (1997, 7). The racial and gender divisions in 
occupational access, status, and influence found in contemporary clinics mirrors the societal 
divisions that characterized the development of medical professions.  
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Segmentation was explicitly central to the professionalization strategy of nursing.52 The 
work was gendered in the United States even before it left the home, with women extending their 
‘natural’ caring capacities to tend to sick relatives and neighbors. Elite women tended to the sick 
in almshouses and other early hospitals as charitable and uncompensated work. As hospitals 
transformed in the 19th century, and admitted the wealthy (albeit in separate sections of the 
institution with better and more private amenities) instead of being only the last resort for the 
destitute unable to purchase private home care, it necessitated an increase in people to provide 
that care. Unable to sustain on the good will of wealthy white women alone (or the destitute 
women who provided care in exchange for room and board, an association early hospital leaders 
wanted to distance their reputations from), hospitals advertised for women to become 
professional nurses. In order to prevent the perceived degradation of the wholesome nature of the 
work, hospitals specifically sought out young, White women from agricultural families. They 
were paid very little if at all to receive training within the hospital under the explicitly stated 
belief that salary would attract selfish women. Once graduated, they would enter private duty 
nursing, to care for the sick in private homes. The elite, wealthy women were appointed as 
nursing supervisors, overseeing the nursing students from comparatively lower classes who 
entered the hospitals to train. There was a clear class distinction in role.  
 
52 Even the story locating the origins of the profession with white, wealthy Florence Nightingale, has 
undergone recent fierce defense in the United Kingdom, against British-Jamaican and legally “mulatto” 
Mary Seacole, a “doctoress” in the tradition of Jamaican obeah herbalism, who may have popularized 
handwashing as a life-saving medical practice during the Crimean War and influenced Nightingale who is 
credited for it.  
McDonald, Lynn. 2012. “Statue of ‘nurse’ Mary Seacole will do Florence Nightingale a disservice.” The 
Guardian, 8 June 2012. 
Alexander, Ziggi and Audrey Dewjee. 1984. Wonderful Adventures of Mrs Seacole in Many Lands. 
Falling Wall Press. 
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Meanwhile, enslaved Black women were compelled to serve as nurses in plantation 
hospitals or sick rooms, and then in segregated black hospitals. Though the latter were initially 
funded by the Freedman’s Bureau authorized by Congress, this support was temporary, and 
resulted in segregated and suboptimal facilities for Black people across the southern United 
States: “Thus, federal policy paved the way for the adoption of segregated hospital facilities by 
municipal governments, especially in the South” (Rice & Jones 1994, 8). The 1949 Hill-Burton 
Act reinforced the segregation of health facilities, as it provided federal funding to build 
hospitals, yet deferred to segregation practices that prohibited Black medical professionals from 
training or working in White facilities, and limited funding to Black hospitals that were built in 
response to such exclusion. 
 Glazer (1991) defines segmentation partly through job grade and training, as different 
levels of education qualify nurses for different entry into practice at different wages. 
The planned segmentation of nursing after WWII intended the following distinctions: 
Registered nurses with graduate training were to plan and direct, less-trained RNs 
were to care for acutely ill patients, and licensed practical nurses were to care for 
the less ill… A follow-up report 20 years later reiterated the [National Nursing 
Council]’s support for a segmented nursing labor force by proposing that nurse 
assistants (disproportionately, women of color) be trained for nonnursing functions 
in order to release RNs for administration and patient education. The Report also 
rejected a career ladder in which further education for nursing assistants could lead 
to the RN degree.              [Glazer 1991, 364] 
 
Though they do not necessarily relish the everyday actions involved in administrative work, those 
advocating for nursing professionalization specifically wanted RNs to do administrative tasks, 
which came to include patient records. In addition to distinguishing different tasks for nurses with 
different educational backgrounds, these divisions were not intended to be easily transcended. 
Until recently, an LPN, despite having over a year of training in a community college, was not on 
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an educational track towards an RN certification degree, such as the Bachelor of Nursing Science 
(BSN). 
Segmentation has been an indelible part of nursing history. In the past, intentionally and 
explicitly limiting the numbers of working class women from bringing down the potential of the 
ranks (Reverby 1987), as well as entirely excluding Black women (Hine 1989), was seen as a 
strategy to raise the status of nursing practice for middle and upper class White women. Newer 
strategies of segmentation do not directly seek to limit the numbers of structurally marginalized 
people from higher level nursing positions, but further marginalization is often the effect. Those 
without the means to fund their education are more likely to be crowded into lower tier nursing. 
As federal funding sources have historically funded the shortest and cheapest training programs 
for lower class women, even outside financial support repeats this trend53. The legitimacy offered 
by a scientific re-articulation of nursing practice is limited to nurses educated in colleges and 
universities, where they are required to take courses in chemistry, biology, microbiology, and 
anatomy and physiology. Professional nursing organizations work to implement higher standards 
of education and training for nursing practice to protect higher tier nurses from replacement by 
more affordable, less educated workers.  
 Back in the HCH clinic, Marta explained in an interview that she had intended to become 
an RN. After working for a few years as a Medical Assistant, a job with much lower pay but only 
requiring an affordable nine-month educational program, Marta pursued nursing education at a 
 
53 Prior to the Great Depression hospitals were largely funded through charitable means, after which 
insurance and patient payments indirectly accounted for nursing salaries. However, the federal 
government became a major funding source for nursing training between 1962-1967, with the creation of 
68,000 federally funded programs to get welfare recipients into work, with the largest portion of programs 
training lower grade nurses. Significantly, however, Congress primarily funded community college two 
year nursing programs because they were cheaper and more accessible to women on welfare. These 
programs therefore provide only lower tier access to the nursing profession to lower class women, 
effectively limiting their options for upward mobility (Glazer 1991). 
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local community college. She completed nearly all of her pre-requisite requirements before she 
gave up. The cost of tuition and books, and time commitment to the program while working full 
time and raising a family, were out of reach. Most of the RNs in the HCH program attended 
nursing school while living with their parents, being supported by their husbands, or by 
participating at the hospital-based programs that used to be more common across the country, 
where young women lived, attended classes, and worked all on the hospital campus.  
This is not simply a distinction made of professional training or class, though it is often 
glossed over as such. The most highly paid and educated staff are predominately White or Asian 
women. The majority of CNAs and case managers, often called “support staff,” are Puerto Rican 
women. The distinction is stark and immediately evident upon entering these clinics. Equally 
evident is the absence of discussion about race in these sites. This phenomenon can be 
understood as “racial refusal” as conceptualized by Dána-Ain Davis, “in which race is 
purposefully ignored. Instead, class became race’s surrogate” (2019, 88). The category invoked 
in these contexts is profession, as if the occupational categories are not themselves deeply and 
obviously segmented by race. Davis argues that this linguistic substitution is not benign, but 
rather, “justifies a particular ordering of society in which white supremacy sustains the care for 
particular groups of people through arrangements that are embedded in institutional settings” 
(2019, 88). By focusing on profession, the assumption is that if a case manager or CNA wanted 
to, they would pursue higher levels of education and become an RN, and apply for the positions 
that make more money, have more professional autonomy, and bestow more influence over 
staffing decisions and patient care plans. As Davis has argued, “in the free-market, restricted 
occupational choices are attributed to lack of qualification, not to systemic barriers” (2007, 349). 
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“Front Desk Girls” 
 A discussion of Spanish language use in the HCH clinic exemplifies how race54 was often 
discussed while insisting it was not. In the clinic, Spanish became divided into privileged and 
problematic uses. In a provider’s meeting, consisting entirely of White women certified as 
Advanced Nurse Practitioners, one manager complained that the case managers were always 
speaking Spanish at the front desk instead of doing their work. Could they limit Spanish 
language use to patient translation? The room was divided. Some of the managers were visibly 
uncomfortable but hesitant to explain why. At least one woman said, “I don’t think we can tell 
people not to speak their native language.”55 Several managers were concerned that the case 
managers could be speaking negatively about them behind their backs, maybe even to patients56. 
In attempting to control the clinical space, use of Spanish was defined by some managers as 
 
54 As the American Anthropological Association (AAA) has noted and critiqued, the U.S. Census does 
not clearly define “race” or “ethnicity,” or explain why they are held to be separate categories for official 
data collection. The 1997 AAA response to the decision to separate Hispanic or Latino from race, points 
out that it ignores the historical context of these terms, namely that “today's ethnicities are yesterday's 
races” (AAA 1997, 4). Irish ancestry used to be a separate racial category, for example, until socially and 
politically the Irish were reimagined to be White. The report recommends that race and ethnicity be 
merged to “race/ethnicity” (and then eventually phase out use of ‘race’ altogether in favor of ethnicity) 
since the two are usually conflated by respondents, and because there is no clear official explanation for 
the distinction. For example, in the American Community Survey, White and Black are the only two 
identity categories not broken down into more options. There are seven options for Asian: Asian Indian, 
Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Other Asian. Ethnicity categories are broken down 
in the same way, with four options for Hispanic or Latino: Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Other 
Hispanic or Latino. Though Asian is supposed to be a racial category, and Hispanic or Latino an ethnic 
one, both list nationalities as more specific options. What’s more, the only other ethnic category, Not 
Hispanic or Latino, is broken down not by a list of nationalities, but by Census-based racial categories. 
Therefore when I discuss race and racism, I do not exclude those who identify or are identified as 
Hispanic or Latino. As the AAA report contends, “the American system of categorizing groups of people 
on the basis of race and ethnicity, developed initially by a then-dominant white, European-descended 
population, served as a means to distinguish and control other ‘non-white’ populations in various ways.” 
The broad category of Hispanic and Latino has not been fully socially, politically, or culturally made 
White, and therefore belongs in an analysis of racism and white supremacy, not artificially sifted out.  
55 In fact, health care facilities have been brought to court for firing employees for speaking Spanish for 
personal reasons while at work, as recounted by John Haviland (2003) 
56 Linguistic anthropologists like John Haviland call this “linguistic paranoia” (2003, 771) 
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preventing “appropriate” and “professional” behaviors and interactions; in other words, the 
“niceness” of the clinical environment was threatened by actions, even speech, that decentered 
whiteness (Low 2009). Simultaneously, the managers valued Spanish language fluency as a tool 
of information technology, as it enabled providers to communicate with patients, and viewed 
speaking Spanish for their own purposes as unprofessional. Management decided that the best 
solution, and one that avoided the potentially unlawful restriction of language use, was to 
separate case managers, and have only one at the front desk at a time when they were not needed 
to assist patients. This was framed as ensuring productivity and limiting socializing during clinic 
hours.   
 The irony was that the case managers were not technically supposed to be working at the 
front desk. The work that case managers were assigned to do there was not part of their job 
description, but because the clinic didn’t have the funds, or the managers were unwilling to use 
the available funds, to hire someone to work at the front desk full time. The frustration this 
caused finally erupted one month after the provider’s meeting where speaking Spanish was 
secretly discussed as a roadblock to productivity. Every week, the HCH clinic closed early on 
Wednesdays for a staff meeting. They always began with a morale-boosting practice called 
“sandbox”57 in which providers thanked each other and other staff for helping them do their 
work, or accomplishing a difficult or undesirable task, in the week before. As Marta pointed out 
to me, it almost never went up the hierarchy – people thanked or highlighted the efforts of those 
who worked below them, and the case managers usually thanked each other if anyone at all.  
At this particular meeting, the RN Rachel thanks everyone who works at the front desk, 
emphasizing how hard it is, and calling out, “Here, here for Marta who does it every day!” On 
 
57 This term was explained as “everyone plays nice in the sandbox.” 
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the rare occasion when Marta does sandbox a provider, it is almost always for helping out at the 
front desk, further emphasizing that the work should be shared. But at this particular meeting, 
she does not sandbox anyone. She looks away and shifts in her chair as she is called out for her 
work at the front desk. When the sandboxing comments end, Marta says, “I have some points to 
mention.” She begins with how patient information is entered into the Electronic Medical Record 
(EMR) at the clinic. “If demographics are wrong, please change it or tell whoever is at the front 
desk,” she begins, “so we don't get scolded.” Without waiting for a response, she adds that they 
also cannot walk every patient to providers for their appointments, “that's why schedules are 
color-coded. Patients are getting skipped, because people aren't going in order on the schedule, 
not appointments first, and walk ins are skipping the line.” Dr. Anna cuts in to complain that 
someone is cutting and pasting patients into her schedule, and quickly adds that she knows it’s 
not the front desk. Nurse Practitioner Patricia looks around the room and reminds everyone that 
their protocol for this is to add their initials after the diagnosis in the EMR when they schedule a 
patient, so they can keep track of who is scheduling who. Of course, no one adds patients to 
provider schedules more than the case managers who are made to work at the front desk 
answering phones and checking in patients. Marta shakes her head, frustrated. 
“A lot has been added to the case manager's job. When will it stop? It goes way beyond 
my job. I am getting reprimanded by other staff members,” Marta says. She describes how some 
providers do not keep track of their own schedule and then expect case managers to knock every 
time another patient is there waiting, and get angry when it doesn’t happen. When some ask 
incredulously about color-coding patients, not realizing they are supposed to be doing it, RN 
Dorothy explains that walk ins are white, green means arrived and checked in, and blue means 
checked out. Program Director Evelyn says they need a protocol, and they need to decide on it 
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now, draft it up, and stick to it. RN Dorothy said, “We should bounce the protocol off of the 
front desk, and then discuss it with the team.”  
“That’s another thing,” Marta’s voice rises slightly to regain their attention, “we are not 
the front desk. We have names. I know the ideal is to have a checkout person, but we don't have 
one.” She describes how patients have begun calling them the “front desk girls” instead of 
referring to them by name or the title of case manager, because some of the providers refer to 
them that way. “We are being asked to do more and more but we are not acknowledged for our 
training,” Marta adds. “How we refer to people is important,” the Program Director Evelyn says, 
“Especially calling people ‘girl’ isn't appropriate.” She quickly assigns Karin, the mental health 
counselor, to talk to some of the staff who are not at the meeting about color coding their 
schedules. RN Rachel offers to help out at the front desk more often to relieve the case 
managers. Nurse Practitioner Patricia says everyone needs to stop scattering after the morning 
huddle at the clinic, where Marta says they hide in order to do paperwork instead of taking their 
first patients on time. The managers make sure to address the issues Marta raises immediately 
during the meeting with protocols and new practices. Evelyn thanks Marta for speaking up, asks 
if she feels better, and then introduces the next topic on the agenda. 
However, the root cause of the problem remains unspoken and unaddressed. The day 
after the staff meeting, one of the nurse practitioners announced that she would continue to call 
whoever was working at the front desk ‘front desk,’ and then commanded the RNs that she 
managed to stop assisting there. Reflecting on this, Marta recounted, “I feel like they demote me 
in a way because like the RNs they would sit in the front, and her comment was, ‘they’re nurses, 
they don’t need to be sitting in the front desk to do nothing there. They need to do their real 
job,’” She raises her hands in frustration, “So what are you saying about me then? It’s okay for 
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me to sit in the front desk and not have a real job, is that what you’re saying?” She points out that 
no one said this during the staff meeting when the Program Director Evelyn could hear it.  
In an interview, Marta explains that all of the case managers used to work outside of the 
clinic when she was first hired eight years before. At that time, the staff was much more 
dispersed across different soup kitchens and shelters. Providers were at each location a day or 
two a week, and often for just a few hours. Some patients made appointments, but it was largely 
drop in, each patient signing their name on a notepad so the provider could just call the names 
down the list during her shift at that particular site. This is how it often still occurs in some of the 
smaller outreach sites. Case managers were free to flexibly schedule their time across the region, 
signing patients up for insurance, but also serving as advocates to help them navigate the 
complicated bureaucracies of medical and social services. This often involves breaking down the 
process of applying for housing, for example, and then waiting in line with them at City Hall to 
apply for the records they would need in order to obtain a social security card, and then help 
them apply for a job, or fill out an application for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), 
for example, to help supplement their future housing costs. 
It wasn’t until a large centralized clinic was built in the resource center a few years before 
that they suddenly had a front desk, and the need to staff it. Marta then listed the tasks that have 
been added on to her case management and translation workload as a result of being relegated to 
the front desk: checking in patients; managing patient flow; scheduling patient appointments; 
answering the phone; providing patient information to doctor’s offices over the phone or by fax; 
processing, scanning, and attaching patient records from other clinics into their files in the 
Electronic Medical Record; calling other practices to initiate patient referrals; and most recently, 
reviewing how providers are entering patient data for billing. Many of these tasks literally build 
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the records that providers will then draw from as they assess their patients, and make up the data 
that will be reported for reimbursement and program auditing.  
Their excess work is both routinely publicly praised, and privately reorganized for fear 
that they are not working enough. In both cases, Spanish language use is blamed. Though there 
are a handful of case managers, it is only those who are Puerto Rican and speak Spanish that are 
reassigned an ever-growing list of tasks to complete in addition to their case management work. 
After all, it is reasoned, how could someone who doesn’t speak Spanish be expected to process 
their many monolingual Spanish patients? The same logic is not held for providers, none of 
whom speak more than basic Spanish. Even when speaking up, the way this work is racialized 
remains muted. Spanish language fluency, due to Puerto Rican heritage and identity, enables 
records to be built for patients who do not speak English. This then justifies the addition of other 
record building tasks to Puerto Rican staff members. As a result of workforce segmentation, 
those staff members are disproportionately case managers, and therefore the disruption to their 
work is viewed as less problematic than if it were foisted upon nurses or other clinical staff. The 
data at the clinic is often ghostwritten by women who are not seen as authors, as they translate, 
scan, upload, and type the words of others, their simultaneous ubiquity and absence in the 
records justified on the basis of professional boundaries. 
 
Spanish as IT  
Given the insights of linguistic anthropologists from the last few decades, the clinics’ 
language dynamics are not surprising. Such studies have shown how Latinas’ use of Spanish and 
of English is closely monitored, commented upon, and controlled in White public spaces. This 
does not occur equally for all languages and their users, but rather follows the logic of “a 
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racializing hegemony, in which Whites are invisibly normal, and in which racialized populations 
are visibly marginal and the objects of monitoring” (Hill 1996, 682). The Spanish language 
cannot be understood in isolation from the way the people who speak it are racialized, as a result 
of the “co-naturalization of language and race” (Rosa & Flores 2017, 631). In the U.S. context, 
native speakers using Spanish in public are often read as impolite by White people, and yet the 
use of fragmented, heavily accented, or mock Spanish by White speakers is seen positively (Hill 
1996; Rosa 2016, Urciuoli 1996). This is why the White nurse practitioner’s recitation of 
memorized lines of Spanish exam room commands could be read as a thoughtful effort to 
communicate with her patients, even though she was unable to understand their responses or ask 
any follow up questions, while the Puerto Rican case manager’s fluent code-switching between 
English and Spanish was perceived as threatening by her supervisors. It is not about the language 
in and of itself – it is about the speaker and her use of the language.  
 Yet just as the relevance and reality of race is muted in clinic dynamics, the racialization 
of Spanish and how it in spoken in the clinic is reframed. In the meeting where managers debated 
the staff’s language use, the ability to speak Spanish was artificially detached from the identity of 
the speaker. Instead, language was conceived as a tool, one that was very useful and valuable in a 
clinic serving a large number of Puerto Rican patients, but one that could be misused. It was as if 
the case managers speaking Spanish with one another, outside of the context of assisting a 
patient, was comparable to using company resources for personal reasons. Language is often 
conceived as a tool (Gibson & Ingold 1994, Miller & Hoogstra 1992, Orellana 2010 et al. 2010, 
Tylén et al. 2010).58 In an analysis of court cases where he served as an expert witness, linguistic 
 
58 Several of these, those pertaining to child development especially, are influenced by John Dewey. At 
the turn of the century, Dewey argued that if “to be a tool, or to be used as means for consequences, is to 
have and to endow with meaning, language, being the tool of tools, is the cherishing mother of all 
significance” (Hickman & Alexander 2009, 58). 
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anthropologist John Haviland identifies language ideologies in the U.S. legal system, including, 
“the detachability of this majority language from the social circumstances of its acquisition and 
deployment, and, thus, its conversion into a mere ‘tool’ of propositional transmission, to be 
picked up as needed” (2003, 766). The assumption is that bilingual speakers can simply choose 
to switch on and off a language to retain linguistic purity, as one might put down a hammer to 
pick up a wrench.  
 In the clinic, Spanish is treated as an instrument of information technology (IT). As a 
tool, ideologically separated from a speaker, Spanish facilitates the use of the Electronic Medical 
Record (EMR) and its component parts, in order to process patient data. The Spanish language 
can be used to access information from a population of patients that the state, in the form of 
funders and public health data collection agencies, prioritize data collection for because there are 
many people in the category of “Hispanic/Latino” who demonstrably receive less adequate care 
than other populations in the U.S. In order for a monolingual English speaking nurse practitioner 
to elicit information from Spanish-speaking patients that can be typed into the EMR and later 
submitted for funding and reporting, Spanish translation is the requisite interface, the point 
where two people can meet to communicate. Abstracted in such a way, speakers can be chastised 
for perceived misuse of clinical resources, even when the resource is their own voice.  
 
“On That Back Wall” 
 That the racial segmentation in these clinics is muted, cast as professional distinction and 
linguistic resource, speaks to the ways it is institutionalized. Even the Puerto Rican women in 
these clinics do not directly identify their racialized identities as part of the division of labor, also 
referring to language use and job descriptions. This is not to say they are unaware of it, rather 
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that their being a CNA or a case manager is internalized as the result of a series of personal 
choices, even if they are made in the context of a narrower set of options than their White 
colleagues. No one in either clinic spoke of racism on an individual or systemic level, except 
when discussing patients in the abstract aggregate of population health. All of the staff in both 
clinics were adamant that the work being done by the case managers and CNAs was vital to the 
model of care they provided, which acknowledges and takes seriously the social and economic 
contexts that influences a person’s health.  
However, even under the premise of differences in certification and training, it was 
inescapable that every Thursday in the PACE conference room, a group of white women sat at 
the table, while a group of predominantly Puerto Rican women sat in a circle around and behind 
them, pushed up against the wall. Even as they muted race, this routine was emblematic of a 
problem for the CNAs: they were literally not at the table when it came to patient care decisions. 
This came to the fore on Veteran’s Day one year, when the Day Center and clinic were closed to 
participants for a full day of staff professional development. Over complementary bagels and 
orange juice, Program Director Alison asked everyone to write anonymous worries on small slips 
of paper. These were then shuffled and redistributed, read aloud by different staff members. The 
concerns were either personal, concern about family members and finances, or related to work. 
At work, staff concerns varied from insufficient time to complete paperwork in the EMR, to 
meeting patient needs with increasingly limited time and resources as the participant census 
grew, and preventing staff burnout. Once they had all been read, Alison noted that there were 
common themes, “One reason we do this is to share these commonalities so we don’t feel alone. 
These are important concerns for managers to know about.” 
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 Andrea, the RN who served as manager for the CNAs who worked in participant homes, 
announced in a sarcastic voice, “Safety in the community was not brought up and I am so 
pleased that my workers feel so safe in patient homes.” Her words are chased by laughter and a 
chorus of rebuttals. Sofia, a home care CNA, spoke up. “Participants have to qualify to be here,” 
she said, “but not all of us are qualified to care for them in their homes.” She explained that 
when she worked elsewhere she was repeatedly trained in de-escalation and keeping personal 
space for patients with mental health diagnoses. “But we don’t know their histories like IDT 
does, and we are helping them with personal care,” she explained, “Some of them have sexual 
histories, and we don’t know that. I think that’s just rotten. And we are alone.” Andrea whispered 
“good job” to her, as she settles back into her seat. “I’m surprised to see so many shocked faces,” 
Sofia replied, “I talk about this kind of thing all the time, but maybe just to the same people. I 
guess I struck a nerve.” 
 This icebreaker was a warm-up for the next activity, introduced as “Stop, Start, 
Continue.” They all divided up by department to discuss what was going well, what they wanted 
to add, what they wanted to discontinue, and then a plan to bring back to the full group. Three 
RNs and six CNAs who work in home care were joined by the patient scheduler. They began 
with what worked: building a strong team; great communication between the RNs, scheduler, 
and the CNAs; making their participants happy, and covering each other’s shifts. Sofia steered 
the conversation back to the concerns she voiced a few moments before: 
Andrea responds quickly to our concerns and supports us, even when the rest of 
IDT doesn’t listen, but it is frustrating that we don’t have enough time with them 
to express our concerns. If I have a concern about a patient and IDT says it’s not 
an issue, they might be right, or they might be wrong. They tell us it’s an IDT 
issue, but we don’t go to those meetings. We learn a lot on that back wall there in 
PAR… And you're quickly dismissed and they move on 
“And we’re the ones who really know the participants,” rejoined Camila, another CNA.  
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The group expressed concerns about the way IDT organized patient care plans 
that they were supposed to implement in the home: catering to the desires of their favorite 
participants; giving other participants minimal services because the resources, like CNA 
time, is already taken up by other participants; not matching participants well with CNAs; 
and feeling pushback from IDT when they do make suggestions that do not privilege their 
“favorites.” When Sofia said she didn’t feel like she’s part of PACE because she isn’t 
part of IDT, Andrea said they should move the monthly meeting for all home care staff to 
a date that falls after the care planning for all newly enrolled participants has ended, so 
they can be more fully briefed on each person. When she suggested the CNAs can also 
read the EMR notes about the participants, they say no one had ever told them they had 
access to that information. 
The PACE Executive Director Ted had walked in partway through the discussion 
to listen, and eventually responded. He said if the CNAs feel disconnected, they should 
increase the number of home care meetings that they have. They should speak up more 
during PAR about what they think participants need. When Ted told them to physically 
sit at the table during PAR meetings, and they replied that the table is always full from a 
previous IDT-only meeting, he joked, “then kick them out of their chairs.” He insisted 
that IDT does listen to their concerns, though they do not always act on it. The CNAs 
retorted that it’s in reverse. Andrea relayed their message that one participant needed less 
of their time, and then the family rallied and IDT increased the participant’s home care 
hours; or Andrea argued on their behalf that another participant needed more care in the 
home, and IDT voted against it. Sofia exclaimed, “we all need a forum to talk instead of 
being talked to,” but no one suggested that they reorganize the IDT schedule so that they 
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could attend. Even the suggestion of meeting more amongst themselves was met with 
concern about finding the time in their packed schedules.  
In the end, they scheduled an additional home care staff meeting each month, and 
were encouraged to speak up more during the weekly PAR meetings that they are invited 
to attend. Rather than telling the staff with more power to make room at the central table, 
or reorganizing the room so they could all sit together in a wider circle, the CNAs are told 
to somehow make room for themselves, as if forcibly displacing senior staff is a 
reasonable suggestion. The CNAs are gently chastised for not speaking up during the 
PAR meetings, even after they explain that their advice, either translated to IDT through 
their RN manager or voiced themselves at PAR, is seldom heeded. They are directed to 
resources, such as the EMR notes, where they can educate themselves about the patient 
care plans before their workdays, but their workdays are not reorganized to accommodate 
this additional labor.  
Consciously or not, their silence is structured to reinforce the privileging of white 
women’s voices. The segmentation of documentary practices, and the clinical decision-
making they represent, reveals “how ‘nice’ people, who say ‘nice’ things, and have ‘nice’ 
or liberal values, participate in maintaining whiteness in their built environment,” even or 
especially in the absence of conscious intention, as privilege goes unrecognized (Low 
2009, 79). In parallel, women working as nannies or au pairs, often women of color 
employed by white women, are meant to fade when their shift is over and the ‘real’ 
mother returns (Macdonald, 2011). Erasure here reflects an ideology of centering the 
correct parent or provider, one with acceptable authority and influence, and removing or 
failing to capture the role and contributions of the women who provide care but are not 
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“really” the parent, or who do not have the professional title or credentials to be a 
provider, despite being critical to their decision-making and care delivery. 
 
Conclusion 
Authoring the record is a way of justifying and validating the work being written. This is 
not to say that CNAs and case managers wish to be burdened with more paperwork. Rather it 
bears noting that there is a degree of power in controlling the record, in choosing how patients 
and, in aggregate, clinics are officially represented. When the work of support staff is erased, it 
further foregrounds the work of their supervisors, the more highly reimbursed providers. The 
way these roles are racialized is muted through louder discourses about profession, and Spanish 
language use is limited to how it can serve the purposes of white providers. The power dynamic 
means that less highly reimbursed staff engage in some of these support practices routinely, 
becoming a standard part of their work responsibilities, even when the tasks are excluded from 
their job description. If shadow standards bring the appearance of success in conforming to 
clinical best practices through data creation, it does so by repeating and reinforcing the 
segmentation of health care labor and value. 
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Chapter 4 | Little Boxes: Evidence-Based Care and Accountable Financing 
 
It’s an early afternoon in January. Dorothy navigates her Prius through the strip mall 
parking lot, passing a man with a large white beard, another on a bicycle with a plastic trash bag 
tied to his back. “They might be interesting stories,” she says. She identifies herself as an 
outreach nurse, and asks if they had seen anyone who might be homeless, careful to never ask 
directly and cause offense. She pulls up behind a department store, and points to the empty space 
beneath a loading dock. She is looking for cardboard or blankets, some sign that someone has 
taken shelter by blocking the exposed front against the cold. We gingerly step from the car and 
across the iced-over railroad tracks, into the bare woods. She knows her way. We emerge into a 
clearing, a soiled mattress at its center, wooden pallets laid like ladders against a tree. She 
remembers when this was a vagrant camp. She points to debris through overgrown bushes, 
sketches with her hands the memory of a two-room structure where a pile of pallets lay.  
She first heard of the camp from a client at a shelter who told her there was an elderly 
man sleeping out who might need a nurse. She worked through her contacts and tracked down 
the old man’s son in another shelter. He told her, “oh yeah, that’s my dad,” and where to find 
him. She had approached slowly, a colleague in tow, calling out her own name and credentials 
before anyone was in view. “I don’t want to surprise someone,” she says, “I want someone to 
know it’s a friendly person, not to worry.” She pauses to laugh, “And I don’t want them coming 
at me either, right?” She calls her stethoscope a good ombudsman, a symbol she has something 
to offer those she finds. She looks for signs that someone has been back in the two years since 
the site was abandoned, since the landlord threatened to destroy the camp and anything 
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remaining, when the lot was for sale. Everyone had left, yet the land was never sold. Dorothy 
shakes her head and returns to the path. No one has returned. 
Outreach encounters begin simply. Dorothy asks the homeless men and women she finds 
“sleeping out” if they have any health concerns, and if they have a doctor. She might check their 
blood pressure, and offer to bring medications or blankets with her when she next visits. But she 
only asks for their name and date of birth.  
Eventually then my goal is if somebody’s unhealthy, and they really need to see a 
doctor, and they’re not seeing a doctor, is to try to get them to come in. So if 
they’ve trusted me, then maybe eventually they’re going to trust the people I work 
with, and if the problem is big enough they’ll come into the clinic, and I can offer 
them bus tokens.     [Interview March 26, 2015] 
 
She describes a woman she met on an outreach encounter experiencing tremendous pain, but 
who was so anxious that she hadn’t sought treatment in years. Dorothy had to visit her multiple 
times on the riverbank where she was camping with her boyfriend, and leave her bus tokens, 
before the woman showed up one day at a Health Care for the Homeless (HCH) clinic. On the 
same day, a case manager filed to have her insurance re-activated, the woman was seen by a 
provider, and she was referred to a chiropractor for treatment. It took a full year from first 
encounter to first clinical visit. 
 “Now, in our EMR (Electronic Medical Record), we’re supposed to get a social security 
number,” Dorothy explains, “but I never want to get a social security number on my first visit, 
because I think that’s way too intrusive, and I wouldn’t trust anyone I just met. I’m not going to 
put them in that position. That’s crazy. So I try to keep it simple.” Simple means a 
stenographer’s pad, strewn through with lists of allergies, medications, and requests. Some 
details will be entered into the EMR, and the notepad kept in her desk until shredded. Back in the 
car, Dorothy makes use of red lights, scribbling the hours she worked that week on the back of a 
 104 
receipt, and details from a phone call onto the skin of her palm. Her data collection process is the 
most haphazard and incomplete of anyone in the program. And she is responsible for securing 
housing for more homeless individuals than anyone else on staff. The data collection priorities of 
federal funders are not her priorities.   
 Dorothy’s slow and gradual process with patients reflects the reality that the relationship 
homeless individuals have with health care and other services have been shaped by previous 
traumas. As Karin, the HCH mental health counselor explained in an interview, homelessness is 
a “series of social losses”59 that results, among other things, in a difficulty conforming to 
mainstream care models that require a person to initiate contact with providers, attend scheduled 
appointments, and follow-up as needed. Traumas are often closely linked with losses, such as 
physical or sexual abuse, family neglect, exploitation, or theft of scarce belongings, leading to 
the loss of a home, vehicle, job, or social connections. Homeless individuals who receive care at 
HCH often reveal an assemblage of such experiences. Both providers and patients associate them 
with the frequency of mental health and substance use disorders, which add a veneer of blame 
for their poverty that further alienates them from traditional health care models. When homeless 
individuals are enrolled in health insurance plans, “deservingness” for care becomes dictated by 
ability to conform to health care norms in traditional models. In an effort to accommodate the 
needs and traumas of their patients, HCH providers embed flexibility into their methods and 
plans of care. They anticipate missed appointments, send peripatetic providers like Dorothy out 
to pursue those who otherwise would not seek or accept care, and stretch visit lengths to 
 
59 As Karin identified this phrase as something people in the field of mental health say, and as a previous 
undergraduate anthropology major, it is possible the phrase derives from medical anthropologist 
Guarnaccia et al.’s 1996 article, “The experiences of ataques de nervios: towards an anthropology of 
emotions in Puerto Rico.”  
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demonstrate investment in each person and sensitivity to their potential need to tell their story 
before accepting care or working their way up slowly to acknowledging their health problems.  
 Such flexibility has increasingly come under threat as a result of the federal government’s 
increasing interest in enforcing data collection practices that divide patient encounters into 
quantifiable pieces of health information. Clinic visits do not make more money when they last 
longer. Missed appointments cost clinics insurance reimbursement, which is why many homeless 
patients have been banned from some traditional medical practices. Sending a nurse under 
bridges and into bars means that she sees fewer patients, and can potentially claim fewer billable 
hours. Though the information that is collected itself may seem innocuous, charting practices in 
community health settings such as HCH reveals that government investment in the care of 
“vulnerable”60 patients passes responsibility off to private health care providers and insurance 
companies. The control this awards private insurers leads to increased costs and endangers 
continued support for government-funded programs. Funding for federal grants and public 
insurance reimbursement has been restructured through the twin lenses of evidence-based care 
and accountable financing. Evidence-based care is a project of population health, that demands 
certain kinds of information about patients be tracked in their medical records. From there the 
information is placed in a feedback loop. Providers report the information to federal agencies, 
where it is aggregated at the population level, so patterns can be identified, and then used to 
prioritize care practices. If certain health conditions are most common in a given population, 
providers will be directed to screen for those during patient appointments, and to provide 
specified treatment plans that have been shown to be most effective. Providers can then use each 
 
60 “Vulnerable” is a classification broadly used in U.S. federal policy documents to describe “children, 
older adults, homeless individuals, victims of abuse or trauma, individuals with mental health or 
substance-related disorders, individuals with HIV/AIDS, and individuals with disabilities” (ACA H. R. 
3590—499). See Chapter 1 for a discussion of this category. 
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patient record to analyze whether care has been appropriately provided to individuals, when 
compared to the priorities and best practices established using the aggregated data. Accountable 
financing follows the same contours as evidence-based medicine. It is concerned with whether 
providers ask standardized lists of questions, and provide standardized treatment plans. However, 
the primary motivation in this case is not the care itself, but how it is paid for. This motivation is 
fragmented further into the competing interests of government-backed health services, and the 
private insurance companies that they contract to manage payment for care.  
 Both evidence-based care and accountable financing practices jeopardize clinical funding 
through data collection practices, and as a result, alter the character of care delivery for homeless 
people. As a result of the increase in charting activities and their import with regards to funding, 
provider interactions with patients at HCH have been changed. I examine this process, and the 
potential it has for eliminating support for flexible programs, at the intersection of data and care 
regimes. The records created and submitted to funders, auditors, and insurers can be understood 
as data regimes alongside the “censuses, indexes, indicators, registers, rolls, catalogues, logs, and 
archives” that are used to exert influence and authority over subjects (Ruppert, Isin, and Bigo 
2017, 3). Anthropologists have demonstrated not only how data can serve to endanger care 
(Mulligan 2015, Ruckenstein and Schüll 2017), but more insidiously how care itself can 
endanger people through reliance on data to direct it (Davis 2019, Mulla 2014, Stevenson 2014, 
Ticktin 2011). The use of data collected in the context of providing care is not restricted to the 
well-being of patients61. 
 
61 There are other medical contexts in which systematic data collection can serve to thwart care, for 
example, “efforts to protect ayurvedic knowledge by compiling a digital database of ayurvedic treatments 
may actually facilitate the misappropriation of this knowledge” (Halliburton 2011, 86). 
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 Care, in the context of data regimes, has been restructured to satisfy reporting 
requirements in ways that can jeopardize future access to care at HCH as well. The logic that 
homeless patients should integrate into mainstream health practices now that they have been 
insured is a “logic of costs.” I use the term logic of costs, inspired by anthropologist Annemarie 
Mol’s “logic of care,” to capture the ways in which a budgetary lens is used in making care 
decisions. HCH was designed in order to reach people who are more likely to have intense health 
needs, and also more likely to avoid or have reduced access to such care. However, in order to 
justify requests for funds, even the earliest founders had to articulate how such care could be 
financially beneficial. Early iterations of HCH episodic care were arranged explicitly to provide 
care only for those who had no access to health insurance. Now, insured homeless patients can 
be billed like any other patient, and due to complex health needs from what is often decades of 
lack of care, they might even garner higher reimbursement than other patients. Both the 
providers who designed, and those who now maintain the program, frequently evoke arguments 
through a logic of costs to defend their care model. Intensified data collection practices require 
HCH providers to cultivate a logic of costs to direct their patient interactions. Providers face the 
specter of the data they create and submit potentially leading to the closure of their clinic, and the 
end to a flexible model of care for the homeless. For some providers, adopting a logic of costs to 
defend their program becomes in itself a form of care.  
 I combine clinic observation, archival research, and health provider interviews at Saint 
Catherine’s Health Care for the Homeless clinic in order to trace the development and escalating 
authority of evidence-based care and accountable financing in publicly funded health centers. 
Contrasting the format of the earliest documents from the patient record archives, with data 
reporting seminars for clinics that receive federal grants, reveals how data collection 
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expectations have shifted over time in response to funding requirements. Data reporting 
requirements have been standardized, so that health outcomes across the country can be 
compared, but the patients are not standard. Ethnographic observation of data collection practices 
during patient encounters, and debates about data processing at staff meetings, expose the 
difficulties providers face in eliciting the volume of information expected of them. The trauma, 
instability, and uncertainty of homelessness decenter data collection. Providers are caught 
between prioritizing their patients, and the flexibility needed to provide them with 
comprehensive care, and the rigidity of data collection demands.  
The intensive collection of patient data in evidence-based care is a biopolitical project of 
governance that makes safety net providers responsible for ensuring care is delivered to 
vulnerable populations (Foucault 1977). When standardized data collection processes are applied 
to vulnerable populations, the data that providers end up capturing and using to populate reports 
often distort or silence the story of their patients’ health. Mirroring the dilemma found within 
Paul Brodwin’s community health-based field site, “staff members must often explicitly figure 
out how to use this paperwork technology: how do you insert the chaotic life into an orderly 
storyline that justifies continual interventions” (2013, 94-95). With private insurance companies 
empowered to manage government-funded health programs, health care providers must 
effectively perform in addition as accountants and bureaucrats through data collection and 
reporting practices. In this chapter, I will examine how the incongruity between the 
financialization of patient care, and patient non-conformity to the standardized norms of health 
care practice, fuels consideration of withdrawing federal grants and endangers the continued 
existence of these programs. Chapter 5 will explore how the data collection process is further 
 109 
undermined at health centers through inadequate staffing, training, and access to health 
information technologies. 
 
Reporting Training: Uniform Data System  
 The January Uniform Data System Annual Meeting is in a luxury hotel near the Boston 
Common. With a modern, minimalist aesthetic, the entry hall to the conference room is filled 
with breakfast pastries on square plates, coffee and tea in squat mugs, and little hexagonal jars of 
honey. I follow HCH Nurse Practitioner Clara into the large hall to some empty chairs. We sit 
behind one of the dozens of long clothed tables facing a screen at the front of the room. She has 
been coming to these meetings for the last six years. She took over the responsibility from 
another manager just before she retired.  
 
Figure 3. Quality of Care Indicators from 2015 UDS Manual—September 3, 2015 V 1.0 
 The Uniform Data System (UDS) is a standardized reporting platform for Federally 
Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs). As their annually updated Health Center Impact report 
declares, “The UDS tracks a variety of information, including patient demographics, services 
provided, staffing, clinical indicators, utilization rates, costs, and revenues” (HRSA 2013). The 
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connection between this data collection tool and federal funding is unambiguous. UDS was 
created in 199662 with the introduction of the Health Center Consolidation Act, which both 
brought all FQHCs under the same grant agency63, and initiated the systematic collection of 
patient information. FQHCs were tasked with providing safety net care to those who had less 
access to standard medical treatment and health insurance, and charging fees on a sliding scale to 
address affordability as a barrier to care64. They became eligible for increased Medicaid and 
Medicare reimbursement by serving select demographic populations, offering flexible payment, 
and submitting annual documentation on their patients. This had an immediate impact on the 
quantity and content of the records providers kept on their patients in programs like Saint 
Catherine’s Health Care for the Homeless (HCH). As I will discuss below, UDS made providers 
responsible for representing their patients as a population to the state, and their own success as 
care providers, through the collection of health and social metrics determined by federal funding 
agencies. 
 For Clara, working with UDS clarifies the purpose of the data that they are supposed to 
routinely collect during patient visits, even when it does not seem to relate to the purpose of the 
encounter. “It’s the big picture” she tells me:  
You realize it’s the Bureau of Primary Health Care setting these goals for people, 
and they’re setting these goals because we’re looking at Population Health and 
we’re looking at underserved people who have hypertension and diabetes and it’s 
 
62 This was also the year that the first Electronic Medical System was created for a Health Care for the 
Homeless Program in the country (O’Connell et al. 2010). 
63 Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) Section 330 grant funded programs for 
medically underserved populations include: Health Care for the Homeless, Community Health Centers, 
Migrant Health Centers, and Public Housing Primary Care programs. These clinics had been designated 
Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) through the Bureau of Primary Care in 1991.   
64 In addition to the four categories of programs eligible for these grants, the Health Center Consolidation 
Act brought two other categories under HRSA (Health Resources and Services Administration): tribal 
health centers and “look-alikes.” These programs do not receive federal funds from the same source as the 
330 programs, but do receive increased reimbursement and must engage in UDS reporting. 
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not being well treated, and that’s why we’re looking at A1Cs, that’s why we’re 
looking at blood pressures.    [Interview February 11, 2017] 
 
After spending their work days intensively identifying individual patient needs and how to 
accommodate them, the process of data entry can feel peripheral or even arbitrary to the program 
staff. Going through UDS trainings enables Clara to step back and “see the forest instead of just 
the trees,” she says. It allows her to pivot from the nursing model, holistically assessing and 
addressing the social, medical, and emotional factors shaping each patient’s health and well-
being, to the public health model, tracking the patterns of health conditions within a larger 
population to better strategize how to reduce the rates of disease for entire communities. This 
ability to switch perspective is not unusual for medical providers working in community health 
settings, and Clara sees value in both. However, the danger in being responsible for both is that 
the metrics produced in the clinic are evaluated when funding decisions are made. Programs 
without the staff, training, or technology to provide accurate data are made vulnerable through 
the reports they themselves generate, as I will discuss in the next chapter. However, patient 
success on paper can lead to questioning the need for such programs in the first place.  
 The buzz of the room is stilled as the speaker reaches the podium. She welcomes the 
group to continue eating their breakfast as she begins the presentation. Not long after an 
overview of the day’s agenda, and a description of the purpose of UDS, the speaker touches on a 
subject that has entered many staff meeting discussions at the HCH program over the last few 
months, in voices tinged with apprehension. The speaker urges the audience to more vigilantly 
ask for and record income levels from their patients, so they will be accurately represented in the 
reports. “As we move into the ACA [Affordable Care Act], more patients will be insured. Unless 
you have this data proving low income, it’s hard to prove to the Feds why you need these 
grants.” In effect, the HRSA trainers are cautioning providers to pay more attention to costs for 
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the sake of their patients. The federal grants for the programs represented in the room were 
created largely to serve uninsured patients, before state and federal expansions of Medicaid. Now 
that all of their patients are eligible for public insurance, and they have Case Managers to sign 
them up on their first visit to the program, there is fear that the grants to these programs could be 
cut, forcing them to rely exclusively on billing, like mainstream practices.  
This threat of clinical standardization jeopardizes the flexibility that makes patients 
successful at HCH where they have been unsuccessful or even banned from mainstream clinics 
for “non-compliance.” HCH providers are wary of the concept of non-compliance, and 
constantly reframe this allegation, which can be used to deny care to those who are deemed to be 
insufficiently invested in their own care, by evoking the complicated context of their patients’ 
lives that make complying less feasible. Programs like HCH were designed to “meet people 
where they are,” in particular those who would not come to a doctor’s office once a year for an 
annual appointment, and comply in those fifteen minutes to a set series of basic examinations. 
These are patients who may not have received medical care for years, and who typically have 
complex medical problems that have been compounded by neglect. They often have experienced 
traumas that make them wary of authority figures, and traumas that make untenable the prospect 
of stripping down in front of a stranger so their bodies can be closely examined. What 
mainstream practices would call non-compliance is not lack of self-care, but rather a form of 
self-preservation in the face of trauma histories. As a result, HCH clinical encounters are 
“trauma-informed,” and can last an hour. They may consist of conversations that do not lead to 
boxes being checked off on the medical record. There is no box for building trust. 
The information that the providers elicit, catalogue, and communicate to federal agencies 
are standardized to ensure both that health care is provided consistently to each individual 
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patient, and that patient health outcomes as a collective are improving. These “standards and 
classifications, however dry and formal on the surfaces, are suffused with traces of political and 
social work” (Bowker and Star 2002, 50). They represent a particular definition of what an ideal 
or normal healthy body should be like, and the kinds of care that should be provided to bring 
deviations closer to that norm. They imply an ideal dynamic between patient and provider that is 
both efficient and responsive: providers request information, patients provide it; providers 
recommend treatment and behavior changes, and patients comply. They indicate the value of 
aggregated patient health data, and the obligation to collect and report it. 
These norms are not just objective ideals. They reflect the way responsibilities are 
socially, politically, and economically constructed. While diseases do progress in the human 
body in identifiable ways, how people come to be held responsible for the contraction of illness, 
the way they care for their own health, or the way others care for them—in other words, how to 
be a patient and how to be a health care provider—are part of the process of “making up people” 
(Hacking 2007). Providers are not just recording what is, but participating in the creation of new 
ways to act and be in clinical encounters. Their actions are guided by requirements. “Specific 
numbers can certainly move policy, confer political allegiance, guarantee funding, even bring 
about health,” anthropologist Vincanne Adams explains, 
But they do so not simply by claiming truth about the empirical world. They do so 
because of the ways they are ‘produced’ and the ways they are circulated. These 
productivities and circulations are the stories that precede and exceed numerical 
forms of truth-telling. [2016, 9] 
 
Providers in the HCH clinic have been charged with collecting and turning over the pieces of 
data that help build such numerical forms of truth. But, the elevation of one type of truth risks 
silencing others. The next section will examine the political and financial roots for quantified 
narratives of homeless health, and how the HCH providers became reporters. 
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Funding Origins 
 In order to analyze how documentation practices and health care encounters reflect 
funding sources, this section will describe the program’s funding structure since the first request 
for funding was made. The first applications required a justification for requested funds, starting 
with the number of those to be served. To satisfy this requirement, the homeless individuals in 
the city needed to be enumerated, made into a collective number so their care could be 
quantified. In time, the kinds of care this group of patients would require needed to be known, so 
supplies could be figured into the proposed budgets. In this section, it will become apparent how 
the earliest records were created to answer the questions that would be asked on funding 
applications, even when it was a simple, countable list of names. Then following this discussion, 
I will describe the early records from the clinic in order to show how they changed over the 
years, in correlation to their funding requirements. Care for the homeless has had to be 
financially justified from the start of the program, though this concern was initially limited to 
managers applying for grants. Enumerating patients through intensified documentation practices 
has gradually required more providers to develop a logic of costs, its importance and influence 
over care sharpening with each new reporting and billing requirement. 
Saint Catherine’s Health Care for the Homeless program began in 1983, after one of the 
Sisters65 noticed an influx of people coming into the soup kitchen with sore throats and foot 
problems. She contacted Sister Julia, a Nurse Practitioner, who decided to visit and survey the 
four city shelters and the city streets; “I spent a lot of time down at Court Square, just sitting 
 
65 “Sisters Religious” are effectively Catholic nuns who engage in communities in ways that mirror the 
gospel of Jesus Christ, such as healing, feeding, and clothing those in need, rather than being cloistered 
away from society in prayer. I use the term as it is used in this community, as a title and a category. 
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around on the steps talking to the folks. How are you? Where do you live? Where do you stay? 
Under the bridge. Where’s the bridge? So, they’d show me where the bridge is, about the camps 
down under the bridge.” Sister Julia had spent most of the 1970s working for the East Coast 
Migrant Health Project, stitching lacerations, treating tuberculosis, and following the 
predominantly African American farmworkers up and down the coast between North Carolina 
and Florida, chasing the harvest seasons. From that experience, she knew how difficult it could 
be to access steady work, how easily people looking for work could become vulnerable to 
exploitative employment, followed by unemployment.  
Sister Caritas, the hospital Administrator was astonished by Sister Julia’s report. She had 
not realized the size of the homeless population in the city, and responded by writing a grant 
proposal to fund Sister Julia’s modest and optimistic budget plan. The request was minimal: 
I said I think we can probably take care of the homeless program in [the city] in 
about 6 months. So she said okay. I said I need $10,000. So she said okay, what 
for? And I said well I need gas for the car, I need the car to be repaired, I need 
medical supplies, I need office supplies, I need all kinds of things. We need 
medications, aspirin, Band-Aids… So anyhow, we did, we applied for a grant for 
Catholic Charities, and we got a $10,000 grant. I had a blue hatchback, everything 
was packed into the hatchback, and I would go on a daily visit to each one of the 
shelters.       [Interview July 20, 2015] 
 
She attributed the growing population of homeless people largely to the de-institutionalization of 
mental institutions, especially the local State Hospital. This process began in 1963, with 
President John F. Kennedy signing the Community Mental Health Act into law, and continued 
through the 1990s when the last patients were finally released. Upon signing the Act, Kennedy 
said, “The mentally ill and the mentally retarded need no longer be alien to our affections or 
beyond the help of our communities,” a reference to the institutions that were intentionally built 
in most instances in remote areas so as to be out of sight and mind of “normal” society. 
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Alongside new resources for those who were mentally ill and intellectual disabled66, this vision 
was one of bringing such individuals closer to mainstream society and care. Though Kennedy 
envisaged a 50% reduction in mental institution occupancy within 10 years (Kennedy 1963), his 
plan for transitional housing and “therapeutic centers” were never adequately funded or realized 
(Brodwin 2013). The staff that Sister Julia recruited in the first few years frequently said that 
their goal was to put themselves out of business by getting all the homeless people treated and 
housed. This narrative illustrates a combination of the relative invisibility of homeless people in 
the city at that time, an actual mental health service crisis, and a pragmatic simplification of the 
complexity of the causes of homelessness that framed the earliest iteration of the program. It was 
a strategy that echoed the dominant narrative supported by public policy and grant opportunities 
at the time, that attributed homelessness to mental illness and substance abuse, and downplayed 
or ignored economic contributors to poverty like insufficient availability of employment or 
affordable housing (Hopper 2003, Moser 2015). 
 In 1985, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation in collaboration with the Pew Charitable 
Trust began a demonstration program to fund homeless health programs in the 50 largest U.S. 
cities, following the model of St. Vincent’s Hospital in New York City (Brickner et al 1990). 
Saint Catherine’s clinic, little more than Sister Julia and her hatchback filled with basic medical 
supplies, as well as a group of nursing student volunteers, applied for and were awarded the 
grant. This enabled them to hire paid nurses and expand the geographical area they served. In 
response to the success of the demonstration, funding for Health Care for the Homeless programs 
was written into Title VI of the McKinney-Vento Act in 1987, the most comprehensive 
legislation addressing homelessness passed in the United States. McKinney-Vento defined 
 
66 The official term used in U.S. policy changed from “mental retardation” to “intellectually disability” in 
2010.  
 117 
homelessness67, authorized programs to address shelter, food, education, and job training for 
homeless individuals, and required federal properties be made available for states and non-profits 
to create housing. As part of Title VI, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, took on the grant program established 
through the demonstration, issuing the first federal funding for health care for the homeless in 
1988. 
When the program began, the information shared with funders was minimal: the number 
of homeless people treated each month, by location. This basic census was used to justify the 
budget request. One of the first external grants they applied for with a bank, identified 271 
patients treated in November, 1983, 107 from a soup kitchen, and the rest divided between four 
shelters. The initial HCH mission statement outlined what the program would not do, namely 
serving as anything more that acute care for uninsured homeless people, and would refer all 
those who were insured to traditional medical practices. As Sister Julia’s letter announcing her 
new role and program to her fellow Sisters at Saint Catherine’s attested,  
My goal is to provide preventative medical care for the homeless who have 
neither Medicare, Medicaid or insurance of any kind. I will be making referrals to 
outside agencies, providing education regarding illness, and doing routine follow-
up care. I will not be duplicating the services of other agencies, but rather 
cooperating with their endeavors. [Sisters’ Archive, accessed July 21, 2015] 
Their care was specifically limited to those who were not insured and therefore could not afford 
to be seen in traditional clinical settings. Insisting that her work would not duplicate services was 
 
67 “(1) An individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; [or] (2) an individual 
who has a primary nighttime residence that is- (A) a supervised or publicly operated shelter designed to 
provide temporary living accommodations (including welfare hotels, congregate shelters, and transitional 
housing for the mentally ill); (B) an institution that provides a temporary residence for individuals 
intended to be institutionalized; or (C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a 
regular sleeping accommodation for human beings.” McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 
U.S.C. 11301 et seq. (1987) 
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intended as a salve to any professional territorializing that the new program might provoke, but it 
also indirectly identified the program as fiscally responsible, limiting program funds and 
volunteer’s time to only those who had no access to traditional care. The logic of costs in this 
early stage recognized and honored the mainstream medical facility as the proper site for care of 
insured people, regardless of housing status, where health care interactions could be billed and 
reimbursed. Those deserving of the charity care HCH was designed to offer would be those who 
could not enter mainstream clinics, and initially this was defined purely by insured status. 
Without insurance, or significant outside funding, data collection began minimally. 
It was not until the program was more stably funded that providers began systematically 
collecting data about their patients. Patient visits were episodic and unpredictable. It was often 
difficult for providers to gain the trust of those they approached for care. In the early days, 
providers were responsible only for addressing the acute health concerns their patients presented 
to them, by design. Addressing only acute health need was a minimally invasive approach that 
was also strategic for building a reputation as a source of care without strings attached. This was 
key for patients that were cautious and wary of authorities and institutionalization. As the 
program grew it first received federal grants and later secured increased funding through 
expanded state health insurance. Consequently, providers increasingly became responsible for 
collecting and reporting patient information to track individual health and facilitate insurance 
billing. Such changes altered provider-patient interactions, and molded provider approached to 
care to incorporate reimbursement requirements, the logic of costs necessitating the collection of 
insurance information or referral to case management for enrollment assistance. But, another 
outcome was the compilation of aggregate population data. The latter would then be used to 
determine which health outcomes were deemed the worst for homeless people as a category, how 
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grant funding should be spent based on this evidence, and whether providers were making the 
impact that they should be. The definition of care within HCH transformed through time as a 
result of these twin priorities, centering national population health priorities in the form of 
checklists of questions to be answered, and questions about insurance and income that would 
later direct reimbursement, rather than just addressing the pressing health needs that the 
homeless patient identified as a primary concern. 
 
Patient Records  
They call it the Green Book. I find it tucked into a cardboard box in the Program 
Director’s closet beneath photographs and newspaper clippings, comprising an informal archive. 
It is clothbound, printed with the word “RECORD” on the hard cover, each rounded letter 
bearing a penciled in smiley face. The unnamed nurse’s first entry designates an inch column on 
the left side of the page for the date, 1/20/86. The first note recounts in a few short sentences that 
a man has died in the hospital, how the narrator found out, and the names of the doctors who 
notified his family to arrange the funeral. This is also the last date an entry would be written in 
full sentences, requiring more than one line. The next few entries document appointments she 
scheduled for three men, and another man’s wound that she cleaned with hydrogen peroxide 
(“H202”). The day ends with eight men, each occupying their own line on the page, with their 
names and blood pressures listed.  
Flipping through the volume, the right-leaning cursive with looping capital letters settles 
into this pattern of one line per patient, by page 4 ceasing to record the blood pressure reading 
and instead writing simply “bp” with a check mark, to show the service was provided. This 
measurement is so common that in some places the author has drawn a large angle bracket 
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encompassing several lines of patient names, and the shorthand “bp √” written just once, to 
indicate that the procedure was repeated. Other interventions commonly listed next to patient 
names: “foot soak,” “laceration,” “dressing [bandage] changes,” “cold symptoms,” “edema” 
(swelling), “detox,” and referrals. Once, “doing very well” is all that is noted. 
By the fall of the next year, 1987, several new authors appear, indicated only by a change 
in handwriting. One is more upright with squared off angles, and the next so small each letter is 
barely larger than the blue line it sits upon. “Alcoholism,” “hepatitis,” and “psych” become more 
frequently listed beside patient names, reflecting the professional background of a newly hired 
advanced practice nurse, who specializes in mental health and substance use disorders. For 
several days in 1989, a round looping mix of cursive and print lists only names, without 
declaring the reason for the visit. There is a check mark next to a few – is it a screening for 
tuberculosis, check marks for positive results? Similar clusters are designated this way beginning 
in 1990. That fall, flu shots are indicated with a red “F.” By the following year, someone has 
begun drawing ruler-straight columns down each page, labelled: date, name, problem, referral. 
“Flu shot” is written out again, and sometimes written just once, with empty quotation marks 
beneath to indicate all following patients had the same vaccination.  
The last column is usually “HCH,” referral back to their own clinical services, and the 
problem column, just a few inches wide, captures summary terms or abbreviations. As the 
number of differing handwriting increases, indicating more staff members are making entries, so 
does the variety in cause of visit: “health maintenance,” “supportive counseling,” “basic 
hygiene,” “AIDS education,” “dentures,” “back pain,” “overdose,” “pubic lice.” The referral 
column drops off occasionally at the start of 1993, and “talked” becomes a common reason listed 
for visits.  
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Figure 4. 1986 HCH Records     Figure 5. 1991 HCH Records       
The Green Book is one of many such records. Simultaneously, a bright green, college 
ruled, five subject notebook was used the same way, beginning in 1989. The entries in this book 
begins with columns; whoever innovated the style used this notebook for the first few years. 
“Meds” or “medications” is listed frequently throughout as cause of the visit, along with “soc 
serv” (social services), “tokens” (for the bus), “ETOH” (Ethanol, the medical term for alcohol), 
and “PE” (physical exam). Again, this pattern likely denotes the specialty of the nurse recording 
the visit. A lice outbreak is reflected by 39 lines of entries across 2 pages in the latter half of 
March, 1990, a double quotation mark scratched in each successive row, signaling repetition. 
Two spiral-bound notebooks, one red and one green, begin in 1993. Though the health care 
providers never signed their own names to their entries, the variation in notation style and 
content signifies the degree of control they had over their records, and the determination of what 
kind of information merited tracking. It obscures the depth of knowledge they had and shared 
about their patients verbally, as years later in interviews they can still recount details from family 
stories, living arrangements, and medical histories on some patients. It also demonstrates 
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variation in the terms used, since “talked,” “supportive counseling,” and “psych” could all refer 
to the same kind of visit.  
     
Figure 6. 1983 HCH Mission Statement Sisters' Archive, accessed July 21, 2015 
The most recent of such notebooks represents patient visits that occurred five years after 
the passage of the McKinney-Vento Act. The clinic was federally funded by this point, but 
systematic documentation requirements would not be in place for another few years, with the 
creation of the Uniform Data System (UDS). The introduction of UDS altered not only the 
documentation of activities, but also the activities themselves. For example, before UDS, HCH 
providers did not have checklists of questions to ask patients, nor did they have to perform 
examinations at every encounter. Their documentation style was directed by the format laid out 
by Sister Julia in the original mission statement for the program as well as the needs identified by 
additional providers as they came on board. At this point, Health Care for the Homeless was still 
largely a program addressing homeless patients’ most pressing needs. Patients were usually 
uninsured and so referrals for more in-depth services, like specialist care or surgery, were limited 
to a handful of sympathetic doctors who did the work for free. Other than their names and 
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general health topic being listed together on a notebook page, which were tallied periodically to 
determine how many patients the clinic saw, patient information was not quantified and 
compared. No cost of care was listed next to patient interactions. Costs were tracked separately, 
tallying the number of patients seen each month, the amount of supplies depleted in caring for 
the patients as a whole, and the number of provider hours to be paid for.  
 
Governing at a Distance 
President Ronald Reagan, upon reluctantly68 signing the McKinney-Vento Act, remarked, 
“It is my intention that charitable organizations, including those with religious affiliation, should 
continue to play a vital role in the delivery of services contemplated in this legislation” (1987). 
Non-profit organizations, and particularly Catholic institutions, were awarded federal funds 
through this program to provide social and medical services to the homeless. The federal 
government provided funding to care for this population, but required external, largely private 
agencies to organize and deliver that care. The Sisters partnered with the city Department of 
Public Health to apply for the grant on their behalf. When the funds were awarded, Saint 
Catherine’s clinic became a subcontractor to the city health department for the grant, an 
arrangement that remains today. 
 This dynamic aligns with neoliberal trust in the free market to solve social problems. 
Neoliberalism, as “a theory of political economic practices” (Harvey 2005), holds that 
competition makes the private sector more efficient and cost-effective. Public services are 
provided through private businesses, while the role of government is to amend policies for the 
 
68 Reagan had publicly stated his belief that homelessness was either a lifestyle choice or the result of 
release from mental institutions. Roberts, Steven V. 1988. Reagan on Homelessness: Many Choose to 
Live in the Streets. New York Times, December 23, 1988. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/23/us/reagan-on-homelessness-many-choose-to-live-in-the-streets.html 
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benefit of business, and to supervise remotely. Methods of neoliberal governance create an 
“administrative gap” (Mulligan 2014, 128) that relies largely on people managing themselves. 
Theories of self-governing draw from Michel Foucault’s argument that the State in advanced 
Liberal democracies seeks to make people complicit in monitoring and evaluating their own 
behavior (Foucault 1977). Premised on the ideal of freedom and personal choice, governance 
through self-management is still coordinated and evaluated by the government, largely 
accomplished in these contexts through routine reporting and auditing practices. 
 These forms of management have bled into most industries, and created an audit culture 
(Strathern 2000) where workers are held accountable by being made to participate in a constant 
process of self-assessment. Audits have become routine across industries as a way to 
demonstrate accountability and ethical practice (Brodwin 2013, 99). Nikolas Rose and Peter 
Miller describe this as “governing at a distance” 69 (1990, 1992), derived from Bruno Latour’s 
concept of “action at a distance” (1988). The concept was originally developed to describe 
management of laboratories from afar, by examining how its activities were inscribed in texts, 
notes, graphs, and other material forms that represent the work. A manager could then ostensibly 
“see” the work of the lab without being there directly, glancing over the shoulders of technicians. 
Those working in the lab tracked their own progress. As health centers are audited by the federal 
government, they are comparably “helping (monitoring) people help (monitor) themselves” 
(Strathern 2000, 3-4). These governing strategies seek to ensure accountability by shifting 
responsibility to safety net providers. 
 The renewal of Health Center grants is contingent upon two main forms of review. First, 
the grantees have to submit an annual report to Uniform Data Systems (UDS). Secondly, the 
 
69 It is alternatively called “governing from afar” (Mulligan 2014) 
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grantee has to submit to a review every 3-5 years, which examines health center documentation 
to ascertain if they are complying with nineteen program requirements70. Until very recently, this 
review almost exclusively involved sending documentation to be examined by HRSA reviewers 
off site. As described above from the UDS training conference, when federally determined 
indicators become the measure of clinical effectiveness, insufficient numbers could lead to loss 
of funding and the closure of health centers. This pressure is not new, as these funding sources 
have long required some degree of auditing to renew grants. However, two things pressured 
HRSA to change how these audits are done, as a result of increased funding to the agency in the 
past few years through the stimulus71 and the Affordable Care Act (ACA). First, the fiscal 
responsibility of health center programs has been questioned, and second, the expansion of 
Medicaid coverage imparts new influence to health indicators.  
 In 2012, the U.S. Government Accountability Office72 (GAO) released a report 
recommending that HRSA conduct operational site visits of its grantees. The same year, the 
Office of the Inspector General audited more Community Health Centers than usual and turned 
up significant misuse of funds. An audit of a community health center in Milwaukee resulted in a 
demand that they pay back nearly six million dollars to the federal government due to non-
compliant accounting practices, and embezzlement from an accounts payable clerk73. When a 
 
70 See Appendix # 
71 Stimulus here refers to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, signed into law in order 
to stimulate the economy using public funds during the “Great Recession.” This is an example of the 
government stepping in to aid the economy when public management fails. 
72 The President appoints a Comptroller General to serve as the head of the Government Accountability 
Office. Research into federal spending can then be authorized by the Comptroller General, requested by 
Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, or mandated by Public Laws and Committee Reports. 
“Often called the ‘congressional watchdog,’ GAO investigates how the federal government spends 
taxpayer dollars” https://www.gao.gov/about/ 
73 Ekvall, Ryan. Feds find fraud, bad bookkeeping at Milwaukee nonprofit. Wisconsin Reporter, April 19, 
2013. https://www.watchdog.org/news/feds-find-fraud-bad-bookkeeping-at-milwaukee-
nonprofit/article_3214179d-2b46-5bb9-bca4-fb62c350f497.html Accessed April 1, 2015. 
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federal audit resulted in its HRSA funding not being renewed, a community health center in 
Tuskegee sued the health system in Birmingham that managed the grant, revealing fraud worth 
millions of dollars, and resulting in an eighteen-year prison sentence for the CEO74. As I began 
field work in the summer of 2014, the HCH clinic was beginning to receive information that they 
would be audited in person that fall. Stories of fraud like those in Milwaukee and Birmingham 
were traded and blamed during staff meetings and morning huddles at the clinic. Recurrent 
“polar vortex” snow storms resulted in several postponements, and they were not audited until 
May of 2015. This occasioned nearly a year of intensive internal program review and planning to 
perform well on the in-person audit.  
 
Staff Meeting: Creating Evidence for Evidence-Based Care 
 September 24, 2014. It’s the weekly Wednesday afternoon staff meeting in the first-floor 
conference room below the Community Health department’s offices, but the meeting is not the 
standard agenda of updates and clinical discussions. The staff sits around six long tables pushed 
together. Several are eating their lunches from Tupperware or Styrofoam containers. Florence, a 
Nurse Practitioner exercising her role as the Quality Improvement (QI) Manager, projects a 
powerpoint onto a screen on the far wall. She reminds everyone that QI is a way to make sure 
patient’s needs are being met by focusing on improving processes that, for example, influence 
how many patients are screened for tobacco use each year. It’s a performance management tool 
required by the HRSA as a condition of their grant. She passes out a paper checklist to be used 
 
74 Oliver, Mike. 2016. Former nonprofit CEO sentenced in $13.5 million health fraud. Alabama Media 
Group, October 14, 2016. 
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2016/10/former_nonprofit_ceo_sentenced.html 
Accessed January 27, 2018. 
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with each patient encounter, explaining that not everything on the list is currently being 
addressed at each visit. She asks for ideas.  
Dr. Anna says, “we work with people’s story, and money is a big part of that.” She 
advocates writing the patient’s income during each encounter so they know whether they need to 
write them a voucher for free medications. Karin, the mental health counselor, suggests that 
instead of writing patient incomes separately for each visit, it would be more streamlined to write 
it in just one place, reorganizing the Electronic Medical Record (EMR) categories so that 
income, employment, and social benefits are listed together. There is a debate about whether it’s 
tactful to ask homeless people about work, and Clara offers that she asks about school to lead 
them into their last job. Florence writes the suggestions on the white board with an erasable 
marker. Capturing patient income during each visit would require asking patients about their 
income every time they had a medical visit. By this point, the warnings from the UDS training to 
capture income in order to retain grant funding have been shared across the team. Those debating 
how to best capture it have internalized income information as data that will enable continued 
care. Their efforts to insert income more routinely into their care encounters reveals the logic of 
costs at work.  
 Francis’ eyebrows are furrowed. “We have a unique practice,” she says, “because we see 
people even if they have primary care.” She has been in the program longer than most people in 
the room, before federal funding was awarded, and learned to nurse in an Emergency 
Department. It shows. She favors brief clinical encounters, driven by whatever issue the patient 
presents. She finds the volume of questions she’s supposed to ask exasperating. Dorothy, the 
outreach nurse, suggests holding off on this checklist until the third visit, arguing that some of 
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the questions require them to build some trust first. She adds, “You don’t ask about colonoscopy 
on the first visit.”  
Patricia disagrees. “UDS is saying, did you do it? They don’t care if another provider did 
it. These are things we’re being qualitatively judged on.” She leans forward and looks down the 
table to add, “There is no trying.” Francis begins to object. Dr. Anna asserts “we have to pretend 
we’re their primary care.” She reminds them that because the patients are more sick, and usually 
haven’t had consistent access to health care for a long time, “You got to start this stuff on the 
first visit if you can.” Francis presses over the table, persists, “People ask why they have to 
answer all these questions if they just have a cold. We don’t get credit if we offer but the patient 
refuses.” Clara tells Francis that she explains to her patients why they need TDaP (vaccine for 
Tuberculosis, Diphtheria, and Pertussis). While she never expects 100% will agree to be 
vaccinated, they need to increase those who do, because their patients don’t get the care they 
need. She adds, “No one is getting penalized, but we need to up our game. These are national 
standards.”  
This debate exposes the foundations and fears that spur and inhibit data collection. They 
will be “judged,” they don’t receive “credit,” they could be “penalized.” If they engage a patient 
who has a lot of acute health needs, and take up a lot of time asking what seems like irrelevant 
questions, the patient may not feel heard and avoid follow up care. On the other hand, if they 
don’t ask all the questions in that first appointment, and the patient does not return, it will be 
reflected in the data that they did not provide required services to that patient. Debates about 
which indicators to prioritize, and how to improve them, tend to chaotically spiral. This can be 
attributed, in part, to the deficiencies in the electronic tools they have access to, as I will discuss 
in the next chapter. But it also involves the number of indicators that they are asked to track and 
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improve, and the difficulty of tracking people who are homeless. Even life expectancy cannot be 
clearly averaged for homeless people, so it is placed at a range between 42 and 52 years75. This is 
close to half the national average. Health outcomes are usually worse for people who are 
homeless, and they are more likely to skip follow up appointments. This makes it difficult to 
track health progress. Even when it can be tracked, health outcomes often won’t improve. Those 
living in shelters where they aren’t allowed to stay during the day, and eating in soup kitchens, 
cannot avoid high sodium diets or stay off their feet, even if they have diabetes. In other words, 
“The demand for a story of continual improvement runs up against the definitional chronicity of 
people's illness” (Brodwin 2013, 116). When patients do come to an appointment, providers 
usually try to catch up years of care in one visit, fearing it may be their only time with the 
patient. At staff meetings, providers struggle to prioritize. 
The UDS Manual is updated every year, which necessitates the annual training meeting 
described at the start of the chapter. In addition to the number of patient visits, broken down by 
race, ethnicity, and gender, in 2015 there were 13 quality of care indicators that providers had to 
track76. These included both screenings and standard therapies for particular health conditions. 
Providers must screen patients for cervical cancer, colorectal cancer, tobacco use, depression, 
and weight77. They must provide specified treatment for asthma, coronary artery disease, 
ischemic vascular disease, and HIV. They must provide, or indicate from transferred records that 
other clinics have provided, dental sealants, immunizations, and prenatal care. To prove that 
these standards are being met, they must be tracked for each patient, and then the numbers must 
 
75 National Coalition for the Homeless. 2009. Health Care and Homelessness. 
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/health.html Accessed 1/30/2018. 
76 See Appendix # 
77 Weight is separated into two indicators, one for children and one for adults. HCH serves only adults. 
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be sent to UDS. This is a difficult prospect for providers who may never see their patients again 
after the first visit. 
Few HCH patients undergo colonoscopies for colorectal cancer screening, so the clinic’s 
numbers are low for this procedure in their UDS reports. Dorothy suggests a special day for 
patients over 50. They had previously organized a spa day to encourage more women to get pap 
smears, a procedure to screen for cervical cancer. “Colonoscopy is one piece,” Clara interjects, 
“but we need to look at our A1C’s,” a blood sugar test for patients with diabetes78. The Program 
Director Evelyn says, “what’s missing is the goal,” and recounts that she’s seen these green, 
yellow, and red bar graphs to indicate when a goal is met, on the right track, or unacceptable. 
Several providers debate how to best capture these numbers in the EMR. This reminds Dr. Anna 
to explain that she identifies homosexual patients in the sex history section because she doesn’t 
know where else to do it, and doesn’t want to say something insensitive by forgetting. This 
reminds Clara to suggest that condoms be kept in the exam rooms so they can be taken in 
privacy, instead of only in a big bin by reception. Sexual orientation and prophylactics are not 
UDS priorities, though treatment for sexually transmitted infections and pregnancy are. A debate 
erupts as Francis asserts again that they should only have to focus on pressing needs instead of 
collecting this long list of required items. Clara looks at me and laughs, “This is why we never 
finish notes, because there’s so much going on.”  
 
  
 
78 Hemoglobin A1Cs were not a clinical measure for quality of care at this time, though they were 
included elsewhere in the UDS. Since 2016, when UDS measures were aligned with CMS electronic 
Clinical Quality Measures (eCQMs), A1Cs became one of 12 such measures. Coronary Artery Disease 
therapy was replaced with controlling high blood pressure, and HIV was removed. 
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Accountable Financing 
 What are the financial implications of the requirement to track and report patient data? 
Health Care for the Homeless programs, since they have been grant-funded since the late 1980s, 
were initially largely exempt from the intensified charting and reporting requirements that 
hospitals and physician practices have undergone over the last few decades. Insuring homeless 
patients has swept them closer to mainstream health care financing, and its accompanying data 
practices, due in large part to the continued expansion of state Medicaid programs contracting 
out to private insurance companies79. As of result of their new access to and enrollment in health 
insurance, care models for homeless people are newly endangered by insurance company 
strategies that serve to jeopardize Medicaid expansion, manipulate clinical practices for billing, 
and threaten homeless patients with prohibitive copayments. HCH program providers have had 
to advocate in order to retain the exemptions that make their practices accessible to homeless 
individuals. To do so, they must continuously define their patients against the norm of 
responsible consumers.  
 Increased reporting and auditing are part of what has been called a new era of 
accountability for Federally Qualified Health Centers. In parallel, anthropologists Cris Shore and 
Susan Wright have claimed that, “What is new about audit culture is the extent to which these 
calculative practices of measurement and ranking have become institutionalised, extended and 
above all, financialised” (2015b:24)80. The last term has been used in several ways, but if we 
 
79 As I will discuss in chapter 6, though not insured by Managed Care Organizations in this way, residents 
eligible for Medicare, those living in institutions like nursing homes, and those in specialized programs 
for the elderly are similarly insured through private programs subcontracted by the state government. 
80 Shore and Wright situate audit culture’s financialization in a trajectory from military graduates bringing 
their strict rules and grading in a competitive hierarchical system, into their jobs as corporate managers 
demanding the same standards of their employees, through Taylorism and then Fordism, to influencing 
the Vietnam war, and onto universities. 
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take finance to reference the management of large sums of money that “convert already existing 
(and highly varied) assets into more liquid forms of capital” (Bear et al 2015), we can use 
financialization to describe the increasing influence and dominance of these institutions in 
neoliberal capitalist economies. This was enabled through the shift away from an economy 
centered on production and manufacturing, to one reliant on credit and the trading of risks and 
debts. In the health care arena, the pharmaceutical industry is commonly acknowledged to be 
financially exploitative, both in countries like the U.S. where their pricing is sparsely regulated 
(Dumit 2012), but also through the global “multinational pharmaceutical industry” (Sunder 
Rajan 2017, 4). Recently, anthropologists have turned their attention to how insurance81 
financializes other elements of health care. Insuring homeless people is an example of how 
health care is financialized, and its potential to jeopardize access. 
 As Jessica Mulligan has argued (2015), financial strategies for managing health insurance 
entail risk management, similar to trading on the stock market (Ho 2012). They also require data 
collection and reporting, much like evidence-based care requirements:  
Typically, performance was expressed in financial figures, and while claims were 
made that these numerical indicators were only proxies for quality or 
effectiveness, in reality, monetary value became the dominant measure. In this 
way, quantification and scientific management were married to a project of 
financialization and a new ethics of accountability. [Shore & Wright 2015a:425]  
 
Based in her ethnographic work at a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) in Puerto Rico, 
Mulligan details the many strategies insurance companies use to maximize profit, by cutting 
services and shifting responsibility for health to patients. Anthropologists have long identified 
the ways in which patients are made responsible for their own health and related costs by casting 
 
81 There are other forms of insurance that this applies to. “Extreme mortality” insurance is offered to 
countries at higher risk of epidemics like Ebola (Erikson 2015). Life insurance prompts new kinship 
configurations, as it privileges legal forms of guardianship to care for orphaned children (Golomski 
2015). 
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them as responsible consumers (Maskovsky 2000, Craven 2007), but Mulligan’s work looks 
more critically at the financial mechanisms through which this is accomplished. By comparing 
contemporary HMO practices and those in the 1990s, Mulligan demonstrates how policy 
changes aimed at regulating insurance, result instead in companies redefining their services to 
maintain financial benefit.  
 Mulligan describes three key ways this is accomplished: “gaming” Medical Loss Ratios, 
Cost Shifting, and Risk-Adjustment (2015). Insurance companies are able to engage in these 
practices in part because they are ostensibly more efficient in providing coverage while 
maintaining lower costs than government insurance has been in the past. Mulligan’s analysis of 
these three strategies reveal that the perception of efficiency is an effective bait-and-switch, in 
which health care costs are actually elevated, but appear lower because of the way they are 
reported. The Medical Loss Ratio is central, by emphasizing how the costs of medical services 
has been reduced, while masking the enormous administrative costs of operating a large 
bureaucratic insurance company. The medical cost reductions are not historically based on 
efficient care so much as shortening hospital stays and other coverage limits. Meanwhile, the 
cost of insurance increases due to administrative glut. The ACA included provisions to stop this 
behavior by mandating a change to the required ratio: 85% of insurance costs now have to be 
medical instead of administrative (2015, 9). To circumvent this, Mulligan argues, insurance 
companies immediately reclassified some administrative costs as medical. 
 The inflation of health care costs due to practices like this have serious implications for 
public health insurance because benefits have been increasingly privatized. State Medicaid 
programs slowly began contracting with Managed Care Organizations82 in the 1980s (Kaiser 
 
82 MCOs are a category inclusive of HMOS, PPOs (Preferred Provider), and EPOs (Exclusive Provider).  
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2012), gaining momentum with the introduction of a waiver system in the 1990s (Lamphere 
2005), and leading to 77% Medicaid enrollment in Managed Care on average across the 
country83 by 2014 (Kaiser 2014). Anthropologists have argued that the management of Medicaid 
services reveal devolution, transitioning responsibility over care down the hierarchy from the 
federal to the state level (Lamphere 2005), where contracts with MCOs devolve responsibility 
further onto patients (Mulligan 2015). Managed Care programs are typically organized around a 
capitated system of payment in which they receive a set amount of money to treat each patient 
each year. A formula is used to calculate how much care for each patient should cost based on 
factors like their age and medical history. Then, if providers spend more money than the formula 
dictates, they will not be reimbursed above the capitated amount for the year84. Withholding 
reimbursement is supposed to be a disincentive for unnecessary medical tests and procedures. In 
practice, Medicaid is often inaccurately billed in addition to their capitated amount. A recent 
audit in Massachusetts identified $233 million paid out by MassHealth (Massachusetts 
Medicaid) for inappropriate fee-for-service charges that should have come under capitation. The 
report that identified it, as the result of an audit, calls for more quality control. 85 As MCO 
strategies inflate reimbursement rates and overbill, Medicaid costs increase. When it comes time 
to balance state budgets, legislators begin looking for ways to curtail Medicaid spending – 
 
83 This varies by state: 14 states are between 90-100% MMC, 12 are in the 80s, 10 are in the 70s, 8 are in 
the 60s, 5 are between the 40-50s, 1 is 22, and 3 are 0% MMC. Massachusetts is 59.1% MMC.  
84 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Medicaid, Managed Care, Overview. 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/managed-care/index.html Accessed February 11, 2018. 
85 Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the State Auditor, Office of Medicaid (MassHealth) Review 
of Fee-for-Service Payments for Services Covered by Managed- Care Organizations, For the period 
October 1, 2009 through September 30, 2014, Official Audit Report – Issued June 16, 2015, 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/ns/201513743m1.pdf 
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Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker has used this justification to try to reduce MassHealth 
eligibility over the last several years86. 
 HCH receives a federal HRSA grant because their patient population has a higher than 
average rate of uninsurance, even with the expansion of Medicaid, harkening back to the 
program’s origin and exclusion of insured homeless patients. At the time of my research, the 
national rate of uninsured patients in HCH clinics hovered between 20-28%, and this was 
mirrored at Saint Catherine’s clinic87. A key point of the grant is to provide care free of charge to 
homeless people who do not have insurance. When the program started, it was very rare for 
homeless patients to have health insurance at all, but the 2006 Health Reform in Massachusetts 
dramatically changed this. The state provided funds to train and hire Case Managers as 
MassHealth navigators, to insure as many people as possible. HCH used these funds to hire a 
Case Manager whose job is specifically to insure patients as soon as they come into the 
program’s care, and now there are several. As insurance access expanded, HRSA mandated that 
grantees must bill insurance for patient visits, when it’s available. This was another catalyst for 
increased data collection, so patient visits could be billed. Provider charting became more 
standardized, so that visits could be coded for billing. The logic of costs guiding HCH providers 
reversed directions; instead of referring away insured patients, all incoming patients were insured 
whenever possible. Responsible care for the homeless changed from distinguishing HCH as 
charity care that was itself unable to be provided in the mainstream due to insurance limitations, 
to a model of care that had to adopt some of the financing mechanisms of mainstream practices. 
 
86 Miller, Joshua, Michael Levenson, and Dayal McCluskey Priyanka. 2018. "In Budget Proposal, Baker 
Tries Again to Move 140,000 Residents Off Medicaid." Boston Globe (Online), Jan 24. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1990583345?accountid=33619. 
87 Health Resources & Services Administration. 2016. National Health Center Data. Uniform Data 
System. https://bphc.hrsa.gov/uds/datacenter.aspx Accessed February 11, 2018. 
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 Since MassHealth benefits are predominantly managed by private insurance companies88, 
HCH patients are suspended between special population status, and the same insurance 
mechanism that most other low-income residents experience. Homeless people are considered to 
be high risk because as a population they experience higher rates of diseases, and lower rates of 
compliance with treatment, due to instability. However, this means that they are also assigned a 
higher reimbursement rate from Medicaid, making them more attractive to insurers who 
previously would have screened them out of coverage altogether. Though the policy aim of risk-
adjustment is to prevent insurance companies from insuring only healthy patients to keep their 
costs low, Mulligan explains that this too was quickly “gamed” by insurers (2015). In order to 
receive the highest possible reimbursement, insurers encourage providers to bring new and 
existing patients in for comprehensive physicals with the objective of identifying new diagnoses. 
When patients have new and more complicated diagnoses, the reimbursement rates increase. 
HCH providers are once again directed to capture more, specific types of data during their 
clinical visits, apart from whatever the patient has come in for. 
 In sum, as soon as patients encounter HCH, they can be enrolled in health insurance, 
which will be billed through a private MCO, and ultimately reimbursed by the state via 
Medicaid, essentially the same process for low-income people who are not homeless. By 
insuring homeless patients and billing for their care, providers documented that homeless 
patients could be integrated into the same models of care that are dominant in mainstream 
clinical practices. HCH was told that the federal government needed more justification for 
continuing their grant funding at the UDS training because of the apparent success of insuring 
 
88 At the time of this research, in 2014 and 2015, MassHealth contracted with six private Managed Care 
Organizations to insure over seven hundred thousand residents in the Commonwealth: Boston Medical 
Center HealthNet Plan, Fallon Community Health Plan, Health New England, Neighborhood Health Plan, 
Tufts Health Plan—Network Health, and CeltiCare 
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homeless patients, as evidenced in debates in the year leading up to their HRSA audit about co-
payments and patient appointment lengths. These are both examples of cost shifting, which 
requires patients, family members, or health care providers to take on some care expenses. 
HRSA grantees are supposed to charge co-payments for appointments on a sliding scale, but like 
most clinics for the homeless across the country, HCH never charged anyone. They did not even 
have cash registers at their patient windows. HCH providers were told at one point that they 
might have to start using the patient income information they collected, which was often from 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), to determine which patients should have to pay a 
copayment. 
 Medicaid co-payments do little to directly offset the cost of care. They are largely 
symbolic. In Massachusetts in 2014, MassHealth co-payments were set at $3 for in-patient 
hospital stays, and between $1 and $3.65 for prescription medications. No co-payments were 
charged for physician visits, but they warned that this was likely to change: “Over time, we 
anticipate that more providers will be required to charge MassHealth members a copayment.”89 
These co-payments are affordable for most of the low-income residents enrolled in MassHealth, 
but they certainly contribute little to the actual cost of care. Instead, these charges are an example 
of “moral hazard… an analytical tool employed in economics and political policy 
regarding social responsibility” (Fletcher 2016, 9). Moral hazard represents the concern that once 
people are insured, they use more of a service than they actually need. In other words, people 
who are insured are irresponsible and inflate costs by over-utilizing care. Hypothetically, the 
uninsured should be comparably thriftier, since they will seek care only when it’s seriously 
 
89 Commonwealth of Massachusetts. MassHealth Copayments, Frequently Asked Questions. 
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/masshealth-copayments-frequently-asked-questions, Accessed 
February 11, 2018. 
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needed, to avoid unnecessary charges. This is partly contradicted by the panic surrounding 
emergency department “superusers” discussed in chapter 1. Instead of contributing to the cost of 
care, these low copayments are a disincentive, to urge publicly insured patients to behave more 
“responsibly,” and only seek “appropriate” care.  
 After the UDS Training, and a few months before the audit, Clara told me over lunch that 
the clinic was agonizing over how to deal with the problem of adding a sliding-scale fee. She 
said the sliding scale is supposed to help make HCH more self-sufficient financially, but it would 
be very difficult to implement. How much should they be charging these people who make so 
little? HCH providers work hard to convince homeless individuals to come into the clinic to be 
seen, and charging would be a disincentive. Indeed, that is the purpose of copayments for low-
income patients. She suggested that it would be dangerous to keep money at the shelter clinic, or 
on the nurses when they visit other sites in the community. Like many other elements of their 
data reporting requirements, Clara sees this as something designed for Community Health 
Centers (CHC), which while under the same HRSA funding umbrella, provide services to a 
much more economically diverse and stable population of patients. CHCs are often 
indistinguishable from standard medical offices, with similar fifteen-minute appointment slots, to 
churn as many billable patients through the doors each day as possible. This is the other side of 
the concern about patient copayments. If the clinic were to become dependent on patient 
payments, they would have to shorten their patient appointments so they could fit more of them 
into a single work day. As demonstrated in Dorothy’s outreach above, this would be another 
disincentive for homeless patients to come into the clinic for care. Clara was worried they would 
get “dinged” over this during the audit, since they just bill patient’s insurance companies, and 
use grant money to cover all other expenses. She noted that a huge service they provide is getting 
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people insured so their care is covered, though, “so if they want the safety net covered, they need 
to be reasonable about this expectation” (Interview, February 18, 2015).  
 By the time of the audit, “the feds” had agreed that HCH did not have to charge their 
patients copayments, and they were not penalized. But this was not a forgone conclusion. The 
National Healthcare for the Homeless Council (NHCHC), of which HCH is a member, 
advocated to have language protecting clinics that do not charge copayments be added to a 2014 
Policy Information Notice (PIN), which are documents published by HRSA90 that “define and 
clarify policies and procedures that grantees funded under Section 330 must follow.” These PINs 
are removed from the HRSA website when they no longer reflect current policy – significantly, 
the PIN that spells out protection from “nominal fees” is no longer posted91. Medicaid refers to 
co-payments as “cost sharing” instead of cost shifting, and clarifies that states have the ability to 
set higher rates, to a point92. Since MassHealth at present also does not charge copayments for 
provider appointments, HCH felt the issue was settled after the audit. However, as health care 
costs continue to rise, pressure to conform to accountable financing practices is unlikely to 
remain settled. 
Conclusion: Out of the Box 
 A physician told me, when describing evidence-based standards of care, that “People are 
more complicated than little boxes” (Interview September 8, 2015). This is especially true of 
 
90 Health Resources and Services Administration. Health Center Program Policies. 
https://bphc.hrsa.gov/programrequirements/policies/index.html Accessed February 11, 2018. 
91 NHCHC. 2014. Policy Advisory: Nominal Fees for Health Center Patients Under 100% of Federal 
Poverty Guidelines. http://www.nhchc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/policy-advisory-nominal-
fees1.pdf Accessed October 6, 2014.   
92 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Medicaid, Cost Sharing. 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/cost-sharing/index.html Accessed February 11, 2018. 
 140 
those served by the Health Care for the Homeless program. Standardization is ostensibly an 
equalizer, a way to ensure people receive the same things, in the same quantity, and of the same 
quality. If everyone is to have access to health care, there needs to be clarity about what that 
consists of. What kind of procedures and services should someone receive when they are first 
born, or if they become sick, or when they die? And if the government is going to ensure that 
everyone receives equitable care, then those elements of care need to be listed in each patient 
record, so that there is evidence that the right care decisions were made and services provided. 
Those little boxes need to be checked.  
My analysis aims to complicate this simplified narrative. Standards are important, but 
they are not autonomous. Tracing those who set them, and their motivations, reveals complicated 
power dynamics. Though they can be superficially unravelled for the sake of analysis, standards 
are enmeshed in the political, economic, and moral interests that construct them. The physician 
referenced above was alluding to the checkboxes that health care is both literally and 
metaphorically divided into, but I also titled the chapter “Little Boxes” in reference to an 
American folk song by Malvina Reynolds. Here, “little boxes all the same” reference the mass 
produced tract houses that populated post-war U.S. suburbs. The song dryly satirizes how 
conformity to societal standards strips away individual characteristics or trajectories. People in 
these little boxes grow up, get an education, and get a job in order to support a family within the 
same kind of neighborhood and home. This is the kind of norm that health care interactions are 
designed for, regardless of the heterogeneity of individual patient backgrounds.  
HCH patients certainly cannot be standardized in this way. Their educational 
backgrounds, family dynamics, and career histories cannot be assumed. In fact, the common 
denominator in this health care context is that they are or have recently been without a home, a 
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“little box” that provides shelter from the elements, and a safe place to prepare for medical 
procedures or recover from illness. As Nancy explains, to continue to provide care to this 
population, it’s necessary 
…not [lose] sight of some of the out of the box things that have to happen… 
There’s still a lot of people out there, whether they’re doubled93 up, they’re really 
homeless, whatever, that need some kind of more personal connection to health 
care then they’re going to get in the big system. And I know public health is very 
big and very global, but they know how to do the big stuff real good. They’re 
good at bureaucracy. They need to remember that there’s still this other part that 
still needs to be nurtured and kept going.  
[Nancy, Interview, February 19, 2015] 
 
The instability of these patient’s lives and their inability to conform to standard health care 
practices is why clinics like HCH were deemed necessary in the first place. Though the earliest 
providers at HCH hoped that they would “put themselves out of business” by resolving 
homelessness in their community, it seems more likely that the federal government would stop 
making exceptions instead. Homelessness persists. Attempts to alter public insurance policies, 
restrict eligibility, increase copayments, and end grant funding would serve to narrow access by 
insisting that those who are homeless seek care through the same standardized channels as 
everyone else, or forgo it altogether.  
  
 
93 Doubled up refers to when someone temporarily and unstably resides in other people’s homes, also 
commonly referred to as “crashing,” or “couch surfing.” While a person who is doubled up is unstably 
housed and at risk of having to rely on a shelter, and can be considered homeless under the McKinney-
Vento Act, they may not be considered homeless with regards to eligibility for various forms of relief.  
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Chapter 5 | Work-Around Queens: the Limits of Information Technology 
 
 I walk through a haze of cigarette smoke as I enter the small homeless shelter a few cities 
away from Saint Catherine’s. Those that recognize me nod and smile in my direction. The shelter 
is dominated by a single large room organized to be in constant view of the management counter. 
The few residents who do not smoke are sitting at the dining tables that fill the front half of the 
room, playing solitaire, reading worn paperbacks, or staring into their phones. They are not 
allowed to enter the sleeping area until 5:00 each evening, though it is in plain sight of the tables, 
portioned off only by a few evenly spaced wardrobes. Paper signs taped to the walls warn that 
charging electronics during the day, or entering the kitchen without permission, can lead to 
eviction.   
In the small clinic room, Clara greets a young man and says, “Let's make some 
commitments about smoking.” As she begins to refer him to a case manager who specializes in 
smoking cessation, the man interrupts. He says the nurse he talked to the day before already 
asked him a series of questions about his asthma history. Clara nods as she glances over his file 
in the Electronic Medical Record (EMR) on her laptop. She says that she needs to ask a little 
more, “some different questions” about any hospitalizations, procedures, or medications related 
to his asthma. “I know it’s hard to repeat it all again, but you shouldn’t have to do it next time. I 
just need to get it into the computer.” She asks to see his inhaler, and regards it approvingly 
when he hands it to her. “I like these because they have a counter,” she explains, that shows how 
much medication is expelled in each puff. The patient agrees, and describes how he relies on it 
multiple times a day. Clara tilts her head to the side slightly, and explains that an albuterol rescue 
inhaler like this should only be used about once a week, and that he should be using his steroid 
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inhaler more routinely, because “this opens the airways, and the steroid reduces inflammation.” 
But the man does not have a steroid inhaler.  
 When the wireless access slows down, Clara shifts to other aspects of his medical history. 
She sighs softly, but transitions nearly seamlessly to a pen and legal pad. This disruption is 
common, she later explains to me, due to outdated wireless cards in the laptops, and a mandate to 
only use secure networks, even if a more stable public option is available. She asks questions 
from memory and habit, capturing information required by the patient’s MassHealth94 insurer 
and the program’s federal grant. After a physical exam, they discuss his medications. Clara will 
give him an albuterol refill for his rescue inhaler and a free allergy nasal spray today. He worries 
that he will lose his insurance coverage once he is assigned more shifts at work, and won’t be 
able to afford his inhalers. She reassures him that she will bring him a steroid inhaler to use 
regularly in the next few days, “Don't worry, I'll get you one. However I need to, I'll get you 
one.” 
Then she asks if he has a spacer. A spacer is an inhaler attachment used to express the 
medication into a chamber. The user can then take a longer time to breathe in the medication, 
inhaling through multiple breaths, so more of the medicine ends up in the lungs instead of the 
mouth or throat. This is especially useful for those in the middle of an asthma attack, who are 
unable to draw one deep breath. She recommends waiting between inhaler puffs, “the first will 
affect the top of the lungs, then wait, and the second puff will affect the bottom of the lungs.” 
But he does not have a spacer.  
Clara walks to the small refrigerator in the corner and pulls out a short bottle of water. 
She empties it in the sink, and jabs the bottom with a pair of scissors until it punches through. 
 
94 Massachusetts Medicaid 
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She angles the bottle, and cuts an opening until it yields a hole big enough to fit the mouth of the 
man’s inhaler. She unscrews the top of the bottle, and explains he should hold this end to his 
mouth. The man frowns, “They are going to think I am doing drugs.” She leads him to the 
management counter, and describes the improvised device to the staff. “It’s legitimate,” she 
declares, as she tears away the paper logo. She adheres a hand written medical label to the thin 
plastic bottle. The employee smirks, “If you say so, Mr. Wizard,” and Clara laughs. Back in the 
clinic room, I ask whether she’s ever done that before, and she shrugs, “We are work-around 
queens.” 
Providers at HCH work around barriers to address their patient’s health needs all the 
time. Within this 30-minute visit alone, Clara worked around weak internet signal, insufficient 
access to EMR tools, insurance limitations on medications and devices, and the punitive shelter 
policies that can intimidate patients away from engaging in medical practices. In computer 
science, “working around means intentionally using computing in ways for which it was not 
designed or avoiding its use and relying on an alternative means of accomplishing work” (Gasser 
1986, 216). HCH providers certainly engage with computers in this way. But as Clara’s 
comment suggests, work-arounds are not something they just happen to do in their work, it is 
their work. Their expertise and authority are largely exerted through informal patches to make up 
for a lack of resources that they have no control over. Their reign is in making do.  
The plastic bottle fashioned into a spacer will never be typed into an official report. 
Clara’s motivation for creating it was how to best help this man, who struggled to breathe and 
had few resources. However, an anonymous trace of this encounter will be electronically 
inscribed and transferred. “Use of Appropriate Medications for Asthma” is an electronic Clinical 
Quality Measure (e-CQM) required by Medicaid and Medicare for reimbursement. In alignment 
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with e-CQM, it is also a Clinical Measure for the Uniform Data System (UDS), the data 
collection platform used to aggregate population health data for federally-funded health center 
programs. Clara may not have been able to “e-prescribe” the refill for the man’s albuterol inhaler 
due to her crashed laptop, part of another standard called Meaningful Use, but she gave him the 
paper script, a free nasal spray to combat the histamines that exacerbate his asthma symptoms, 
the makeshift spacer, and a promise to bring him a free steroid inhaler for daily use. The record 
will show that she used appropriate medications for asthma – it just won’t show how. 
Data for evidence-based care is not simply collected, but rather produced. Government 
agencies rely on auditing practices to inform and maintain standards of care and accountable 
financing because there is “trust in numbers” (Porter 1996), a prestige afforded to quantified 
presentations of information. This data is put to work in tracking and directing health care 
interactions, but what work is put into the data? The creation of health statistics, standards, and 
funding decisions rely on clinically reported health data. Clinical data is produced both by the 
government interests that delineate the format and categories of reported information, and the 
providers whose informal system of work-arounds scaffold the assembly of those reports. The 
result is a distillation of health context down to simple numbers, that often inaccurately portray 
or silence the flexibility and invention that health care work depends on. 
 Continuous reporting is intended to improve consistency and reliability. As earlier 
chapters detail, such requirements expose a logic for governing populations shared by business 
management and public health, as providers and patients are drawn into a parallel trajectory of 
quantification for the sake of efficiency. Borrowed process design assumes an industry model 
where innovations will be incorporated and fully supported. Using computer systems is supposed 
to facilitate the reporting process, making it possible to instantaneously sort and submit a large 
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amount of data electronically. This raises expectations. Practices to elicit and shape patient 
information saturate health care work, and has intensified with the digitization of medical files. 
Mandating the use of computerized reporting systems to quantify health care encounters can 
serve to paradoxically yield inaccurate, partial, and arbitrary data.  
Transitioning to electronic data collection did not result in a complete conversion. 
Examination of the oral work histories of Saint Catherine’s care providers and the digitization of 
clinical records in relation to each other, reveals that there was uneven task completion. The 
digitization of clinical records improved their ability to provide coordinated care to itinerant 
patients, since it enabled all providers to view the same patient record simultaneously, but 
volumes of paper documents remain in the clinic to this day. Providers with varying degrees of 
computer literacy were required to use computer programs with minimal training. Unlike most 
mainstream clinics, the new Electronic Medical Record (EMR) system was not accompanied by 
a staff position dedicated to data entry or information technology. The EMR itself operated on a 
lower tier of service, restricting access to data management features behind paywalls. Providers 
continue to rely on paper records to adapt to inevitable electronic failures and limitations. 
Insufficient training, staffing, and access to digital tools constrain the work of providers in new 
ways, and they adapt through informal innovation. These reporting shifts, and their mirroring of 
business management strategies, illustrate a political shift preferential to private control of health 
care. However ethnographic research at Saint Catherine’s expose the thinness of the contention 
that private business models lead to more efficient and accurate care. 
Observations of HCH providers in their offices, clinics, and cars lay bare their 
dependence on improvisation. Rather than just cultivating a pivot-ready defense against the 
unpredictability of resource availability (Livingston 2012), or engaging in individualized “craft 
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work” that enables providers to set and seek to attain patient goals (Brodwin 2013, 89), the work-
arounds in this setting are often so routinized that they become shadow standards. I use this term 
to encompass the unofficial guidelines that providers develop and attempt to reinforce across the 
clinic to make their required reporting work possible. Like the shadow economy from which I 
borrow the name, shadow standards are unofficial and uncounted, remaining outside of the 
statistical representations of clinical work. They mask the messiness of data production, and 
enable providers to only submit “clean” numbers to funding agencies (Biruk 2018), which come 
to depend on shadow standards, in much the same way that governments become dependent on 
underground systems of exchange (Lomnitz 1988). Once the informally standardized work-
arounds appear to resolve reporting problems, there is little incentive to invest in systemic repair. 
Despite serious faults in management and reporting systems, stripped down numbers serve to 
reinforce their apparent success in achieving higher quality care.  
 
Garbage at the Speed of Light95 
 “Data is only as good as how and where you document it,” Florence states at the 
beginning of a Quality Improvement (QI) review of their patient medical records. It takes up the 
second half of the weekly staff meeting, and is not greeted with enthusiasm by the staff. Quality 
Improvement (QI) reporting consists of quarterly chart review to analyze the group’s 
documentation habits as a whole. There are criteria for medical, mental health, and case 
management visits that are updated every year to align with requirements from MassHealth, 
Medicare, and the Uniform Data System (UDS). Florence has been in the program for over a 
 
95 This phrase can be attributed to Gary S. Kaplan, M.D., chairman and CEO, Virginia Mason Health 
System in the 2014 U.S. News Hospital of Tomorrow Conference roundtable, in reference to Meaningful 
Use of Electronic Health Records required by Medicaid and Medicare. 
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decade, and was tasked with Quality Improvement given her Master’s degree in Health Policy 
and Management and familiarity creating basic statistical reports. When she had to complete the 
reports using paper charts, before the conversion to the EMR, she initiated chart review 
meetings, so they could go through the files as a group. But while the digitized files are quicker 
to look through, collecting data for the reports from the EMR is frustrating. Rather than selecting 
a criterion from a drop down menu, and running a comprehensive report of the entire medical 
record, identifying patterns for the practice as a whole, she has to randomly click through 
individual charts looking for the information she needs. The process is not actually randomized, 
as it is supposed to be. Since she needs to find six charts for each provider each quarter, she 
looks for those that have been seen in the clinic at least three times, so they’re more likely to 
have had time to check all of the required measures. They also try to include an equal number of 
men and women, even though they see far more men than women, because pap smears are one of 
the required measures. Once she has a large enough sample, she enters the numbers manually 
into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, selects the mathematical formulas, and from there creates the 
graphs for the quarterly reports. It is, in effect, very similar to the paper process.  
 Florence projects the results of this survey, displayed in bar graphs, onto a screen. She 
goes through each item one by one, reciting percentages, as staff react. The statistic for blood 
pressure checks are low. Patricia asks, “Is this totally accurate? When we’re just giving meds, it 
doesn't mean blood pressure needs to be done.” Florence replies, “We make assumptions that 
this has been done but it falls to the wayside.” They debate what counts as a “true” office visit, 
requiring this standard procedure. Does it count if a patient is just there for a bandage change? 
Dorothy says they definitely skip by and forget to check some patients who are there for full 
appointments. Florence says they need to make sure the colonoscopies, STD labs, mammograms, 
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and cervical screenings are in the Diagnostic Imaging section of the EMR, with an accurate date. 
And they need to make sure, if the test was done by another provider, that is noted in the EMR as 
well. Florence admits, “I don’t know if I’ve ever entered one.” If they are not listed in the EMR, 
but they have been done, the reports will inaccurately indicate that they have not provided the 
care that is required.  
Dr. Anna blames the EMR layout, “It's complicated to know what to choose first – select 
site, date, population, deselect hepatitis C diagnoses, select visit dates – like a game of logic.” 
They discuss where in the EMR they are supposed to write about stopped medications. “That's 
Meaningful Use,” someone mutters, in reference to a CMS funding requirement that EMRs are 
used to record and report specific kinds of data. Due to “a glitch in the system,” they have to 
enter medications in two separate locations in the EMR, one to compare with other medications 
currently being taken, and another to chart medical history. This is a work-around the staff had 
previously agreed on to deal with “the quirks in our EMR,” Patricia reminds them. If the work-
around is not used consistently by all staff, however, they can’t rely on it. 
 They shift to the Case Management slide, and Florence says everyone should be using a 
checklist to make sure all comprehensive benefits have been checked, so that patients are 
connected with services as needed. Clara suggests using the sticky notes in the EMR, a feature 
designed to look like the little yellow pieces of paper, visible at the top of each patient file. They 
are not programmed for anything in particular, so the clinic can use them as they want. Sticky 
notes are a frequent suggestion when their indicators are slipping. Do they keep forgetting to ask 
about tobacco use? Put a reminder in a sticky note. Do they forget whether a chart was pulled 
last time there was a review? Mark its use and the date in a sticky note. Do they want to 
remember that a patient is a violent sex offender so they remember to leave the clinic door open 
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during visits? Sticky note. Francis says she wants more programmed pop-ups to remind them to 
enter information, but Clara says it's not possible for HCH to control that. While it is a feature of 
the EMR program, it is behind a paywall.  
 The way information is entered is one problem. Though the criteria required by federal 
agencies has been standardized, the way providers engage in data entry tasks is not. As Florence 
later explained,  
one of the issues, is trying to get people to document consistently, a particular 
type of information in the same place so that you always know where to look. It 
looks like there’s only 50% of the charts we used met criteria x, but it may be that 
they’re documented in places where we couldn’t find it, so it’s not to say that 
we’re not doing it.     [Interview February 10, 2015] 
 
The staff does not always agree on which information it is a priority to collect, where to type the 
information in the medical record, and how to phrase or code the information. For example, if 
Florence uses the EMR browser to search for “smoking,” it might result in 15 different types of 
entries, but these would not all be automatically pulled into a report on tobacco cessation 
counseling. Without consistency in these elements of form entry, the reports pulled from the 
EMR will not accurately represent all of the relevant information contained in the files, let alone 
all that is done that may not be captured in the medical record.  
There is a phrase for this in computer science that is repeated frequently when the staff 
discusses the EMR and these reports: “garbage in, garbage out.” The idea is that computers will 
faithfully output flawed or even nonsensical data, if that is what is input. The margin for human 
error is enormous, but it is widened at the clinic by barriers to adequate EMR tools. A paywall 
blocks HCH’s access to a drop-down menu of Standardized Forms in the EMR such as the 
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ9 Depression Test) and Drug Abuse Screening Test (DAST). 
With access, the HCH patient data could be systematically input the same way by each provider, 
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through use of these forms, and they would be seamlessly drawn from to populate reports. 
Instead, the providers create and rely on work-arounds, such as scanning the completed PHQ9 
into the EMR area for laboratory tests, and then running a lab report to identify how many PHQ9 
screenings have been done, based on the number of attachments. However, this does not 
automatically populate a report with the average depression score for a group of patients, so they 
have also added all of the questions that are in the PHQ9 form into the History of Present Illness 
(medical history) section of the electronic patient charts, as well as in the mental health section. 
This duplication increases the work that they do, as they must effectively redesign the EMR, in 
order to fulfil their requirements. This is not because the tools do not exist, but because the clinic 
does not have the resources to purchase them. As Clara laments,  
it’s redundantly all over the place, and you have to gather it together, when it 
seems like it would be so simple if someone took charge and purchased the 
standardized forms so that we knew how it was attached. And then you could pull 
it right out and you would have a report that was accurate.  
      [Interview February 11, 2017] 
If they had full access to the software behind the paywalls, all providers could easily input data 
the same way. But these obstructions necessitate providers craft their own standard form entry 
practices. 
Clara is confident that the program is doing especially well with this particular screening, 
thanks to their system of integrated mental health care, where the medical provider or case 
manager will walk a patient to the next exam room to speak to their psychiatrist or psychiatric 
clinical nurse specialist if a patient needs to be prescribed medications. Clara explains,  
When they’re in the community, they need to see a therapist three to four times 
before they see a prescriber, and sometimes the wait for a prescriber is over a 
year. How does that work? How does anyone deal with that? Great, you get 
therapy, but if you need meds? And a lot of our patients need meds, that’s a 
travesty.      [interview February 11, 2017] 
 
 152 
They write up mental health contracts, agreeing to write prescriptions to continue their 
medications, which they will renew each month as long as they come in for a visit, until they are 
able to secure an appointment with a mental health prescriber. As a result of their system of 
“wraparound care,” their patients receive mental health care and prescriptions, which many times 
lapsed while they were institutionalized in detox, jail, or Crisis (mental health) stabilization, far 
more quickly than is typical. But without the standardized form in the EMR to populate a 
complete record of their mental health screenings, their apparent rate is documented and 
officially recognized as much lower than it is.  
 
Digitized Bureaucracy and Shadow Standards 
The providers are acutely aware that a large portion of their work is bureaucratic. 
However, given the depth of reporting struggle and debate I witnessed at HCH, it is striking that 
the standards themselves are seldom critiqued. They generally agree that it important for their 
patients to be screened for cancer and depression, and to have their high blood pressure and 
diabetes controlled. They even agree that this should be tracked not only for each patient, but 
also compiled and assessed at the population level. Most see increases in the percentage of their 
patients receiving pap smears as evidence of better care provided more consistently across the 
program. Part of the reason is that they already buy in to the quantification of health information, 
as it is integral to their professional education and experiences. Public health developed in 
tandem with statistics. This seems contrary to the “confusion, anger, and frustration people 
express about standards,” that result from “the apparent alogical or irrational character of 
standards [which] demonstrates… Max Weber’s powerful insight that the move toward modern 
rationality necessarily resulted in forms of irrationality” (Lampland and Star 2009, 15). The 
 153 
bureaucratic systems that run on health information are modeled on management philosophies 
dedicated to efficiency, transparency, and constant improvement. And yet, despite accepting the 
logics of standardized data collection, flaws in the process are inescapable.  
Weber (1958) identified the emergence of bureaucracy as the result of modern capitalist 
societies, efficient administrative systems necessitated by the increased size of governed 
populations and economic complexity. He characterized bureaucracies as hierarchical, 
consistent, and legitimized through legal and rational principles, instead of traditional values like 
kinship ties. The “iron cage” of bureaucracy refers to this staunch dedication to rules designed to 
maximize efficiency and rational calculation. Counter to the Weberian ‘ideal type’ of 
bureaucracy, anthropologists have documented its often arbitrary and inconsistent functioning. In 
bureaucracies, scholars have seen evidence of both the interest and indifference of the State 
(Feldman 2008, Gupta 2012, Hull 2012, Stoler 2009, Stevenson 2014). This not just the result of 
piecing together a narrative from historical archives; documents do not just record but produce 
state authority (Stoler 2002). This is true for both paper and digital formats. 
The clinic’s EMR bears evidence of restrictions of access, and imperfect improvised 
solutions. Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star borrow Marx’s definition of technology as 
“frozen labor” to understand how information technology “embed and inscribe work” with 
“values, opinions, and rhetoric… in many ways software is frozen organizational and policy 
discourse” (2002, 135). This is not only true of software. Documentation and reporting served 
the same function, increasingly, for the decades leading up to the introduction and expansion of 
EMRs. However, the speed and volume accompanying health information technologies and big 
data intensifies the relationship. Tracing these standards and requirements lays bare an 
accelerated distrust in public management of public services. Instead they are contracted out, 
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relying on audit and self-governance so that providers can identify and resolve their “own” 
problems, while government agencies govern at a distance. Paywalls are a frozen indication of 
the privatization of health information technologies. 
 This requires the complicity of those counting and being counted. “Rankings and 
measures may appear as external, constraining and oppressive, but they are also empowering and 
self-affirming, or at least for some people. Their construction of easy-to-read, decontextualised 
numbers, however faulty, also makes them popular and a useful tool of management and 
governance” (Shore & Wright 2015, 27). It is not unusual that the particular experiences of HCH 
providers are not captured in standardized reporting systems. Sally Engle Merry identified a 
similar process in international human rights agencies, and attributes the exclusion of “local 
systems of knowledge” to the need for commensurable categories (2016, 215). These categories 
must simultaneously be translated into locally-understood terms, and maintain their universal 
meanings. Yet, even though what is documented and reported is limited and often determined by 
government agencies, or their privately contracted counterparts, people also use numbers for 
their own purposes (Emigh 2002), such as indicators used to make governments accountable 
(Merry 2016). This is part of their appeal. Unlike other systems, evidence-based reporting is 
ostensibly transparent and logically responsive to new information. This doesn’t make it less 
bureaucratic or overwhelming, but makes it appear best, a seduction of collective improvement. 
 Yet, as I have recounted, the data collection process is deeply reliant on work-arounds. 
They fill the gaps left by government indifference and eschewal of responsibility. The work of 
anthropologist Larissa Lomnitz on informal economies provides a template for understanding the 
implications of this dynamic. She reasoned that the logic of economies could not be fully grasped 
through analysis of state-sanctioned systems of exchange, and urged study of the shadows, long 
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ignored by Weberian analysis. Lomnitz contended that centralized power and state bureaucracy 
complicate and slow production and distribution, creating shortages. Once the government has 
created a problem that it cannot resolve, “These deficiencies give rise to informal solutions… 
Eventually most goods and services becomes available in this fashion, thus further decreasing the 
incentive to make the formal economy work” (1998, 53). Similarly, the effectiveness of the 
work-arounds providers create and use make quality reporting systems seem rational and 
functional. They step in where the government has stepped out. Work-arounds are transformed 
into shadow standards as they become more commonly used, filling in the gaps of official quality 
reporting mechanisms. 
 
Data Collection as Quality Control 
I find the outreach nurse Dorothy sorting through folders of paper in the backseat of her 
car. She’s parked behind the old brick hospital building that originally housed nursing students 
when there was a program on campus. She hauls bags of paper through the back entrance and up 
two flights of stairs to her office. She shares this small space with another nurse, paired up like 
most of the members of the department, as the students were decades ago. Some of her 
colleagues even slept here after unpaid shifts working as student nurses, beds crowded into 
corners where desks now sit, the same metal radiators hissing. Despite the conversion to the 
Electronic Medical Record (EMR) in 2008, paper still abounds. Forms for confidentiality and 
consent, applications for services, and more crowd desks and tightly fill filing cabinets.  
Across the hall, in another shared office, Rachel considers the shift in documentation 
through her decade at HCH. She has worked at Saint Catherine’s, across multiple departments, 
for over 35 years. She remembers that when she first came to HCH, their reporting requirements 
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were much less intensive than at the hospital, which had begun to use an EMR system. With 
decades of experience working in the hospital, she recalls how the sentence that nurses used to 
write about each patient every two hours became insufficient, eventually replaced by near 
constant documentation. She attributes this incline to the Joint Commission, the accreditation 
body for health care organizations that must be satisfied in most states before hospitals can 
receive reimbursement from Medicaid and Medicare.  
Joint Commission developed through a century of efforts to standardize medical care and 
professions. In 1906, the Council on Medical Education, sponsored by Carnegie, commissioned 
a survey of all medical schools to establish quality control measures. This resulted in the Flexner 
Report, which established ratings for hospitals, and spurred the creation of medical professional 
quality committees, which produced the first hospital standards96 (Baer 2001, 36). These 
committees merged to form the Joint Commission97 in 1951. Though hospital review by this 
private body was completely voluntary, participation boomed as Congress declared Joint 
Commission accreditation sufficient for Medicare Conditions of Participation when it was 
created in 1965. President Lyndon Johnson wanted a smooth transition to Medicare, and relied 
on the existing Joint Commission review process so as many hospitals could participate as 
quickly as possible. Rather than create an entirely new system, the federal government relied on 
this private professional organization to audit health care quality in hospitals across the country. 
At this point, the government required no oversight of the Joint Commission’s accreditation 
decisions, unable to even access the reports they were based . From the beginning, the provision 
of public health care was evaluated through a collection of private corporate interests. 
 
96 American College of Surgeons, American Hospital Association, American Medical Association, 
American College of Physicians, Canadian Medical Association. 
97 Originally named Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), then Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) in 1987, and then The Joint Commission in 2007. 
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This was part of a larger shift in political ideology, as the contention that private 
enterprise is a superior manager became more mainstream. By 1972, as Richard Nixon ran to 
serve a second term as President, Congress amended the Social Security Act to increase 
government oversight of the Joint Commission. This was spurred by charges of corruption and a 
lawsuit about the power and authority over care given to a private organization, led by consumer 
interest groups. Joint Commission retained control, with some adjustments. The new legislation 
required the accreditation body to share its data with the federal government. Joint Commission 
instituted medical audits to assess quality of care, requiring accredited hospitals to be trained in 
quantitative reporting practices. At first, this was a meeting where clinical staff discussed 
medical cases to determine if the correct care interventions were made, but the documentation 
requirements intensified from there.  
When Rachel was a new nurse in the 1980s, the government had only just instituted a 
new Conditions of Participation requirement for Medicare and Medicaid called Quality 
Assurance (McGeary 1990), the former name of the clinic’s Quality process described above. 
Rachel began at HCH in 2005, just one year before Massachusetts health reform would expand 
insurance access. In that year, with predominantly uninsured patients, the data collection was 
minimal. “Now we really get into like almost every nook and cranny of their life if we can. So 
there was less paperwork back then,” she pauses, and clarifies, “there’s less paper work now, but 
if you convert the computer into paper, there would be a lot more paper today.” HCH 
transitioned from notebooks to individual paper charts in response to federal policy change. The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was signed by President 
Bill Clinton as an amendment to the 1944 Public Health Service Act. HIPAA had two main 
objectives. It was written to help employees keep their health insurance when they switched or 
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lost their jobs. However, the second central objective was to update the Social Security Act to 
reduce the risk of fraud by making it easier to transmit administrative data about patients and 
their insurance98. To assuage fears that patient’s medical information would be vulnerable during 
digital transmission, a key element of the act was the safety and privacy of patient files. HIPAA 
necessitated a more confidential system of recordkeeping, where multiple patients wouldn’t be 
on the same page, their information easily accessible to anyone who picked up a record book or a 
folio of files. Though administrative data about patients became more commonly digitized for 
insurance, patient records maintained their form as pieces of paper, now in basic manila folders, 
that were supposed to be locked in cabinets or car trunks for safekeeping when not in immediate 
use.  
 
Transitioning to Electronic Medical Records 
Economic recession catalyzed the digitization of health records, just as the financial 
considerations of insurance companies have driven the increase in standardized data collection 
and reporting. However, the recession was an opportunity for justifying the expansion of an 
agenda that was already underway. Displacing the central role of the state in providing public 
services, a previously radically conservative idea, had become mainstream. Increasingly, private 
corporations garnered the trust to resolve public problems. Unlike government-run programs, 
private businesses were perceived as cutting bureaucratic fat, maximizing efficiency and 
reducing costs. It is significant that data collection has been done by the private sector since the 
advent of quality reporting with Joint Commission, shrinking the direct influence of the 
government. Fiscal responsibility and perceived insufficiency of government systems for 
 
98 Bowers, Donna. 2001. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: is it really all that bad? 
BUMC Proceedings 14:347–348. 
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oversight were used as justification, advancing the development of auditing systems so private 
business could manage public care. I note the following chronology of EMR policy not to 
suggest that these changes can be pinned simply to determining moments, but rather to 
emphasize that the preoccupation with and reliance on quality thrives across the political aisle.  
Nursing informatics was introduced to scientifically track and evaluate nursing activities 
through record-keeping practices. Nursing Interventions Classification (NIC) is one such system 
of recording the actions of nursing to benefit patient health. The intention behind nursing 
informatics is to build a base of scientific legitimacy of nursing knowledge for 
professionalization, as well as making visible the actual interventions that nurses make into 
patient health. “Only work that is visible can be truly identified as valuable” (Bowker et al 2001, 
1). Without systems of nursing informatics, nursing records of patient health are the first to be 
discarded from hospital record systems, as they are not required for billing, and physicians do 
not consider them useful for medical research. Cataloguing nursing actions serves not only to 
make nurses more visible, but also creates a record of nursing decisions that can be quantified 
and compared across medical facilities to help establish what nurses should do in a given 
situation. Keeping careful record of actions to determine their effectiveness and improve method 
establishes the scientific legitimacy of nursing practice, and improves the likelihood of it being 
recognized as a full profession: “you need to produce numbers, even if you don’t believe in the 
numbers that you are producing” (2001, 5). If nurses want to professionalize, in other words, 
they need to use acknowledged tools to do so.  
President George W. Bush initiated the spread of EMRs in 2004, with an executive order 
to create the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC), and 
set incentives for using such services. EMR standards were determined during this period, but it 
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was the infusion of $30 billion dollars in 2008 that spurred the digital transformation of U.S. 
health care. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) 
Act was part of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the stimulus bill 
that newly inaugurated President Barack Obama signed to address the economic downturn. The 
HITECH Act used incentive payments to enable health care practices to purchase computers and 
change their recording and reporting practices to a computerized system. In exchange for the 
funds, recipients would have to follow “Meaningful Use” criteria to prove that they were actually 
using the purchased technology in specified ways. At the time, only 9% of hospitals reported 
using an EMR, compared to 96% in 2016.99  
The most difficult part of the conversion for HCH was the skill gap. The training, about a 
week sitting in a classroom with an instructor from e-ClinicalWorks, the EMR company, was the 
most in depth education most of the staff would receive in how to use the new system. For 
several of the nurses, it was the most they had ever had to use a computer. At least one staff 
member returned to retirement instead of transitioning to the new machines. A few nurses had to 
learn how to turn a computer on and type on a keyboard, some hitting the keys with such force 
that they broke them. Some felt that using the computer displaced their care for their patients, 
unable to look them in the eyes as they typed up their medical histories so as to focus on their 
fingers. Clara began working in the program shortly before the conversion process, as a new 
Nurse Practitioner. With the computer literacy she had gained writing papers in school, and her 
experience nursing in an Emergency Department with an EMR, she was hired in a managerial 
position as a Clinical Systems Coordinator. Whenever there is a routine update or a new version 
 
99 The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. 2016. Report to Congress 
on Health IT Progress: Examining the HITECH Era and the Future of Health IT 
https://dashboard.healthit.gov/report-to-congress/2016-report-congress-examining-hitech-era-future-
health-information-technology.php Accessed 8/11/2017.  
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release for the EMR software, Clara has to spend hours reviewing the online tutorials and 
experimenting on her work laptop, frequently from home while she is technically off the clock. 
Sometimes she looks to her husband for help, a computer specialist for a life insurance company. 
Once she sufficiently understands the changes and new features, she presents it to her colleagues 
in short blocks of time during staff meetings, and helps them troubleshoot over the phone, in 
between her own patient appointments.  
In her office, Patricia has laid out several piles of paper. She is reordering and organizing 
them before she enters the information on each page into the computer manually. She complains 
about the duplication of work that this causes. At this point, they have had an Electronic Medical 
Record for 7 years, but paper has remained. Patricia had been working in the program for five 
years before the conversion. As 2007 ended, just before Barack Obama was sworn in as 
President of the United States, Health Care for the Homeless began the transition to electronic 
records. For three days, they closed their clinical services, and they scanned. They collected 
paper records from their multiple sites, and brought them to one location. Rather than replacing 
the paper system they had, the electronic record was built on its bones, dependent on the 
continuation of paper collection, but now adding new steps of scanning, digitization, and file 
attachment to each page. At the largest shelter, they decided the patient turnover was so frequent 
that they didn’t need to scan all the files. Patricia explains, “we had a double record in the sense 
that we’d work in the EMR, but we didn’t enter anything anymore into that old record. But we 
relied on it.” After the conversion process was technically over, a staff member was assigned to 
upkeep the digitization of files through continued scanning, since the providers created new 
paper records all the time. “We overwhelmed that person with what needed to be put into the 
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medical record,” Patricia remembers. “She was always behind in the scanning. It’s a bear, and 
it’s a bear if you don’t do it every day.”  
The frequent reference to paper is not just illustrative of the increase in health care 
reporting work. The paper is also a work-around. It is so consistent and benign that it could be 
easily overlooked. But the paper records remain in this clinic in case of the failure of internet or 
software access. More structurally, paper proliferates because the privatization of EMR systems, 
due to the strengthened political belief that the private sector has the capacity to develop 
technology more quickly, has resulted in a crowded market of digital health record programs that 
cannot communicate with each other. Programmers call this interoperability. Part of the 
explanation is the difficulty of transmitting patient information securely, without risking hacking 
and theft of personal information, a violation of HIPAA. However, this problem, which currently 
remains system-wide across U.S. health care, is also due in large part to the fact that EMRs are 
proprietary. They were developed privately, and are offered into a marketplace that has 
increasingly strict government expectations and requirements for their clinical use. Hospitals 
then choose the EMR company that they want, and are left to deal with the fallout of being 
unable to digitally share patient information with providers using a different EMR system. The 
fallout is an avalanche of paper.100 
 At the end of the day, Clara walks by laden with two canvas tote bags full of paper, 
pulling a wheeled backpack a foot wide behind her. They are full of medical records faxed from 
other clinics. She is bringing them home. She will sit in front of her television after dinner, and 
type the information about each patient into the EMR from her laptop. At the clinic, they scan 
and attach these faxed documents, but that does not enter the data into the actual patient charts in 
 
100 I borrow the avalanche metaphor from Ian Hacking’s “avalanche of printed numbers,” discussed in the 
introduction. 
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the EMR. She is a manager, so she does not have to sign out by swiping her magnetic 
identification badge against the Kronos timekeeping system at the end of the day. Managers are 
not paid overtime for working more than 40 hours a week. All non-management staff have to 
swipe in and out within 8 minutes of their scheduled shifts each day, to avoid unauthorized 
overtime pay. The ritual of clocking in and out of Kronos is regimented, but the control it has 
over hours worked is illusory. As the clock ticks past 4:36 pm, someone yells the time as a 
warning into the hallway. R-RM curse mildly and runs down two flights of stairs to the wall-
mounted Kronos machine by the back door to sign out. Then she returns to her office to continue 
typing reports. 
 
New Technologies of Management 
 Scientific Management is in many ways the backbone of contemporary audit culture 
(Shore and Wright 2015). As discussed in chapter 2, turn of the century techniques to separate 
and standardize labor activities, so they could be quantified and controlled, have long permeated 
medical contexts and professions. While constant documentation of patient information has 
helped to establish legitimacy for nurses, by making their interventions visible through the 
standardization of charting practices (Bowker & Star 2002), it also intensifies their workloads, 
and vies for time with their clinical care practices (Boje and Winsor 1988, Wigens 1997, 
Ackroyd and Bolton 1999). Though Scientific Management has significantly influenced many 
current management practices, social science analysis needs to be updated for current dominant 
models that have come after the influential Fordist influences (Lamphere 2005). For example, 
flexibility and constant improvement is a crucial element of Lean management strategies. As 
opposed to the rigid standards imposed from above in Taylorist methods, a Lean approach is 
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supposed to integrate improvement both horizontally across different departments, and vertically 
across hierarchy, to use its terminology. This means all members are responsible for assessing 
their individual and collective workflow, proposing possible interventions that could improve 
efficiency or the end product, testing them, and then integrating any improvements. This 
displaces the manager as sole leader of workplace changes. Everyone is an auditor. Yet this 
management model focused on process is theoretical. In practice, individual creativity is often 
subsumed by the motivation to meet requirements for sales (Brondo and Baba 2010), or patient 
visits that are tied to reimbursement. 
 In addition, the Lean approach recognizes that technologies are not just designed for one 
purpose, and then used as intended. Machines often cannot properly operate without a human 
element, requiring the ability to spontaneously adjust to new circumstances (Marques 2011, De 
Genova 2010). Rather than deskilling workers altogether, use of new technologies and 
documentation practices require cultivation of new skills, and can result in the redefinition of 
professions and re-gendering of activities. The Jacquard loom is a telling example, and “a fatal 
innovation, which weaves its way from squared paper to the data net” (Plant 1995, 56). Weaving 
was a skill done by hand, typically by women101, that became mechanized, and converted to mill 
work. Mechanization often destroys the craft of work, but it is also generative, extending 
occupations, and requiring new sets of skills. Technologies are not limited to their initial design. 
The Jacquard loom used punch cards to store and repeat patterns. In other words, it stored and 
transmitted information, and soon inspired other uses, such as “the 1890 census… punch card, 
chief peripheral tool of early computing devices. By 1911 this census taker and statistician, 
 
101 The transformation of work, and how it is gendered, did not end there for computing. Women were 
seen as ‘natural’ computer programmers because it was perceived as a low-skill activity akin to secretarial 
work. It was not until the complexity of coding was popularly acknowledged that it became a prestigious 
field, and pushed women out (Abbate 2012) 
 165 
Herman Hollerith, helped form the Computing Tabulating Recording Company. It later changed 
its name to IBM” (Hacking 2016, 76). These narratives celebrate the innovation of technology 
users, and their often transformative role in developing the purpose of things, beyond the initial 
intention of designers. Lean management models seem to embrace this contention of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) that technologies are co-constructed (Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003), as 
users are defined anew along with the technologies. Generating reports has become central to the 
work of contemporary health care providers, just as providers re-design how those reports are 
generated.  
However, Lean was designed for business management, in contexts in which the workers, 
employers, and products are all under one private, corporate umbrella. This is the fissure 
between factory models and the service industry into which healthcare providers often fall. In 
U.S. healthcare, services funded by the state are passed through private insurance companies, 
quality consulting firms, and technology design businesses. Providers are reminded of the market 
whenever they hit a paywall to engage in reporting work that the government requires but does 
not directly accommodate. In this context, the work-arounds they innovate to circumvent these 
resource roadblocks, do not get fed back into the system to improve process as Lean champions. 
Instead, they are made invisible, even as they make work possible. The shadow standards that 
result—such as routine use of digital sticky notes, and re-typing scanned forms into agreed-upon 
areas of digital files, as one might write in a paper margin—are required for the health data to be 
produced and submitted. The standards are recruited to make the digital data collection process 
seem logical, efficient, and accurate. As a result, the numbers are created and sent on to funders, 
even when providers know they are not the right numbers. Overburdened providers, through lack 
of time, technology, or willingness to prioritize data collection, help to make themselves seem 
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less successful in patient care than they are. 
 
Conclusion  
 Celebrating the ingenuity and resourcefulness of health care providers can serve to 
atomize structural deficiency. I was often stunned to witness their spontaneous innovation, 
everyday objects transformed into medical devices, but it is telling that they were not. They took 
such maneuvers in stride because they were so common. This is not about the creativity of 
individual providers, just as increased funding to the clinic would not resolve all of the issues 
requiring work-arounds. Both are systemic and entangled. The U.S. health care system 
increasingly relies on paradigms of business management like Lean for Quality Improvement 
because the ideology that the private sector can more efficiently manage public services has 
gradually become dominant. The ubiquity of work-arounds in Saint Catherine’s HCH program, 
and their routinization into shadow standards, accentuates the difference between a car 
manufacturer and a publicly funded clinic. Lean demands constant improvement by opening up 
feedback loops across a company, but the idea is for any improvement to be integrated. 
Innovations that demonstrate through testing that they save time or improve outcomes are 
supposed to become part of the formal process. But health information systems, though they 
imitate Lean principles, do not integrate the critiques of clinics. Their barriers, such as paywalls, 
are often by design. They are not all representing the same company, and so their motivations are 
not aligned. Providers are not in a position to improve the process itself, and so create an 
underground system of work-arounds just to satisfy their work requirement, unacknowledged but 
vital. 
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 The stakes are also different. Michael Burawoy’s (1979) analysis of factory workers 
identified the creation of a motivation to produce more not just for bonuses, but because they get 
sucked into “the game,” in part to stifle boredom. HCH providers, on the contrary, can barely 
keep up with the production of the data. Their work is not monotonous, and rather than the 
production of more and better data being an enjoyable game, there are potentially punitive results 
if they can’t meet the standards. Providers know they cannot have the same outcomes as standard 
medical practices due to their patient population, yet there was palpable tension and worry that 
their work would be sped up, and their reimbursement impacted, if they couldn’t improve their 
numbers. Furthermore, they are not fighting just for their own reimbursement but for the 
continued care of their vulnerable patients. These providers end up shouldering the responsibility 
of ensuring their patients continue to receive care at all, not just controlling the conditions of 
their own labor. 
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Chapter 6 | Spend it Wisely: Stewardship & the Right to Make Bad Decisions 
 
 “Hot issues?” nurse Alison asks. She sits at the head of a long cluster of tables in a purple 
room with one yellow accent wall bearing a decal that reads, “The most important things in life 
aren’t things.” The dozen staff that make up the Interdisciplinary Team102 (IDT) consider. The 
Executive Director Ted, also a nurse, sits silently in the back of the room. “Howard has 
requested103 that we fix his mobility scooter,” the occupational therapist Amy announces, “I got 
an estimate for the repair, replacing the battery charger and labor. Should we approve it?” It 
would cost over a hundred dollars. “What are the benefits of using it?” Alison asks. As the 
Program Director for the Program for All-Inclusive Care of the Elderly (PACE), it is Alison’s 
role to ensure IDT decisions assess the potential benefit to participant’s104 health outcomes. 
“Well,” the clinic manager Cindy offers, “on the plus side he can get around in the community, 
and he drives it well. But on the negative, he can really get around.” Everyone laughs. The 
physical therapist Ellen adds that he doesn’t get any exercise. “What do we do if it breaks down 
in the community?” the social worker Christine asks, “We can’t put it on one of the vans. Is that 
our responsibility to solve?” Alison prompts that it could fit the care plan if isolation is one of his 
needs, and then, “Any reason to agree or disagree?” Christine expresses concern that the scooter 
enables him to obtain alcohol, but they all quickly agree that he would get it either way. “So will 
we support his functional mobility?” Alison asks. They approve the repair. 
 
102 CMS requires a minimum of eight IDT members, each representing different specialties and/or 
professions. 
103 According to regulations from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) that funds 
PACE programs, service delivery requests submitted orally or in writing by a participant must initiate an 
reassessment of his care plan, and a decision about the request must be communicated within 72 hours. 
104 Since the PACE program is not a purely medical model, and incorporates daily activities alongside 
various forms of health care, the frail elders who join the program are referred to as “participants” and not 
as “patients.” Similarly, those in nursing homes are referred to as “residents” instead of “patients.”  
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  Two months later, they receive the same request. “I don't think we should decide based 
on the money,” Amy begins, “but is it in his best interest to fix it again?” Ellen notes that other 
PACE programs discussed this, and consider it an Activity of Daily Living (ADL) issue for 
community transportation, but he also has a wheelchair he can use. “Also, we fixed it once and 
this time should be on him,” she concludes. Alison cautions them about assuming it is Howard’s 
fault that the scooter is broken. “He does have access to funds,” Christine offers, “We could see 
what the costs are and if that's something he will do.” Alison weighs in again, “Choices aside, 
does it help him in the community for access? I think that we have a hard time in this program 
letting people make bad decisions, it’s not our job to change them.” She is steering them back to 
considering the participant’s health, away from allowing cost to foreground their decision. With 
this course correction, Christine considers aloud that the scooter does enable Howard to get to 
the store easier, and he will buy alcohol no matter what. Then she asks, “How much do we plan 
to pay to maintain it and keep it operable?” The home visit nurse Marilyn jokes, “We should ask 
for, what would we call this as an insurance company? A deductible!” She laughs, but it’s 
agreed. The quality assurance nurse, Kingsley, recommends they use the same standard form that 
they use to have participants help pay for unnecessary emergency room visits.  
 Two weeks later, in the more inclusive all staff meeting that precedes the IDT meeting 
every morning, Alison announces a “magical moment” to the group, between stories of 
participant successes and colleague collaboration. “Ted fixed Howard’s mobility scooter in a suit 
and tie, saving the program one hundred dollars!” The staff laugh and applaud cheerfully. Ted 
waves off the praise. “I didn’t do it because I’m nice,” he jokes, “I did it because I’m cheap!” As 
the Executive Director of PACE, Ted is responsible for managing the program’s finances. He is 
not supposed to influence care planning decisions directly, though in this case he circumvented 
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an IDT decision by literally fixing the problem himself. As he explained in an interview, the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) that funds PACE has rules preventing Ted 
from being a member of IDT to inhibit care decisions from becoming too financial. Yet IDT, 
guided by Alison, is supposed to make decisions that spend the program’s capped funds. “It’s 
naïve of CMS to think Alison and I don’t confer,” Ted told me in an interview. Though their 
roles are designed to maintain a degree of separation between care decisions and the price of 
enacting them, IDT providers learn to cultivate a logic of costs. The logic is evident in the 
trajectory of this service request. At first, even the potential arguments for denial, his use of 
alcohol and lack of exercise, clearly relate to his health and well-being. However, by the second 
request, the team is unable to decide based purely on how Howard might benefit. They 
repeatedly return to a belief that he should share the cost as an incentive to prevent future 
damage to the device. Rather than just being a punitive or educational measure, their hesitation 
to pay for a second repair speaks to their constant concern with managing a set amount of funds 
to care for multiple participants. Their role shifts perceptibly from care providers to insurers.  
 PACE programs serve as both health team and insurer by design. The model was 
developed as an alternative to institutionalized eldercare, so a core purpose is to keep those who 
qualify for nursing homes105 out of them. In order for frail elders to remain safely living “in the 
community” — in their own homes, the homes of family members, or in assisted living facilities 
— the IDT members need to assess participant’s individual life circumstances so they can 
develop a holistic care plan. PACE goes beyond what would normally be considered in 
traditional eldercare programs. In contrast to the uniformity of nursing homes, devised to 
 
105 Nursing home is a broader term. For CMS purposes, nursing homes that meet certain standards in how 
they operate and obtain patients are referred to as Skilled Nursing Facilities, or SNFs (pronounced 
“sniffs”). I use the term nursing home in reference to SNFs. 
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minimize risk and ensure equal treatment of all residents, the PACE model depends on 
flexibility. Participants are understood as having unique constellations of health-informing life 
conditions. How well their housing is adapted to their needs, their particular family dynamics, or 
whether they have friendships or hobbies or pets that they prioritize, are considered alongside 
their medical and mental health diagnoses. As a result, care plans are not restricted to 
recommended treatments, medications, and provider visits. IDT members meet with participants, 
but also their families, to discuss what each person’s goals are. The result of these conversations 
is a broader, personalized picture of quality of life that becomes the context in which IDT care 
planning takes place.  
Tailoring care plans to each participant in this way is feasible because of the way PACE 
is funded. With capitation reimbursement, a set amount of money is allocated to the program 
based on how much CMS estimates it should cost to care for their participants as a whole. They 
do not receive more reimbursement if they should spend more money, as in fee-for-service 
reimbursement models. In this chapter, I will argue that the capitation funding for a population of 
beneficiaries requires health care providers to develop a sense of the cost of their care decisions, 
and to consider participants in relation to each other when making choices about how to allocate 
resources. Using Annemarie Mol’s critique of the “logic of choice” and her contrasting analysis 
of the “logic of care,” I introduce a third logic that accompanies them. Rather than replacing 
choice or care, I intervene with the logic of costs to point to the ways in which the three are 
imbricated in important ways across health care decision-making. I bring the history of the 
patient rights movement in the United States to bear on the “logic of choice,” rather than 
reducing it only to a critique of consumer-based care, and differentiate it from the logic of costs 
which is activated in providers through contingent models of reimbursement. In the ethnographic 
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context of the PACE program in Massachusetts, this dynamic is understood as “stewardship,” 
bearing religious undertones from the Catholic hospital with which the program is affiliated, and 
legitimizing the activation of health care providers as insurers through the lens of responsibility. 
Reporting to CMS in PACE is part of a panopticon of managerial healthcare bureaucracy, as 
everything must be documented and decisions justified. This is not a shadow standard, because it 
is given the freedom to make and improvise unusual solutions to patient problems but also 
required to thoroughly document and report it.   
Second, this chapter will analyze how the logic of costs animates the recognition and 
treatment of risk. In contrast with risk-adverse nursing home care, PACE providers commonly 
repeat the mantra “the right to make bad decisions” to remind themselves and each other that 
their definition of goals of care often means becoming more comfortable with the possibility of 
participant injury or illness. If a participant wants to remain independently mobile for as long as 
possible, for example, they may schedule her to attend physical therapy to improve her strength, 
rather than commanding her to rely on a wheelchair to reduce her risk of falling and breaking a 
hip. The risk of physical harm for a participant in this context, however, does not translate to 
greater financial risk for that person. Unlike most insurance programs, PACE is fully at financial 
risk instead. As a rule, PACE programs are not allowed to routinely implement cost-sharing 
measures that are standard in most insurance, such as deductibles, copayments, or coinsurance. 
Instead, to mitigate the risk of overspending, PACE providers attempt to project into the future. I 
will examine how care planning is an exercise in imagining possible futures for participant health 
and well-being, calibrated against the future cost of potential consequential hospitalizations, and 
how it might impact available future funds for other participants. However, the use of the phrase 
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the right to make bad decisions also demonstrates how providers resist the logic of costs, and 
upend the concept of non-compliance. 
 
Financing Eldercare 
 Many of the PACE staff explain the model of care by contrasting it with nursing homes. 
After all, for the majority of providers working in geriatric care, nursing homes dominate. Even 
if not hired through them directly, those working in home care, hospice, or hospitals often 
interacted with the facilities in order to transition an elderly person back home for the end of 
their life, or to transfer to or from short-term rehabilitation (rehab). The PACE model itself was 
developed as an alternative to nursing home care in San Francisco’s Chinatown, which faced 
limited long term care capacity and an increasing number of elderly residents that had migrated 
from China, the Philippines, and Italy. By creating a network of health and social services within 
the community, united by a day center for socialization, the program enabled seniors to “age in 
place” in their own homes. The original program106 developed in the early 1970s was inspired by 
the culture of the residents it was designed to serve, who would traditionally continue to live 
with their adult children as they aged. It was called “On Lok,” Cantonese for “peaceful, happy 
home.” Like other innovative programs that eventually became replicated nationwide, On Lok 
was a demonstration program for several years before CMS granted them waivers to use 
Medicare and Medicaid funds in a novel way: a capped amount each month for a group of 
participants. Congress approved the model as a Medicare option in 1986, no longer requiring 
waivers, and positioning it for nationwide replication. Though the model was initially slow to 
 
106 https://www.onlok.org/about/ accessed December 1, 2019. 
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spread (Gross et al. 2004), there were three in Western Massachusetts alone by the time of this 
research. 
 Many PACE providers were attracted to the program precisely because of the ways in 
which it differs from nursing home care. And financing is a core difference. Nursing home care 
is generally divided between short-term rehabilitation, which is reimbursed by Medicare, and 
long-term care, which is reimbursed by Medicaid. The occupational therapist Amy was so 
frustrated in her previous jobs that she joked with her husband that she would leave healthcare 
altogether and open a home goods shop. As people were discharged back home from the hospital 
or a short term stay in a nursing home for rehab, Amy would recommend adding handrails and 
ramps to their houses to decrease the risk of falls and injuries, but no one followed these people 
home. No one would necessarily be there to determine which pieces of Durable Medical 
Equipment, like walkers, would be reimbursable by Medicare. Home modifications generally are 
not. Medicare will not pay to have ramps installed, which can cost thousands of dollars. They 
also will not pay for grab bars or handrails to help a frail person balance in the shower, by the 
toilet, or alongside stairs, though these modest additions greatly reduce the risk of falls. Medicare 
is traditionally not designed for preventive services, to keep people safe enough at home that 
they can avoid the nursing home. Instead elders resort to the nursing home after an injury, and 
then either remain, or return home with little chance of making home improvements that 
accommodate their needs. Amy likened the nursing home system to teachers in the U.S. who 
were caught erasing and redoing their students’ answers on standardized tests in order to improve 
the school’s test scores: 
And then somewhere in the back of your brain, you know that they’re in some 
completely convoluted system, that someone doesn’t go into being a second grade 
elementary school teacher to make money or to gain some. That’s not why you go 
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in. And I just, working in the SNFs107 right now is like that, it’s like you’re 
looking at this system that is so profoundly broken that you feel like you are on 
the edge of always making a choice that’s borderline unethical. It’s awful. It’s 
really truly awful. 
Medicare reimburses for occupational and physical therapies only until the person reaches 
“maintenance” level. Rather than decreasing the level of support they receive gradually, they 
typically receive assistance with their mobility in the nursing home until they have improved 
enough that Medicare ceases to pay, and they are discharged back home with no follow up 
services to maintain their level of mobility. 
 The physical therapist Ellen noted how this sometimes leads those in nursing homes to 
inaccurately document rehab patients’ progress as a way of advocating for them. One test she 
uses to assess if a participant is ready to return home from rehab is to watch them get out of bed 
and walk to the bathroom. If the nursing home staff document in their records that a rehab patient 
can do this safely, Medicare determines they are ready for discharge and stops reimbursing for 
their stay. Nursing home staff who may witness a patient safely walking, but who feel they still 
need time in the nursing home, may omit this progress in mobility from the medical record to 
ensure that the patient can continue receiving care108. She explained: 
Funding in nursing homes for short term people all runs on rehab dollars. It all 
runs on rehab, it’s really hard on billable minutes, and so people are put in 
positions to do things. And also with managed care, when I was doing it too, if 
managed care heard that somebody didn’t need help, then they’d be like well 
why, they need to go home, we won’t pay for this anymore. But maybe their 
spouse is 98. And maybe their daughter is going to be in next week. You know, 
you’re doing that thing as an individual to help that other individual. I don’t think 
we always think of ourselves as healthcare providers, and maybe [that is] fraud. 
Considering the life circumstances that influences a patient’s chance of success, such as family 
support, is not unique to PACE providers, but other payment models do not validate these 
 
107 As explained in the introduction, “SNF” refers to Skilled Nursing Facilities, a type of nursing home.  
108 Similarly practices have been ethnographically documented. (Rodriguez 2014). 
 176 
concerns. When she worked in nursing homes, Ellen says she would see patients being 
discharged, and know they would be back in a month or two because they had no support to 
maintain their safety at home.  
 The social worker Christine recounted the arguments she would get into with her husband 
as she consistently paid for things for residents that their insurance would not cover. She was so 
burned out on the work she referred to herself then as “crispy,” and she would rotate to a 
different job every three years. Medicare may only pay for rehab stays for a limited amount of 
time, but the reimbursement rate is higher than it is for Medicaid patients staying in the nursing 
home for long term care. As a result, the norm in nursing homes has become bed shifting, 
making room for Medicare-reimbursable rehab patients at the expense of other residents 
(Rodriguez 2014).  
I struggled with that, because as a social worker, it’s not about the money, it’s 
about the people. So they wanted me to ‘oh move their room, so we can bring this 
person in, and get Medicare, move their room, do this, do that,’ and I would dig 
my heels in and start telling people like, you have the right not to move. And so 
that was like my way of getting back at the administration.  
In her previous work with nursing home models, Christine could easily align herself with her 
patients against the administration or the insurance company. She herself was not able to control 
what they had access to, so the issue of payment felt as if it stood apart from care, even impeding 
it. It was not until she began working for the PACE program that she began to “get better with 
understanding the business aspect of it, and the care aspect of it. Because if you don’t bring in 
money, then you can’t provide the staff, or maintain a building to provide the care.” It was not 
until she was made responsible for the costs that financing decisions began to seem like they 
could be reasonable or enable good care. 
 The clinic manager Cindy contrasted the PACE model with the organization and 
financing of a nursing home she used to work for when she first became a registered nurse. 
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Based in Florida, it was a corporation that owned a chain of nursing homes in a handful of states, 
including Massachusetts. “They’re just manufacturers of nursing homes,” she explained, “that all 
operate under a formula… a PPD [patient per day] number that’s based upon your census that 
allows you to have one aide per twelve people, no matter what their care needs are.” The PPD 
formula is only based on the numbers of staff and residents, and does not take into account the 
particular conditions, severity, or complexity of the residents being served. In contrast, the PACE 
model does not allow patient care resources to be allocated on the basis of a formula. Unlike 
nursing home residents that receive the same number of hours of personal assistance to ensure it 
is fair, PACE participants are assigned home care hours based on their particular circumstances, 
whether they can clean their home or bathe themselves, or have family who can provide some of 
the support instead. IDT goes through each participant by name, when they first enter the 
program, and then every 6 months to reassess their needs, as well as any other time as needed. 
Even though both nursing homes and PACE programs receive reimbursement through CMS, 
Cindy argued that,  
Medicare and Medicaid favor this program because this whole time, yeah it might 
cost the same amount at the end of their life, but there’s this whole gap, which 
sometimes can be a 20 year gap that they’re saving a significant amount of 
money, because we’re providing tightly coordinated care during this time frame 
that helps prevent the necessary hospitalizations and nursing home stays. So we 
might be providing better care for somebody because it’s more individualized and 
it’s catered to what they actually need, but in the long run it’s still not the same 
cost as an ER stay. 
CMS determines how much PACE will be reimbursed each year using a Prospective Payment 
System specified for home care, which assigns a set amount of money based on each person’s 
health conditions and anticipated care needs. Though the participants are assessed and their care 
needs assigned monetary value individually, the program receives one collective sum to use to 
treat all of their participants, rather than keeping each person financially separate. The 
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reimbursement amount is only adjusted when official participant diagnoses change, anticipating 
greater need for care, or are adjusted to reflect a more accurate diagnostic code. PACE providers 
are able to decide how their set amount of money gets spent throughout the year. The 
occupational therapist Amy explained how much of a relief it was to finally be able to tell a 
patient with limited mobility that the program would pay for a $6,000 accessibility ramp to be 
added to her house, after working in nursing homes and telling patients that they needed to pay 
out of pocket because insurance would never cover it. The social worker Christine described how 
she used to tell patients in the nursing home that they had the right not to move rooms, and not to 
be pressured by management, who often reorganized patients for greater insurance 
reimbursement. In these instances, the providers could associate themselves with patients against 
the insurance companies or care institutions, because they had no power to change the rules. 
Now that they work on an Interdisciplinary Team that can spend the insurance money as they see 
fit, they do have the power to approve or deny the services patients request, or offer support they 
think will improve patients’ health and safety. But this also means that they are the ones who 
deny requests as well – as Christine put it, they “own it.”   
Most insurance companies have blanket policies about what they will and will not cover, 
but the PACE funding structure allows them to spend flexibly according to determined need. 
Christine explained that once patients understand that the program controls the money, they 
come with a list of things they want – dentures, cataract surgery, and hearing aides are especially 
popular because they often are not reimbursed by Medicare – but the program cannot afford to 
provide them to everyone. Christine explained,  
We look at if it’s a medical issue in relation to their teeth and infection, and what 
needs to happen. What stage of life are they at, what does it mean? Will they lose 
them? Will they take them out and put them in a tissue and they get tossed in the 
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trash? Can they tolerate it? There’s a lot of things. It’s not just, oh you need them? 
Stamp. You need them? Stamp. You need them? Stamp.  
Patients are accustomed to a medical culture where everyone is ostensibly offered the same range 
of services, which they pick and choose as consumers. Often, PACE participants discuss what 
the program has given them during group activities, and think it is unfair when they have not 
been offered the same things. Some providers have even left the program because they felt so 
uncomfortable discussing what patients could or could not have. Even though they are able to 
offer so much more than traditional insurance companies, the provider is usually not the one who 
decides, or says no. “We all want to save the day, and we want to give them everything,” 
Christine laments, “but then when do we take the step back and say, we have this one pot of 
money, and we need to help a lot of people with it. So some person might cost more because 
they have just heavier needs, versus another person. How do you find that balance?”  
 
Logics of Choice, Care, and Costs 
 As I observed PACE meetings—from IDT, to one on one onboarding appointments 
between the new participant and each department, to follow up between providers and participant 
family members—it became clear that the providers were constantly negotiating their priorities. 
Everyone wanted the participants to be provided with good care that met their needs “where they 
are,” a phrase used to center the priorities of participants. As a result of the financing structure of 
the program, PACE providers were able to flexibly assess and address individual participant 
needs and desires, providing goods and services that might delay health decline and limit injury. 
However, the IDT was also incentivized to consider the cost of care decisions to a certain degree. 
They were consistently but subtly coached to restrain their impulse to provide every possible 
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resource to every participant. They developed a sense of how to weigh the health and wellness 
benefits of a decision on one participant, against the collective pending needs of all the others.  
Annemarie Mol’s theorization of the logics of choice and care provide some insight into 
the ways in which care is framed and care decisions are made in the PACE program. However, 
the relationship between health care financing and care decisions are essential to the context of 
health care in the United States. Instead of bracketing policy and insurance as Mol does, I clarify 
how it directly informs how providers interact with each other, with patients, and with the 
regulatory bodies they report to that cyclically influence their financing and standards of care, as 
discussed in previous chapters. PACE attempts to model their program according to a logic of 
care in a cultural climate of the logic of choice. Rather than playing these two logics off of each 
other, I will examine how they both inform what care looks like in the PACE program, through 
the concerns that illuminate IDT care planning debates. Then I will propose the logic of costs as 
a lens for understanding how providers come to see budgeting as an essential component of good 
care, and how this coincides with rather than disrupting the logic of choice.  
 Mol explores the logic of choice from two angles, patients as consumers in a market, and 
patients as citizens. In her analysis, the logic of choice attends to autonomous individuals. These 
individuals exchange clearly defined products in a market. Patients are divided into target groups 
and offered positive options and freedom through the advertisement of health care products and 
services. Mol situates the logic of choice as a response to previous eras of patriarchal physician 
control, from which, “patients were to be emancipated into citizens” (2008, 29). Such citizens are 
meant to control their own bodies, and therefore own the decisions about how their bodies are 
maintained and cared for. Mol is critical of this narrative. She proposes that what actually occurs, 
particularly for those with chronic diseases such as diabetes, operates according to a logic of care 
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instead of choice. Rather than autonomous individuals, patients are embedded in social worlds 
with families and friends that shape their health and care practices. She argues that the market 
perspective oversimplifies care as a problem with solutions that can be purchased. Instead, “care 
is an interactive, open-ended process that may be shaped and reshaped depending on its results” 
(2008, 20). The logic of choice assumes that control is possible, and burdens patients with self-
care decisions, when often options are an illusion. She argues it does not actually empower 
patients, because they do not control the options that exist for their treatment. Patients are 
members of a care team comprised of professional providers, themselves, and their loved ones, 
not a target group with generalizable experiences, abilities, and desires. The promises of health 
care marketing are illusory, as we live in bodies that are bound to experience illness, disease, and 
decline. Of patriarchal medical authority, she asserts that, “caring is not a matter of control let 
alone of oppression. It does not involve staying free or making someone else into a slave. 
Instead, it is a matter of attending to the balances inside, and the flows between, a fragile body 
and its intricate surroundings” (2008, 34). Our chronic conditions limit our freedom. 
 Several of these insights were apparent in the PACE program. The design of the IDT is 
intended to conform to a logic of care, though such language is not used. Patients and their 
families meet with the PACE providers in order to assert or adjust their vision for the 
participant’s health and treatment trajectory. The care being provided is customized on an 
individual basis, but also in an evolving context. What a participant wants in January may 
change by May as their health declines. The providers would never promise a participant a 
perfect recovery. The premise of the program, and requisite to their enrollment, is that they have 
chronic conditions and need for assistance that will only increase as they reach the end of life. 
Additionally, the strategies that work for one participant would be irrelevant for another. One 
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woman was reluctant to come into the Day Center, and refused to make her clinical and physical 
therapy appointments. With the insight of her social worker and the Certified Nurse Assistant 
(CNA) that provided her with in home care and light housekeeping services, IDT decided that 
the best way to incentivize this particular participant to return to the center, and to keep her safe 
in her home, would be to help her take care of her cat. As Christine explained, “her cat is her 
only resource, her only person to her in the world. She lives with her cat, together, every day, 
and that’s her only best friend. So how can we support that to help her have a better quality of 
life.” So IDT assigned her CNA to clean the woman’s cat litter box, a service that no other home 
care service would provide. Taking her priorities seriously, they reasoned, would demonstrate to 
the participant that PACE was on her side, and encourage her to return to the center. 
 However, the logic of choice was active in the PACE program as well. There are ways in 
which choice is more limited in the PACE model than other reimbursement models. Once a 
member joins the PACE program, it become the primary health source for all participants. Any 
referrals must go through the program. The participant is not allowed to shop around for 
providers or services, unless they wish to pay for them themselves, out of pocket. Participants are 
also supposed to call PACE first if they think they need to go to the hospital, rather than dialing 
emergency services directly, and the on call nurse is supposed to guide them as to whether 
hospitalization is necessary at that time. However, this poses frequent problems that necessitates 
its own weekly IDT meeting. Participants are used to having more options. They have spent 
decades purchasing care and choosing insurance plans. They may have chosen a higher 
deductible plan in the past in order to retain a primary care provider that they liked, but who was 
out of network for their insurance company. Participants frequently call 911 or drive themselves 
to the hospital, and PACE only finds out about it later. PACE is not consulted first. And IDT 
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often deems in the weekly Morbidity and Mortality (M&M) meeting, in which they discuss 
recent hospitalizations, that admittance to the hospital was unnecessary. Care is customized 
according to participant priorities, but participants largely believe that if the program were fair, 
they would all receive hearing aids and dentures. Participants request such things once they 
enroll in the program, because PACE technically can pay for them where Medicare often would 
not. The service request and appeal process is in place to ensure participants have a voice in their 
care, but it is often used specifically to request goods and services that can be purchased in the 
market. This is not all there is to care, but it is an important element, and one that PACE 
providers must take seriously. After all, they must respond to all service requests within 72 
hours. The design of the program, merging insurance and provider team, keeps the logic of 
choice very much alive and relevant.  
 The second iteration of the logic of choice, positioning the patient as a citizen, bears 
particular importance for eldercare in the United States. While Mol’s critique complicates a 
definition of curative care, it also downplays the importance of the patient rights movement in 
the United States and elsewhere, in response to abuses and subjugation of patients in care and 
clinical research (Reiser 1993). Mol’s context of care in the Netherlands, which has had 
compulsory health insurance since 1941, diverges significantly from that of the United States 
(van der Velden 1996). American patients do not all access care as a right of citizenship, 
problematizing this analysis. Patients in the U.S. gained the right to informed consent in 1914 as 
a result of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, a case in which a woman received 
surgery that she had expressly refused while under anesthesia for an examination. However the 
majority of patient rights legislation occurred after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which was 
foundational in that it asserted the right to be treated regardless of “race, color, or national 
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origin” (Chen et al 2007, 364). The 1979 Natural Death Act ensured the right to refuse or 
withdraw treatment, without it being considered suicide. In 1986, the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) protected the right to be treated in an emergency 
regardless of ability to pay. Though the American Hospital Association introduced a Patient Bill 
of Rights in 1971, and it was introduced as legislation in 1991 and 1993, it did not pass until it 
was folded into the Affordable Care Act in 2010, and largely concerned what insurance 
companies were both now compelled and no longer able to do to reduce costs109. As I describe 
below, there is additional legislation that restricted the routine use of restraints on the elderly to 
prevent falls. When Mol opines that care is not about control, freedom, or oppression, she is 
focused on a life lived with a chronic condition that cannot be controlled and bodies that cannot 
be brought into submission, into wellness. However the logic of choice is a stronger concept 
when it embraces the very real control that has been exerted over patient bodies through either 
forced treatment or experimentation, systematic neglect, refusal to provide life-saving 
intervention, and literal restraint (Briggs 2003, Wailoo 2014, Washington 2006), and the 
persistent control providers wield over those with severe mental health conditions, even in 
community settings (Brodwin 2013110). With this context, choice can be a revolutionary logic. 
The logic of choice, in this vein, is part of what insists that care be “patient-centered,” and why 
 
109 These include: preventing coverage denial due to pre-existing conditions or rescinding coverage due to 
a new condition, enabling patients to choose their provider from within the insurer’s network and to 
receive some specialty care without a referral, preventing lifetime or annual dollar restrictions on 
coverage, requiring coverage of all emergency care regardless of if it is in network, and more. 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/aca-new-patients-bill-of-rights  
110 As Brodwin described in his work on a community-based Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) 
program for the mentally ill, providers can and often do exert control that they sometimes find ethically 
problematic, such as influencing where people live, whether they do drugs or associate with people who 
will take advantage of them, how they spend their money, and whether they take their medication by 
altering the method in which it is proscribed and delivered.   
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PACE providers have such a steadfast commitment to acknowledging participant’s “right to 
make bad decisions.”  
 Whether patients are cast as consumers or citizens, the logic of choice is about the 
decisions that they are able to make. Counter to Mol, several anthropologists have focused on the 
ways in which health care policy and insurance paradigms have increasingly shifted the 
responsibility for managing their own health care to patients under the pretense of choice 
(Craven 2007, Maskovsky 2000, Mulligan 2014). Such analyses have argued that it is a 
neoliberal strategy to require patients to become consumers in a market, limiting the role of 
government by instead positioning free enterprise to control costs as patient-consumers choose 
the private health plans that they want based on what they offer, even for those on public 
insurance. As discussed in previous chapters, state governments have increasingly subcontracted 
private insurance companies to serve Medicaid and Medicare patients through managed care 
plans. For the elderly in particular, Medicare coverage is offered in lettered options covering 
different services, and bundled into a variety of plans which patients must choose from111. The 
PACE program I observed, like all PACE programs, is yet another private company 
subcontracted by CMS to manage insurance. By enrolling, participants have chosen a Medicare 
program that limits their choice of provider to those that are part of or partnered with PACE. 
They are no longer able to independently shop around.  
 
111 So-called “Original Medicare” is comprised of Parts A and B, which pertain to Hospital and Medical 
Insurance respectively, much like the distinction between the Blue Cross and Blue Shield before they 
were merged. These include a deductible and coinsurance. Medicare Part C, “Medicare Advantage,” 
includes Parts A and B but is managed by a private insurer. Part C requires payment of monthly 
premiums, but is also more likely to cover more than Traditional Medicare, such as vision, hearing, and 
dental. Part D covers prescriptions and biologicals, or laboratory tests. Then there are alternative options 
with more limited eligibility, such as PACE. Medicare Health Plans include: Health Care Prepayment 
Plans, Medicare Cost Plans, Medigap Supplemental insurance, Medical Savings Account, Private Fee-
For-Service Plans, PACE, Regional Preferred Provider Organizations, and Special Needs Plans. 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare 
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Concern with the cost of care is not the same as the logic of choice. Though the providers 
make care decisions on the basis of each participant’s health needs and personal goals of care, 
they also must keep constant attention to the fact that they are also insurers in a capitated 
program. The logic of costs is the way that providers come to focus on care through a budgetary 
lens. This occurs when health care financing models involve the providers themselves in 
determining reimbursement rates, either directly or indirectly. Scholars such as Jessica Mulligan 
have examined the ethical concerns that arise when primary care providers (PCP) receive 
monthly capitated payments from a managed care insurance company for each patient: 
This transfers risk to the level of the physician. The idea is that physicians will 
spend more time managing their patient population and promoting preventive care 
if they have a financial stake in the outcome. Under this system, physicians have 
money deducted from their capitation for referring patients to specialists or 
prescribing medications. The predictable result is that the system incentivizes 
rationing care: the fewer referrals and prescriptions that a PCP provides, the 
higher his or her monthly payout (2014, 49-50) 
This dynamic also engendered a logic of costs, incentivizing health care providers to balance 
financial concerns in a way that shapes the content of the care that they provide. This logic is not 
restricted to capitated models. The use of patient satisfaction surveys as a metric of care quality 
has influenced provider reimbursement since they were introduced to hospitals by the private 
company Press Ganey in the 1980s, culminating most recently in their use by CMS. These have 
greatly influenced the behavior of health care providers counseled to improve satisfaction scores, 
as many were trained in customer service tactics and required to implement hourly rounding on 
patient rooms regardless of clinical need and provider work load, and the use of scripts when 
interacting with patients112. The fee-for-service model of reimbursement also activated the logic 
 
112 Boerner, Heather, and Lucia Hwang. 2010 Losing Our Voice. October 2010. National Nurse: 20-24  
National Nurse United. 2010. Scripting and Rounding: Impact of the Corporate Care Model on RN 
Autonomy and Patient Advocacy. October 2010. National Nurse 12-27.  
 
 187 
of costs, as it incentivized providers to order more diagnostic tests and other health services than 
they might otherwise consider necessary or relevant. The logic of costs in U.S. health care can be 
traced back through time, from controlling the length of hospital stay in the 1980s influencing 
physician discharge recommendations (Stevens 1989), to early forms of private insurance in the 
late 19th century in which doctors were directly hired by companies to keep employees well 
enough to work (Starr 1982). As long as there have been policies influencing reimbursement, 
health care providers have been cultivating a logic of costs.  
The novelty of PACE is that it serves as both the insurer and all providers. They receive 
the same amount each month from CMS, but it is to cover the cost of a group of participants, not 
each individual patient. In the PACE model, the logic requires constant return to the collective. 
They assess care at the population health level, in addition to the personalized care team 
approach acknowledged in the logic of care, composed of each participant, their relations, and 
their health care providers. PACE providers consider the cost of care decisions, and assess them 
in relation to potential benefit for others. They come to define health care spending as relational, 
and to define themselves as arbiters of the care-cost dynamic. 
 
Stewardship 
The frustration is palpable one Thursday afternoon during a Participants At Risk (PAR) 
meeting. IDT members sit at the meeting room’s center tables, flanked by a ring of home care 
CNAs who come to the center specifically for this meeting once a week. The conversation has 
turned to Ethel, a participant who has been bullying her home care support staff, CNA Camila 
and RN Marilyn. “Her home is really smelly and just covered in cat poop,” Camila complains. 
Alison, leading the meeting, asks if it is “Board of Health bad” and Marilyn asserts that it is not 
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at that level but will be soon. “The problem is that she either can’t or won’t clean the litter box” 
the social worker Christine explains, and Camila retorts that she can’t afford litter because she 
spends all of her modest fixed income on take out. Christine ignores this and continues to explain 
that she would like Ethel to come into the Day Center more, and that she should move to an 
assisted living facility, but hasn’t managed to get organized enough for the transition. “Also, her 
only friend is hospitalized,” Christine adds sympathetically. “She complains that we don’t do 
anything for her, but she can’t say what she actually needs,” Marilyn vents. Alison reminds them 
that the participant has a brain injury, which could impair her communication skills. Camila says 
that Ethel has asked her to purchase alcohol for her, and that she told her she is not allowed to. 
“Is that the policy?” someone asks, and the CNAs begin to debate what they have been told and 
have been telling their assigned participants. “One discussion please,” Christine says loudly, and 
returns the conversation to Ethel’s cat. “No homecare does pets,” Andrea, the RN who serves as 
manager to the home care staff, says flatly. “But we are PACE,” Alison simply responds. “Is it 
medically necessary?” Andrea asks, and Alison immediately asserts that it does not need to be 
medical to be a PACE strategy. The clinic manager Cindy taps at her laptop and then announces 
that disposable cat boxes sell for between five and fifteen dollars online. “I have a hard enough 
time keeping her lights on,” Christine sighs. Alison notes that they have not made a decision but 
they need to move on. “We are just solving problems left and right,” Dr. Sarah jokes to cut the 
tension. 
In the IDT meeting the next morning, Alison addresses the heated discussion. “We are all 
stewards of our departments,” she says, “When I cut you off, that's my job. When Andrea says 
that requires homecare, she's doing her job. We react when rehab asks for thousands of dollars 
on a ramp,” she says, referencing the physical and occupational therapists. Then she asks for an 
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estimate of home care costs. “The annual cost is thousands of dollars,” Ted responds from the 
back of the room, “Between twelve and fifteen.” Alison’s point in this comparison is that IDT 
members are quick to recommend additional home care hours and tasks, assuming it is 
inexpensive and eager to offer participants as much support as they can, contrary to the way they 
react to supports that they know are higher cost but that are not offered to as many participants. 
“Your budget is important because that's your income,” Savannah, a visiting consultant that the 
program keeps on retainer chimes in. “You all need to keep spending in mind. We are all worried 
about our people, and we bring our emotions to the table. But if you could bring it to your 
discipline, what a difference.” Ted only sits in on these meetings once a week, as a CMS 
measure to prevent cost concerns from unduly influencing care decisions. He interjects again to 
summarize with one of the analogies he frequently recites like a mantra from the back of the 
room: “if you’re going to Disney world, maybe you don't go out to dinner. You have a 
checkbook, spend it wisely.” 
The logic of costs is illustrated in this exchange as program spending become entangled 
with the provision of care. IDT and the broader PACE team inclusive of CNAs debated this 
woman’s cat litter box because it was a potential risk to her ability to remain living safely in her 
home. If the home became dirty enough, posing a Board of Health risk, she could be evicted and 
institutionalized. The home care manager resisted the idea of adding litter cleaning to the CNA’s 
list of tasks for this participant both because it would require additional in home care time, and 
due to the indignity of a unsanitary task that is not typically allowed let alone required by other 
home care agencies. However the task was eventually agreed upon by IDT and added to the 
participant’s care plan, because it was deemed an acceptable program cost to keep the participant 
safe in her home. But adding in home hours for a participant is not easy, as it requires either 
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redistributing time from another participant, increasing weekly hours (and therefore payment) to 
an existing CNA’s schedule, or if there is enough added hours throughout the program, hiring 
additional staff to accommodate the increased demand. Often before this occurs PACE has to 
contract with an outside home care agency to fulfill their scheduled home care needs, which 
costs the program more money than it would to use their own staff.  
The term “steward” by PACE leadership reflects the Catholic hospital system with which 
the program is affiliated. “Stewardship” is one of Saint Catherines’ “core values,” first set by the 
Sisters religious who founded the system, and then adapted over time through decades of largely 
secular management. A statement on their website noted that they are “ever mindful of the need 
to carefully steward our financial resources for the greatest patient care impact.” Multiple 
sources from the national Catholic Health Association, cited the importance of, “careful 
stewardship of declining resources.” The Bible parables Saint Catherine’s staff reference during 
staff leadership trainings, about the Unjust Steward and the Talents, center on wisely investing 
and soliciting owed funds, reinforcing that responsibly managing the health system’s spending 
was “mission critical.” In this system, beginning to “think like an insurance company” was recast 
as a critical part of providing care, as it enabled its future continuation. Stewardship in this vein 
is not just about the immediate costs, but projecting the consequences of care-related spending 
forward. Just as the providers from the Health Care for the Homeless program were made 
responsible for the continued funding of their clinic through data collection and reporting as a 
result of how their grant funding was structured, PACE’s capitation reimbursement and control 
over the use of Medicare and Medicaid dollars charged their decisions at the level of their entire 
participant census. IDT providers learn to make decisions guided by the knowledge that what 
they give to one participant might take a different form of needed care away from another.  
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The cat litter debate is also an example of how the logic of costs is reinforced with IDT 
members through the limited but strategically placed reminders of their obligation not to 
overspend. The social worker Christine alluded to this process as learning,  
to think like an insurance company… they want us to tighten our reigns a little bit. 
So sure, you can have a ramp, but can the family afford to defray some of the cost 
of that? You need to blow out this wall to make this, that happen. What can the 
family do? You’ll see if Ted sits in on some of those meetings, he gets very 
anxious and nervous about how we spend our money sometimes, and he’ll say it, 
you can spend it, just know that once you spend it, you spend it, it’s gone. And 
he’ll say that every once in a while when we’re deliberating about a big ticket 
item. So then we all go [deep intake of breath], you know? [laughs] Okay, let’s 
rethink this again and again, and look at it. It’s powerful and it’s really different to 
be, to say you’re an insurance company because that’s been my struggle my 
whole career, is the money part. 
The IDT team has indeed learned to think like an insurance company. Without adopting the same 
language, what Christine describes at the start of this quote is called “cost sharing” in insurance. 
Anthropologists have examined the ways in which it is used to give the appearance of program 
efficiency by making unpaid patients and family members more responsible for care tasks that 
would have historically been done by professionals, such as allowing shorter hospital stays 
resulting in more recovery and care tasks at home (Mulligan 2015). As the occupational 
therapist, Amy is often the person who ends up having cost sharing conversations with families, 
and she hates it. Despite pressure from the rest of the IDT members, and more general urgings to 
limit spending from Ted, she struggles with “how to actually basically tell people how much 
something will cost, see if they can afford it, and then if they can’t, we end up paying for it 
anyway. And I have just chosen because of who I am to just say we will pay for this.” Since 
ramps are one of the most expensive items that PACE pays for, Amy’s reluctance to attempt 
cost-sharing frustrates other members of the team. The IDT decision to require Howard to help 
pay for his second mobility scooter repair at the start of this chapter is another example of cost 
sharing, but also reflects a principle of insurance company logics that appears in some of the IDT 
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discussions called moral hazard. Moral hazard is essentially the belief that providing coverage 
encourages patients to over-utilize health care resources, and that the only way to temper this is 
to increase the cost to them in some way (Fletcher 2016). Participants who frequently seek 
hospitalizations that are deemed unnecessary by IDT are sometimes asked to begin paying co-
payments on these visits to discourage the behavior. Though CMS disallows standardized cost 
sharing measures in PACE programs, they are allowed to use insurance tools like co-payments to 
disincentive care and service seeking.  
 PACE providers temper their anxieties over rationing care through another component of 
the logic of costs: they have to believe that the model of care simultaneously provides better care 
and saves money in the long run. Several staff members joked to me in individual interviews 
about “drinking the kool-aid” and becoming strong advocates of the program model, but 
believing in the model was essential. In addition to being financially at risk in the capitated 
program, Dr. Sarah explained the ethical risk in balancing the roles of payer and provider:  
that can be an ethically complicated position to be in, because you’re both giving 
services and paying for services, so somebody might say your incentive is to 
provide less services, because it costs more, and you’re trying to save money. You 
know, I think if the team is very clear that their number one commitment is to 
provide good care it will cost less, but that it… has to be a very conscientious 
focus of the team, and I think it’s another reason we’re regulated so highly, and 
get audited so intensively. And I think it’s appropriate because I think it’s not an 
easy thing to do that. You can certainly feel the tug of oh god, I don’t want to, 
that’s going cost us like thousands and thousands and thousands of dollars. But 
it’s the right thing to do. And then you just shrug your shoulders and say it’s the 
right thing to do. But you have to really, you have to believe that. And you have 
to believe it leads to better care, which I think it does. Like if you do the 
preventative stuff it does lead to better care, and decreased overall long-term 
costs. 
The program staff make an effort to mitigate this ethical dilemma by somehow knowing little 
enough of costs that it is not the main focus, yet enough of the costs that they consider the cost-
effectiveness of their care strategies carefully before committing to one. Once they all learned 
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the cost of adding ramps to participants homes, it became the care plan option that incited the 
most anxiety whenever it was mentioned, but IDT frequently makes that decision and pays for 
participant ramps regardless. The providers retain a dramatic amount of authority in how the 
capitated funding is spent, and every day care decision making requires the ability to pivot 
between costs and care without becoming mired in the anxieties of their assumed financial risk. 
Dr. Sarah’s approval of the intensive auditing and regulations belies the difficulty of this 
balance. In addition to buying into the model, providers must consistently demonstrate that they 
are abiding by it. When she leads the weekly Morbidity and Mortality meetings (M&M), Dr. 
Sarah recites questions to IDT from a standard CMS form for unexpected hospitalizations. The 
team has to document hospital admissions because they are costly, and with the elderly, can 
expose them to hospital-acquired illnesses or result in transfer to additionally expensive nursing 
home care. Hospitalization also potentially demonstrates a failure to provide adequate preventive 
and maintenance care within the program. The CMS form is therefore a defense and an 
obligation to confirm a plan to prevent future unnecessary hospitalizations. These frequently 
involve explaining to participants again that PACE is their insurer and that they are supposed to 
call the clinic for an assessment before going to the hospital, and providing additional mental 
health support so misreading symptoms does not lead to panic attacks and 911 calls. Saving 
money, or at least spending it “wisely,” is often deemed synonymous with providing the right 
kind of care.  
 
Right to Make Bad Decisions: Risk and Responsibility 
Financial risk is compounded by the fact that the PACE model makes providers 
responsible for other forms of risk as well. Risks to participant safety that are the norm in the 
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community-based model, as recounted above, would be deemed unacceptable and even negligent 
in traditional nursing home settings. One of the radical premises in the PACE model is that 
participants should be supported in living their lives as safely and healthfully as possible, 
regardless of the activities they choose to engage in. However, when patients are vulnerable and 
more at risk for disease, injury, or decline, abiding by their decisions can make care planning 
more difficult for providers who seek to balance patient health, autonomy, and costs.  
Institutional eldercare in the U.S. has historically been risk averse, the main objective 
being to prevent patients from incurring bodily harm. In old age, this often entails mitigating the 
failings of an elderly person’s own body, in particular the increased likelihood of falls that can 
result in serious injury. This risk averse culture is also embedded in a litigious medical 
environment in which policies are as often designed to protect providers from lawsuits as they 
are to safeguard patients. Just a few decades ago, residents in nursing homes were routinely tied 
to their beds and wheelchairs to prevent falls. The routine use of restraints on the elderly was 
banned in 1989 by the agency now known as the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
and reinforced the next year in the Patient Self Determination Act. This shift was driven not just 
by an increase in clinical evidence that such precautions actually increased the risk of injuries, 
like fractures and pressure sores, but also an increase in lawsuits in which patients were injured 
or even killed as a result of their restraints. Ellen, the physical therapist at the PACE program, 
described the beginning of her career in the 1980s as “untying people and letting them up.” 
While not directly tied down, mobility in nursing homes remains limited, as evidenced by the 
preponderance of wheelchair-bound residents.  
At PACE, on the other hand, falling is seen as inevitable as people age, and the clash with 
nursing home norms is evident. The social worker Christine described an argument with a 
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nursing home rehab about discharging a patient they said was non-compliant because he insisted 
on walking unassisted, whose fall rate PACE had reduced from 7 to 3 times a week. She told 
them, “he’s falling less, he has a better quality of life, we’re going to take him home. And they 
totally freak out. Because if we weren’t involved, they would say you need 24-hour care and 
that’s how people end up staying in nursing homes.” Another participant refused to use a walker 
when she transitioned from her own home to an Assisted Living Facility, telling the staff, “I 
know how to fall!” in frustration. The facility petitioned PACE, insisting that the participant was 
unsafe walking unassisted, but they reminded the facility staff that it was the participant’s 
decision unless she was deemed incompetent. “People have a hard time watching falls,” Dr. 
Sarah explained, “but it's part of the disease process.” Providers at PACE recalibrate the balance 
of patient risk with the patient’s definition of a quality life every day.  
 My use of “the right to make bad decisions” is far from the cooptation of a phrase used 
once, or by just one particular PACE provider. The concept was activated on a daily basis, by all 
of the members of IDT, and reinforced with all other staff. One day it was invoked for one 
participant who wanted to go to a large regional fair and collect cans in the hot sun after just 
being discharged from the hospital, and another who insisted on cooking while drunk. The 
providers agreed in both instances to temper their fears of dehydration and grease fires, 
respectively. The following day, it was used to describe a participant who spent all of her money 
on the Home Shopping Network, but would never agree to a money manager. “She has the right 
to make bad decisions,” Dr. Sarah mused, “then she asks, well why is no one feeding me?” The 
phrase was used as a way of centering the participant’s priorities, even when they were 
considered potentially dangerous by the team, but it also directed providers to view care options 
through the participant’s unique perspective. The path from one participant’s front door to the 
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driveway where the transit van would pick her up was so hazardous that the team recommended 
hand rails be installed. While the team was empowered to pay for the rails, and they would 
achieve the goal of keeping the woman safer in her home, the woman cried in embarrassment at 
the suggestion. Her fear that her neighbors would view her as feeble was a serious enough 
personal concern that the team contemplated not adding the rails.  
 There were times when the “bad decisions” encompassed much more dire potentialities 
than falls or cooking fires. During a Participant at Risk (PAR) meeting, they discussed how to 
support a patient with suicidal ideation. Her husband did not want to put alarms on the doors to 
notify them if the participant left the house. The PACE staff debated if it would be better to put 
her in a nursing home, and if being suicidal meant that she needed 24-hour care. “For someone 
who’s been suicidal for 40 years, she's done a remarkable job staying alive” Dr. Sarah said, 
“Though it’s a real risk, if she wants to be home, we should allow her to stay home.” Christine, 
the social worker, suggested framing the alarms as a structure. “People with a bad heart die of 
heart attacks,” the psychiatrist Sharon offered, “People with really bad depression sometimes die 
of suicide.” The room was tense. The Program Director Alison asked everyone to contribute after 
commenting that the team tends to be “risk-adverse.” Nurse Marilyn suggested that they ask the 
husband not leave the participant alone, and to do his errands while she is at the PACE Day 
Center. “The risk is there,” Dr. Rohini confirmed, noting that the participant herself had said that 
“the bad thing could happen.” She insisted it needed to be discussed and communicated in an 
upcoming family meeting. Sharon agreed that it was a good idea to put a plan in place “as a 
commitment to safety” but cautioned that it was not a guarantee. “She’s her own person,” Alison 
said. 
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  In many instances, such as that of Howard and the mobility scooter that opens this 
chapter, the right to make bad decisions is used to ensure costs do not take precedent over care 
needs when making purchasing decisions. However the reverse also occurred. Providers chose 
not to spend money in several instances as a result of care decisions, prioritizing the patient’s 
goals and preferences rather than acting in all instances to mitigate risk. Often preventive 
measures—such as scheduling meals on wheels to prevent drunken stove use or erecting a railing 
to limit falls in the driveway—are offered as ways to keep participants safer that do not greatly 
impede their autonomy. Because interventions such as these tend to be lower cost, they are often 
not as fiercely debated as some of the larger priced services, and they are more likely to reduce 
potential future costs such as hospitalizations and nursing home stays. And yet, despite the 
potential to save costs in the long run, and maintain patient safety, PACE providers reminded 
themselves and each other constantly that in most instances the participant was the one who 
determined which risks were acceptable. Program Director Alison once read a quote by Ram 
Dass113 as a meeting reflection114, spiritualizing the sentiment: 
When you go out into the woods and you look at trees, you see all these different 
trees. And some of them are bent, and some of them are straight, and some of 
them are evergreens, and some of them are whatever. And you look at the tree and 
you allow it. You appreciate it. You see why it is the way it is. You sort of 
understand that it didn’t get enough light, and so it turned that way. And you 
don’t get all emotional about it. You just allow it. You appreciate the tree. The 
minute you get near humans, you lose all that. And you are constantly saying 
‘You’re too this,’ or ‘I’m too this.’ That judging mind comes in. And so I practice 
turning people into trees. Which means appreciating them just the way they are.  
Though it sounds like a judgmental statement, the right to make bad decisions is actually a 
radical departure from the traditional medical concept of non-compliance. The providers often 
 
113 From a blog post on his website, titled “Ram Dass on Self Judgment,” posted January 25, 2012. 
https://www.ramdass.org/ram-dass-on-self-judgement/ 
114 Saint Catherine programs practice “reflections” at the beginning of the day, or at the beginning of 
meetings, a legacy of the prayers that were traditionally recited in the Catholic hospital system.   
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times join and even support their participants in rejecting medical advice. The phrase is used to 
resist the logic of costs, and re-center the logic of care in patient care planning and decision-
making.  
  
Conclusion: Standards Out from the Shadows 
The PACE program is designed to address frail elders needs so that they may safely 
remain living “in the community,” yet “needs” are defined much more broadly than in the 
traditional medical model. IDT, through the required inclusion of multiple departments, is 
intended to bring a variety of professional expertise to bear in planning and enacting care for 
PACE participants. Elders’ social, emotional, and mobility needs are in theory as highly 
weighted in IDT decision-making as clinical needs. However, as this chapter details, another 
essential component of the PACE model, that of capitation reimbursement and control over 
spending for their population of participants, has a significant impact on how care is 
conceptualized, and care decisions made. The logic of costs permeates provider discussions of 
care and service allocation.  
 Every step of care negotiations and decision making in PACE are subjected to detailed 
documentation practices. PACE programs are required to send routine reports of their quantified 
participant data to CMS, as well as undergo more intensive and qualitative audits in order to 
demonstrate their accountability, with the same purpose and measures discussed in Chapter 4. 
However, unlike the improvised devices and techniques that enable care in the underfunded and 
underequipped Health Care for the Homeless (HCH) program described in earlier chapters, the 
unique and sometimes strange provider actions to address patient needs are catalogued in the 
PACE Electronic Medical Record (EMR) and CMS reports. This demonstrates how closely data 
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collection is tied to reimbursement models. Where HCH providers use donations or their own 
money to provide clothing as an incentive to get patients into the clinic or spa days to improve 
pap smear rates, the government provides PACE programs with open-ended funds intended to be 
used creatively. The result of this form of capitated reimbursement is to bring the improvisation 
and flexibility that health care work often necessitates out of the shadows. PACE provides an 
example of a model of care for a more expensive patient population that both collects 
standardized health data and considers patients in the aggregate, while recognizing and acting on 
the fact that patients’ lives are not uniform, and that they cannot be compelled to conform to the 
ideals of evidence-based care. The PACE model departs from the shadow standards found 
throughout this dissertation; flexibility and creativity are visible, expected, documented, and 
reimbursed.  
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Chapter 7 | Conclusion  
 
 This dissertation has sought to weave together three threads in the provision of 
community-based care for vulnerable populations in the United States: who provides care, what 
that care consists of, and why such care is organized as it is. Each chapter has delved more 
deeply into certain elements of this tripartite dynamic in order to see up close their contours and 
causes. However, a robust and fuller picture demands a lens that brings all three together. The 
work overall lies at the axes of care and data. At that juncture, providers must structure their 
work according to borrowed business frameworks of efficiency and accountability, centering 
data as care while they innovate ways to simultaneously meet patient needs and funder demands. 
Providers navigate bureaucratic frameworks, built over time through policy changes and 
institutional restructuring, by adopting the financial rationalities that delimit the forms of care 
patients can access and the public health rationalities that determine best practices, in response to 
reported data. The persistent feminization and racialization of care work hierarchies shapes both 
how care is delivered and how data is created. In this final chapter, I will explore where these 
considerations converge, how they link to broader impacts, and where future research might 
expand their insights. 
 
Convergences  
 Data has a tremendous impact on the work that providers are able to do, and the ways in 
which they manage to aid their patients. The intensification of data requirements, with its 
accompanying labor burdens, and regardless of adequate tools or training, has exposed savvy 
health care provider teams. Their professional obligations pivoted, and so did they. In order to 
initially develop options to care for the homeless and frail elderly in community settings, they 
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had to carve space for them. Providers at the programs in discussion in these chapters, and those 
who founded the models themselves, had to demonstrate to federal insurers and grant makers 
that providing care in community contexts would save money. From the start, providers had to 
view their care through a budgetary lens, and activate a logic of costs to justify how they planned 
to care for their patients in nontraditional ways. While this can be a burden and an impediment to 
providing care in the way they would like, the providers described within this dissertation 
demonstrated that adopting a logic of costs enabled them to more effectively advocate for their 
patients.  
 The patients described in both Health Care for the Homeless (HCH) and Program for All-
Inclusive Care of the Elderly (PACE) field sites require advocates because they have been 
identified as non-compliant, as a population and often individually. People in both groups 
frequently miss their medical appointments and seek care at hospital Emergency Departments 
much more frequently than the general population. They fail to conform to the life changes 
advised by their doctors that would lower their risk of developing or worsening disease. As a 
result they often lose access to traditional clinical practices. The providers in these community-
based clinics seldom use the term “non-compliant” because they acknowledge that it is rarely 
mere willfulness that leads to medical advice going unheeded. The chaos and instability of 
homelessness, cost or availability of transportation, decline or impairment of mental faculties, 
past trauma, access to a phone, soup kitchen schedule, anxiety, and many other considerations 
can take practical precedence over a medical appointment, and can interfere with routine 
prescription adherence. The providers at HCH and PACE take pains to understand the 
motivations and barriers that shape each individual patient’s relationship with their health and 
the matrix of services to tend to it. However, even as they do, sustaining the unique models of 
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care that they are able to offer, which take the whole complicated person into account, requires 
funding.  
Funding requires data. And so providers in these contexts commit to the near-constant 
creation of data to comply with their funding requirements. But they also go further, and use the 
data to argue that their programs succeed because of their ability to be flexible to patient’s needs. 
As health care in the U.S. is increasingly designed for self-governance, in which individuals are 
responsible for maintaining their own health, seeking out care as needed, and complying with 
medical advice, populations are identified as non-compliant because they do not effectively self-
govern their own health. As a result, the health care providers who serve vulnerable populations 
are made responsible for maintaining the health of those deemed non-compliant instead. Rather 
than just a professional commitment, providers’ responsibility for their patients in these contexts 
is governed from afar. Data expectations are strongly influenced by industrial models of constant 
improvement through collecting, assessing, and acting on data at every step of production. 
Federal funders audit the performance of health care providers to ensure that they are providing 
adequate care and seeking to improve outcomes for their patients. They do this largely by 
compelling providers to report data about their patients and their own care provision.  
HCH is able to flexibly respond to their patient’s needs due to grant funding that covers 
their expenses, no longer because their patients are uninsured, but increasingly to prevent 
insurance reimbursement from determining the length of their patient visits. HCH has limited 
infrastructural support to satisfy data mandates. Spurred by the urgency of satisfying funding 
requirements and keeping their program compliant, HCH providers innovate ways to meet the 
needs of their patients and funders. Rather than mere individual and momentary innovations 
(though these also exist), providers collectively develop and adhere to their own work-around 
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solutions to deficiencies in technology (due to paywalls or machine failures), staff training, and 
required reporting formats that do not accommodate the dense context that accompanies all 
patient encounters. These shadow standards permeate the everyday data creation processes of 
HCH providers. Innovation enables care to be provided even when providers do not have 
adequate access to resources to offer their patients, such as medications or medical devices.  
Shadow standards, on the other hand, enable them to attempt to record that the care has been 
provided, because for both funding and public health reporting, care that has not been inscribed 
has not occurred. Perhaps more insidiously, when standards of care are met and successfully 
inscribed, it can mask the extraordinary difficulty providers faced in their efforts to comply, or 
the messiness and possible inaccuracy of reported data that may make patients appear to be 
doing better or worse than they are. Despite the best efforts and intentions of providers, 
inaccurate positive impressions of patient success risk communicating to funders and public 
health data aggregators that HCH patients are better able to conform to health care norms than 
they are. If patient health conditions are stabilizing or even improving under the care of HCH 
providers, who are reimbursed through insurance, the need for federal grants that enable longer 
visit times and clinical flexibility are called into question, threatening the continuation of the 
HCH model of care. 
 In PACE, the capitated funding structure and Interdisciplinary Team (IDT) control over 
how funds are spent enables providers to respond individually to participant needs. They argue 
that their care more effectively keeps participant costs low for a longer period of time, before the 
inevitable escalation in spending that typically occurs at the very end of life. Flexibility in 
spending enables them to address individual care needs and priorities. This is contrary to the 
formulaic design of nursing home services and Medicare approvals, which are uniform for the 
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sake of fairness, regardless of divergent needs. PACE providers do not require shadow standards 
because their funding model encompasses flexibility and providers themselves choose how funds 
are spent, documenting their justifications in constantly evolving care plans. However, the 
limitation of capitation and flexibility is that they are assigned a capped amount of money to pay 
for the needs of a group of participants, and must therefore gauge the benefit of each care 
decision against the potential cost. This logic of costs is activated on a daily basis during care 
planning, review of service requests, assessments of hospitalizations, and during the enrollment 
process. Stewarding the funds requires attention to how spending might limit their ability to 
provide future services to other participants. PACE providers balance the logic of costs and 
stewardship with their commitment to honoring participants’ “right to make bad decisions.” This 
radical departure from risk-aversion in traditional eldercare challenges PACE providers to put 
the preferences and perspectives of their participants before their own sense of safety, even when 
the result may result in more program spending or contradict best practices. In this way, the 
PACE model flips non-compliance on its head, as supporting patient autonomy grinds against the 
logic of costs.  
 In both contexts, HCH and PACE, it matters who authors the records. Registered Nurses 
serve as staff managers in both programs, and the holistic nursing model of tending to the whole 
patient is evident. Consistent with national trends and historical precedent, the majority of nurses 
are women, as are most of the other staff. This is not to erase the often male transport drivers and 
Executive Director in PACE, or the physicians who spend part of their work days serving at or 
directing the HCH clinic115. However, by and large, the staff remains feminized. Furthermore, 
 
115 With a few exceptions, most of the men in these settings were in positions of power and authority, 
even when they themselves were RNs, confirming the persistence of sociologist Christine Williams’ 
“glass elevator” (1992) where men working in traditionally feminized fields rise to leadership positions, 
in comparison to women hitting a glass ceiling when working in male-dominated fields.  
 205 
these women-dominated workspaces remain segmented in ways that reflect national hiring 
practices and historical prejudices that more explicitly barred Black and Hispanic women from 
entry into higher status and pay tiers of healthcare professions. Providers with higher 
professional credentials have direct influence over the production of medical records and the 
reporting of patient health data to funders and auditors. However, what they enter into patient 
records often comes to them through the lower paid and professionally subordinate case 
managers and Certified Nurse Assistants (CNAs). CNAs and case managers offer insight into the 
lives of their patients that their supervisors can choose to inscribe into the records. Though lower 
professional tiers do include white women as well, and they experience differential influence 
over decision-making, data production obligations do not affect all workers equally. In the PACE 
and HCH clinics, most of the CNAs and case managers are Puerto Rican, and unlike their white 
colleagues with whom they share a job title, they are in particular activated to assist providers in 
patient translation and collection of patient information, resulting in the interruption of their 
other responsibilities. However, even as their work enables care to be provided to and data 
collected about Spanish speaking patients, the Spanish language is relegated to a tool of 
information technology, and restricted to use in helping patients, rather than embraced as part of 
the workers’ identities. As a result of these dynamics, the intense data reporting requirements 
place an exceptional burden on Spanish-speaking staff in subordinate professional roles. 
Broader Impact 
 There are three central ways in which the insights within this dissertation might be more 
broadly useful or productive. The first is in exposing the ambiguity, instability, and 
improvisation of data production. As the organization and funding of health care in the U.S. (and 
around the world) are increasingly data-driven, it is essential to complicate narratives that assert 
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that data will cure the disfunctions that result in health disparities, higher morbidity, lower ages 
of mortality, and high costs. It is important to interrogate how data is created, question the 
process, what gets included and excluded, but also its fault lines, where it fails, where the actual 
process of producing it becomes an impediment, and how data is produced regardless and in 
ways that may not conform to official protocols. This becomes possible by observing the site of 
actual data production, in workplaces by those who serve as mid-level bureaucrats, not just those 
who design the metrics. Furthermore data is not limited to health care, and providers are far from 
the only ones who create it. Intensified data requirements reach across many industries, 
governments, and contexts, all of which require scrutiny.  
 Secondly, care is contextual. Particularly in the context of professionalized caring 
professions, what it means to provide care to another person is dynamic and dependent on what it 
takes to attend to their well-being. Activating a logic of costs or producing data as a way of 
enacting care demonstrated discursive shifts in the work of health care providers in my field 
sites. It has been well-documented how providers such as nurses might experience bureaucratic 
tasks like data collection or consideration of funding to be an interruption to the care they 
provide. Yet providers themselves identified how attention to costs and data not only enable 
them to engage in the activities that are typically conjured in discussions of care, but that these 
bureaucratic tasks are how they care for their patients. Scholars of care, particularly in relation to 
health care, have recognized the role of technologies. If a caregiver administers insulin in a shot 
in order to stabilize a patient’s blood sugar, the act of injection is encompassed in the care. 
Granted, the time frame is greater between engaging paperwork technologies, and the benefit to 
the patient through continued access to health care providers through sustained clinical funding. 
Allowing flexibility in order to honor local definitions does not render care useless as an 
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analytic, any more than recognizing and validating the myriad ways in which people define their 
families necessitated giving up on kinship. On the contrary, concepts like kinship and care are 
more vibrant and accurate when they remain acquiescent to redefinition by our interlocuters, 
even if it means sacrificing structural tidiness.   
 Finally, racialized workplace segmentation persists and is reinforced in new contexts. 
There have been efforts to democratize and equalize traditionally hierarchical professional 
dynamics, especially in but not limited to community health care contexts. Where physicians 
may have commonly made decisions about patient treatment independently or in groups of their 
peers, team-based models that purportedly value the insights and contributions of all staff, such 
as those common in gendered professional dynamics such as nursing, have proliferated. There 
are benefits to this shift, however when the relationship between staff members is organized and 
described as equitable, it can become harder to identify and name where disparities persist. When 
White members of management in particular identify with anti-racist ideals and aims, it can be 
challenging for them to recognize how their own workplaces are structured in a way that 
reinforces white privilege. As a result, it is vital to look beyond posted policies and protocols to 
the everyday treatment of different staff members, and the uneven allocation of responsibility 
and influence, even when everyone appears to be “playing nice in the sandbox.”116  
 
Future Research 
 There are two issues within community health in the U.S. that could enhance the analyses 
presented in this dissertation with more time and research: community benefit and social 
 
116 This phrase, introduced in Chapter 3, explains why the ritual in which HCH staff members praise each 
other and display appreciation for assistance and hard work at the beginning of their staff meetings is 
called “Sandbox,” even on official minutes, and used as a verb. 
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determinants of health. The field sites discussed within this dissertation, programs for vulnerable 
populations located in community settings, were both the product of a hospital system that I have 
called Saint Catherine’s. Though I have discussed the evolution of their data collection and 
reporting processes, linked as they are to state and federal funding requirements, I have done so 
at the level of the programs themselves. However, the hospital has been and remains the 
backbone of many such programs. There was a considerable impact of new regulations from the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) on hospital Community Benefit programs. Historically these 
programs could be seldom more than an accountant who calculated a dollar amount representing 
how much a non-profit hospital spent each year to benefit residents in their service area, and 
reported it in an annual tax schedule form in return for tax-exemption. Vaguely defined, this 
form often tallied the cost of Medicare and Medicaid shortfalls, uncompensated care, charity 
care, capital investments, medical residencies, clinical research, and community donations or 
sponsorships.  
In order to maintain tax-exempt status, for the first time the ACA mandated all non-profit 
hospitals demonstrate that they deserve tax-exemption with more than a tally of categorical 
spending. Beginning in 2013, all non-profit hospitals have had to additionally produce and make 
available a Community Health Needs Assessment (CHNA) every three years that compiles and 
assesses data about the hospital’s service area populations, and then identify the health needs that 
are most pressing in that local region. This report is supposed to then inform and direct a 
Community Health Impact Plan, in which the hospital identifies a smaller number of priorities, 
and develops an action plan to intervene and improve that facet of the community’s health. The 
following CHNA would then recount the hospital’s successes or failures in achieving these 
goals. Though the proliferation of community-level data for these reports has occurred three 
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times already over the past decade, the act of completing the report and posting it to the 
hospital’s website has not made it clear what the impact will be. One possibility is that it will call 
the non-profit hospital tax exemption into question altogether, as data reveals vast discrepancies 
in how hospitals define and implement community investment.  
 One of the central ways that hospitals have assessed community health needs, in addition 
to compiling statistical prevalence of particular diseases, is by turning their attention to social 
determinants of health, the structural, social, and environmental elements that shape risk for 
disease and access to healthful opportunities. This framework is also activated to better address 
patient needs when designing new programs for vulnerable populations and “superusers”117, 
especially in response to new Pay for Performance models of reimbursement. Furthermore, 
attention to social determinants of health in this era of reform enables anthropologists to 
critically engage with health providers to improve health systems for vulnerable populations, and 
work life for community providers. Anthropologists need to track the important ways that “social 
determinants” might conceal or prevent a structural analysis of health, the promise of this 
approach, and the way it potentially masks larger issues like structural racism with more 
palatable stopgaps. 
  
 
117 People who are seen as overutilizing and inappropriately accessing health care services. See Chapter 1 
for a discussion. 
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